# US 2024/0202313 A1 · Implementing secure maintenance including secure debug

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- Number: US 2024/0202313 A1
- Document ID: US20240202313A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/084,196
- Filed: 2022-12-19
- Published: 2024-06-20
- Earliest claimed: 2022-12-19
- Assignees: Cisco Technology, Inc.
- Applicants: Cisco Technology, Inc.
- Inventors: Chandan Singh; Ofer Licht; Chirag Shroff; Srinivas Kothapally
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20240202313A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/52: during program execution, e.g. stack integrity {; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow}
- G06F 21/44: Program or device authentication
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- G06F 2221/033: Test or assess software
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Techniques and architecture are described to control a debug port access employing the debug image signed offline by a challenge/response mechanism, where the signed image itself is tied to an ECID of a chip together with debug lifecycle information coming from fuses and a hash of a loader being debugged. All these inputs form a nonce (the debug image) that ties the debug image to the hardware being debugged and is restricted to the current debug lifecycle. The cryptographically signed debug image is authenticated by a boot image (or the chip) with a public key in the debug image. The debug image may be expanded to secure maintenance using a secure maintenance blob or “firmware maintenance certificate or nonce.” The secure maintenance blob also includes a natural attribute list of low-level features to be enabled upon verification of the secure maintenance blob.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
creating, by a control entity, a secure maintenance challenge comprising a unique identification (ID) of a chip of an electronic device;
providing, to a signing entity by the control entity, the secure maintenance challenge;
signing, by the signing entity, the secure maintenance challenge to provide a response comprising the secure maintenance challenge and a signature;
providing, to the control entity by the signing entity, the response;
based at least in part on the response, creating, by the control entity, a secure maintenance image comprising the secure maintenance challenge and the signature;
providing, by the control entity, the secure maintenance image to a non-volatile memory of the chip;
during a boot process of the electronic device, authenticating, by a boot image, the secure maintenance image; and
based at least in part on authenticating the secure maintenance image, enabling, by the chip, a feature of the chip.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the chip comprises a system-on-chip (SoC) and enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
enabling debugging of one or more processors of the SoC.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
programming of fuses.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein programming of fuses comprises:
programming of lifecycle fuses.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip comprises:
enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip for debugging of a next stage boot image located on the non-volatile memory.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein authenticating, by the boot image, the secure maintenance image comprises:
authenticating an exclusive chip ID (ECID) of the chip;
authenticating a hash of a loader; and
authenticating debug lifecycles within the secure maintenance image.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
based at least in part on a delay within the secure maintenance image, delaying loading, by the firmware executing from read-only memory (ROM) on the chip, a boot code.

### Claim 9

A system comprising:
one or more processors; and
one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform actions comprising:
creating, by a control entity, a secure maintenance challenge comprising a unique identification (ID) of a chip of an electronic device;
providing, to a signing entity by the control entity, the secure maintenance challenge:
signing, by the signing entity, the secure maintenance challenge to provide a response comprising the secure maintenance challenge and a signature;
providing, to the control entity by the signing entity, the response:
based at least in part on the response, creating, by the control entity, a secure maintenance image comprising the secure maintenance challenge and the signature;
providing, by the control entity, the secure maintenance image to a non-volatile memory of the chip;
during a boot process of the electronic device, authenticating, by a boot image, the secure maintenance image; and
based at least in part on authenticating the secure maintenance image, enabling, by the chip, a feature of the chip.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9, wherein the chip comprises a system-on-chip (SoC) and enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
enabling debugging of one or more processors of the SoC.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9, wherein enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
programming of fuses.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein programming of fuses comprises:
programming of lifecycle fuses.

### Claim 13 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9, wherein enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip comprises:
enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip for debugging of a next stage boot image located on the non-volatile memory.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The system of claim 14, wherein authenticating, by the boot image, the secure maintenance image comprises:
authenticating an exclusive chip ID (ECID) of the chip;
authenticating a hash of a loader; and
authenticating debug lifecycles within the secure maintenance image.

### Claim 16 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9, wherein the actions further comprise:
based at least in part on a delay within the secure maintenance image, delaying loading, by the firmware executing from read-only memory (ROM) on the chip, a boot code.

### Claim 17

One or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform actions comprising:
creating, by a control entity, a secure maintenance challenge comprising a unique identification (ID) of a chip of an electronic device;
providing, to a signing entity by the control entity, the secure maintenance challenge;
signing, by the signing entity, the secure maintenance challenge to provide a response comprising the secure maintenance challenge and a signature;
providing, to the control entity by the signing entity, the response;
based at least in part on the response, creating, by the control entity, a secure maintenance image comprising the secure maintenance challenge and the signature;
providing, by the control entity, the secure maintenance image to a non-volatile memory of the chip;
during a boot process of the electronic device, authenticating, by a boot image, the secure maintenance image; and
based at least in part on authenticating the secure maintenance image, enabling, by the chip, a feature of the chip.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 17, wherein enabling the feature of the chip comprises:
enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 18, wherein enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip comprises:
enabling access to maintenance ports of the chip for debugging of a next stage boot image located on the non-volatile memory.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 19, wherein authenticating, by the boot image, the secure maintenance image comprises:
authenticating an exclusive chip ID (ECID) of the chip;
authenticating a hash of a loader; and
authenticating debug lifecycles within the secure maintenance image.
