# US 2024/0176638 A1 · Register protection for confidential computing environment

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- Number: US 2024/0176638 A1
- Document ID: US20240176638A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/071,049
- Filed: 2022-11-29
- Published: 2024-05-30
- Earliest claimed: 2022-11-29
- Assignees: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
- Applicants: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
- Inventors: David Kaplan; Jelena Ilic; Jeremy W. Powell
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20240176638A1

## CPC

- G06F 9/45558: {Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects}
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F 2009/45583: {Memory management, e.g. access or allocation}
- G06F 2009/45587: {Isolation or security of virtual machine instances}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A processing system executing a virtual machine (VM) in a confidential computing environment selectively randomizes the values of registers before the register values are encrypted to ciphertext and written to a secure region of memory upon the VM exiting execution at a processor of the processing system. When the VM later resumes executing at the processor, the processor de-randomizes the register values. By randomizing the register values, the processor obfuscates the register values from a hypervisor or physical attack, thereby protecting against side channel attacks on the encrypted ciphertext.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
in response to a virtual machine stopping execution at a processor, selectively randomizing a subset of values associated with the virtual machine;
encrypting the selectively randomized values; and
writing the encrypted selectively randomized values to registers at a secure region of memory allocated to the virtual machine.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein selectively randomizing comprises:
generating, at hardware circuitry of the processor, a nonce value comprising a pseudo-random or random value; and
hashing the nonce value with the values.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising:
encrypting the nonce value; and
storing the encrypted nonce value at a location within the secure region of memory allocated to the virtual machine.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, further comprising:
in response to the virtual machine resuming execution at the processor, reading the encrypted nonce value from the location;
decrypting the encrypted nonce value;
reading and decrypting the encrypted selectively randomized values from the registers; and
hashing the nonce value with the selectively randomized values.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
selecting for randomization values written by the virtual machine to general purpose registers and floating-point registers.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the values are guest register values associated with the virtual machine.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
initiating selectively randomizing in response to receiving an indication from the virtual machine to selectively randomize.

### Claim 8

A processor, comprising:
a processor core configured to execute a virtual machine; and
secure hardware circuitry configured to:
in response to a virtual machine stopping execution at the processor, selectively randomize values associated with the virtual machine;
encrypt the selectively randomized values; and
write the encrypted selectively randomized values to registers at a secure region of memory allocated to the virtual machine.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The processor of claim 8, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
generate a nonce value comprising a pseudo-random or random value; and
perform a first hash function on the nonce value with the values.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The processor of claim 9, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
encrypt the nonce value; and
store the encrypted nonce value at a location within the secure region of memory allocated to the virtual machine.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The processor of claim 10, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
in response to the virtual machine resuming execution at the processor, read the encrypted nonce value from the location;
decrypt the encrypted nonce value;
read and decrypt the selectively randomized values from the registers; and
perform a second hash function on the nonce value with each result of the first hash function.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The processor of claim 8, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
select for randomization values written by the virtual machine to general purpose registers and floating-point registers.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The processor of claim 8, wherein the values are guest register values associated with the virtual machine.

### Claim 14

A system, comprising:
a processor configured to execute a virtual machine;
a memory; and
secure hardware circuitry configured to:
in response to the virtual machine stopping execution at the processor, selectively randomize values associated with the virtual machine;
encrypt the selectively randomized values; and
write the encrypted selectively randomized values to registers at a secure region of memory allocated to the virtual machine.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The system of claim 14, wherein selectively randomizing comprises:
generating, at the secure hardware circuitry, a nonce value comprising a pseudo-random or random number; and
hashing the nonce value with the values of information.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The system of claim 15, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
encrypt the nonce value; and
store the encrypted nonce value at a location within the secure region of memory allocated to the virtual machine.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The system of claim 16, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
in response to the virtual machine resuming execution at the processor, read the encrypted nonce value from the location;
decrypt the encrypted nonce value;
read and decrypt the encrypted selectively randomized values at the registers; and
hash the nonce value with the selectively randomized values.

### Claim 18 (depends on 14)

The system of claim 14, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
select for randomization values written by the virtual machine to general purpose registers and floating-point registers.

### Claim 19 (depends on 14)

The system of claim 14, wherein the values are guest register values associated with the virtual machine.

### Claim 20 (depends on 14)

The system of claim 14, wherein the secure hardware circuitry is configured to:
initiate selectively randomizing in response to receiving an indication from the virtual machine to selectively randomize.
