# US 2023/0412390 A1 · Rollback protection with ephemeral identities for tee-based consensus protocols

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- Number: US 2023/0412390 A1
- Document ID: US20230412390A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/032,365
- Filed: 2020-11-23
- Published: 2023-12-21
- Earliest claimed: 2020-10-27
- Assignees: NEC Laboratories Europe GmbH
- Applicants: NEC Laboratories Europe GmbH
- Inventors: Sergey FEDOROV
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20230412390A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A rollback protection method for preventing message equivocation in a consensus system is provided. The consensus system includes distributed computational nodes connected by a network and configured to run a TEE-based consensus protocol. The method includes: executing, within a trusted execution environment of a node of distributed computational nodes, a trusted component instance, that includes volatile protected memory with protected data stored therein and a protected piece of code implementing at least a part of a consensus algorithm, generating identity data comprising a unique ephemeral identity, and storing the identity data in the volatile protected memory of the trusted component instance, and certifying a message of the consensus algorithm, wherein a certified consensus algorithm message is generated by cryptographically binding parts of the consensus algorithm message to the unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance and at least parts of the protected data of the trusted component instance.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A rollback protection method for preventing message equivocation in a consensus system, wherein the consensus system comprises a number of distributed computational nodes connected by a data communication network and configured to run a TEE (trusted execution environments-based consensus protocol, the method comprising:
executing, within a TEE of a first node of the number of distributed computational nodes, a trusted component instance, wherein the trusted component instance includes comprises volatile protected memory with protected data stored therein and a protected piece of code implementing at least a part of a consensus algorithm;
generating, by the trusted component instance, identity data comprising a unique ephemeral identity, and storing the identity data in the volatile protected memory of the trusted component instance; and
certifying, by the trusted component instance, a message of the consensus algorithm, wherein a certified consensus algorithm message is generated by cryptographically binding at least parts of the consensus algorithm message to the unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance and at least parts of the protected data of the trusted component instance.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
retrieving, by a node of the number of distributed computational nodes, the unique ephemeral identity from the trusted component instance; and
sending the retrieved identity to each of the remaining nodes of the number of distributed computational nodes.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
sending, by a node of the number of distributed computational nodes upon reception of an identity from another one of the nodes of the number of distributed computer nodes, the received identity to each of the remaining nodes of the number of distributed computational nodes.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
accepting, by a node of the number of distributed computational nodes, a received identity upon reception of a matching identity from each of the remaining nodes of the number of distributed computer nodes; and
verifying, by a node of the number of distributed computational nodes, a certified consensus algorithm message received from another one of the number of distributed computer nodes against a corresponding accepted identity.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
creating and initializing, during a node restart of a node, a new instance of the trusted component;
retrieving, by the restarted node, a new unique ephemeral identity from its volatile protected memory of a second trusted component, the new unique ephemeral identity generated by the trusted component instance and submitting the new identity as a proposal of the consensus algorithm to each of the remaining nodes of the number of distributed computer nodes;
accepting, by each of the remaining nodes, the new unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance of the restarted node once consensus on the submitted proposal is reached.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, wherein the network is a blockchain network.

### Claim 7

A node in a network configured to run a consensus algorithm to reach consensus with a number of other nodes connected by the network the node comprising one or more processors which, alone or in combination, are configured to:
execute, within a trusted execution environment (TEE) of the node a trusted component instance, wherein the trusted component instance comprises volatile protected memory with protected data stored therein and a protected piece of code implementing at least a part of a consensus algorithm;
generate, by the trusted component instance, identity data comprising a unique ephemeral identity and storing the identity data in the volatile protected memory of the trusted component instance;
certify, by the trusted component instance, a message of the consensus algorithm, wherein a certified consensus algorithm message is generated by cryptographically binding at least parts of the consensus algorithm message to the unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance and at least parts of the protected data of the trusted component instance.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, wherein the trusted component instance is configured to randomly generate the unique ephemeral identity) as a binary numeral value.

### Claim 9 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, wherein the trusted component instance is configured to generate the identity data as a new cryptographic key pair,
wherein the public key represents the unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance, and
wherein the secret key is used by the trusted component instance to produce a digital signature over at least parts of the certified consensus algorithm message.

### Claim 10 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, further configured to execute MinBFT as a consensus protocol,
wherein the node is further configured to:
maintain a counter value in the trusted component instance's volatile protected memory; and
increment the counter value and include the incremented counter value in a signed payload of the digital signature produced when certifying the binding of the certified consensus algorithm message with the unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance.

### Claim 11 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, further configured to execute FastBFT as a consensus protocol,
wherein the node is further configured to:
maintain a pair of counter value and view number value in the trusted component instance's volatile protected memory;
increment the counter value and to include the pair of incremented counter value and view number value in a signed payload of the digital signature produced when certifying the binding of the certified consensus algorithm message with the unique ephemeral identity of the trusted component instance; and
reset the counter value to an initial value on each increment of the view number value.

### Claim 12 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, further configured to perform, during a restart of a node, the following steps:
create and initialize a new instance of the trusted component;
retrieve a new unique ephemeral identity generated by the trusted component instance; and
submit the new unique ephemeral identity as a proposal of the consensus algorithm to each of the remaining nodes of the number of distributed computer nodes.

### Claim 13 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, wherein the TEE is provided by a dedicated hardware device, as a CPU feature, as OS kernel, by virtualization technology, or by application software.

### Claim 14 (depends on 7)

The node according to claim 7, further configured to utilize Intel SGX as the TEE to execute the trusted component of the consensus algorithm, wherein Intel SGX enclaves represent the trusted component instances.

### Claim 15 (depends on 7)

A consensus system with a rollback protection mechanism for preventing message equivocation, the system comprising a number of distributed computational nodes connected by a data communication network, each of the computational nodes being configured according to claim 7.
