# US 2024/0205027 A1 · System and method for authenticating and authorizing devices

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- Number: US 2024/0205027 A1
- Document ID: US20240205027A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/406,758
- Filed: 2024-01-08
- Published: 2024-06-20
- Earliest claimed: 2016-10-27
- Assignees: Denso Corporation
- Applicants: Denso Corporation
- Inventors: Eric John Smith; Raymond Michael Stitt; David Stuckless Meyer; Brian Ensink
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20240205027A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- G06F 21/33: using certificates
- G06F 21/44: Program or device authentication
- G06F 21/572: {Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]}
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3213: {using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos (network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807)}
- H04L 9/3234: {involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853)}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)}
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L 63/0869: {for achieving mutual authentication (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273)}
- H04W 4/80: Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
- H04W 12/06: Authentication
- H04W 12/069: using certificates or pre-shared keys
- H04W 12/08: Access security
- H04W 76/10: Connection setup
- B60R 25/24: using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
- G07C 9/00309: {operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks}
- G07C 2209/63: Comprising locating means for detecting the position of the data carrier, i.e. within the vehicle or within a certain distance from the vehicle
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- B60R: VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G07C: TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE

## Abstract

A system and method for a distributed security model that may be used to achieve one or more of the following: authenticate system components; securely transport messages between system components; establish a secure communications channel over a constrained link; authenticate message content; authorize actions; and distribute authorizations and configuration data amongst users' system components in a device-as-a-key system.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system for communicating from a first device to a vehicle device disposed on a vehicle, the system comprising:
the first device configured to:
store, in memory, an asymmetric key pair including a first device private key and a first device public key;
transmit the first device public key to the vehicle device;
at least one of encrypt and sign a vehicle request with the first device private key;
transmit an encrypted form of the vehicle request; and
the vehicle device configured to at least one of decrypt the encrypted form of the vehicle request, the vehicle device configured to determine, using the first device public key, at least one of authentication and authorization of the first device based on at least one of decryption of the encrypted form of the vehicle request.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein the vehicle request is received from the vehicle.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein the vehicle request is generated by the first device.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein the first device is configured to obtain a signature from a second device, wherein the signature is based on the first device public key and a trusted private key.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The system of claim 4 wherein the vehicle device is configured to validate the first device public key based on a trusted public key, wherein the trusted public key and the trusted private key define an asymmetric key pair.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5 wherein the trusted public key is a second device public key and the trusted private key is a second device private key, and wherein the second device public key is signed by a trusted source.

### Claim 7 (depends on 4)

The system of claim 4 wherein the first device public key is transmitted to the second device as part of an approval request to obtain a right associated with the vehicle device.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The system of claim 7 wherein the second device is authorized to grant the right associated with the vehicle device.

### Claim 9 (depends on 7)

The system of claim 7 wherein a user of the second device is presented with an approval prompt in response to receipt of the approval request.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9 wherein the second device is configured to generate a signature of the first device public key with the trusted private key, based on an approval response from the user via the approval prompt.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9 wherein the second device is operable to transmit the approval request to a network-connected device, wherein the network-connected device stores the trusted private key and is operable to generate the signature of the first device public key with the trusted private key.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11 wherein the network-connected device is operable to authenticate approval by the user of the approval request by two-factor authentication with respect to the user and the approval request.

### Claim 13

A device operable to transmit, to a vehicle device disposed on a vehicle, at least one of an encrypted form of a vehicle request, the device comprising:
a communication interface operable to communicate wirelessly with the vehicle device;
memory configured to store an asymmetric key pair including a device private key and a device public key;
a controller configured to establish communication via the communication interface with the vehicle device, the controller operable to transmit the device public key to the vehicle device;
the controller configured to encrypt the vehicle request with the device private key to yield the encrypted form of the vehicle request, the controller operable to transmit, to the vehicle device, the encrypted form of the vehicle request; and
whereby the vehicle device is operable to determine at least one of authentication and authorization of the device based on at least decryption of the encrypted form of the vehicle request.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The device of claim 13 wherein the communication interface is operable to communicate wirelessly with the vehicle device and a trusted device, and wherein the controller is operable to receive a signature from the trusted device, wherein the signature is based on the device public key and a trusted private key.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The device of claim 14 wherein the vehicle device is configured to validate the signature based on a trusted public key, wherein the trusted public key and the trusted private key define an asymmetric key pair.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The device of claim 15 wherein the trusted public key is a second device public key and the trusted private key is a second device private key, and wherein the second device public key is signed by a trusted source.

### Claim 17 (depends on 14)

The device of claim 14 wherein the device public key is transmitted to the trusted device as part of an approval request to obtain a right associated with the vehicle device.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The device of claim 17 wherein the trusted device is authorized to grant the right associated with the vehicle device.

### Claim 19 (depends on 17)

The device of claim 17 wherein a user of the trusted device is presented with an approval prompt in response to receipt of the approval request.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The device of claim 19 wherein the trusted device is configured to sign the device public key with the trusted private key to yield the signature, based on an approval response from the user via the approval prompt.

### Claim 21 (depends on 19)

The device of claim 19 wherein the trusted device is operable to transmit the approval request to a network-connected device, wherein the network-connected device stores the trusted private key and is operable to sign the device public key with the trusted private key to yield the signature.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The device of claim 21 wherein the network-connected device is operable to authenticate approval by the user of the approval request by two-factor authentication with respect to the user and the approval request.

### Claim 23

A method of communicating information from a first device to a vehicle device disposed on a vehicle, the method comprising:
storing, in memory, an asymmetric key pair including a first device private key and a first device public key;
transmitting the first device public key to the vehicle device;
at least one of encrypting a vehicle request with the first device private key;
transmitting, to the vehicle device, at least one of an encrypted form of the vehicle request;
in the vehicle device, at least one of 1) decrypting the encrypted form of the vehicle request; and
determining at least one of authorization and authentication of the first device based on at least one of decryption of the encrypted form.

### Claim 24 (depends on 23)

The method of claim 23 comprising obtaining a signature from a second device, wherein the signature is based on the first device public key and a trusted private key.

### Claim 25 (depends on 24)

The method of claim 24 comprising obtaining approval from a user via the second device for signing the first device public key with the trusted private key.
