# US 2023/0412379 A1 · Anonymous token enhancements

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- Number: US 2023/0412379 A1
- Document ID: US20230412379A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/807,756
- Filed: 2022-06-20
- Published: 2023-12-21
- Earliest claimed: 2022-06-20
- Assignees: VMware, Inc.
- Applicants: VMware, Inc.
- Inventors: Avishay YANAI
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20230412379A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/008: {involving homomorphic encryption}
- H04L 9/3213: {using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos (network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807)}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/3218: {using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 2209/42: Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

The disclosure provides an approach for anonymous access control. Embodiments include receiving, by a client device Ci of a plurality of client devices, from a server, a first table R comprising a plurality of rows. Each row R(j) of the plurality of rows corresponds to a client device Cj of the plurality of client devices. Each row R(j) comprises a public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj, a commitment cmj that is based on a token budget tj of the client device Cj and a random value rj, and a ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the random value rj using the public encryption key ekj. Embodiments include generating, by the client device Ci, based on the table R, a new table R′ comprising a new plurality of rows. Embodiments include sending R and R′ to the server in association with a request.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of anonymous access control, comprising:
receiving, by a client device Ci of a plurality of client devices, from a server, a first table R comprising a plurality of rows, wherein each row R(j) of the plurality of rows corresponds to a client device Cj of the plurality of client devices, and wherein each row R(j) comprises:
a public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj;
a commitment cmj that is based on a token budget tj of the client device Cj and a random value rj; and
a ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the random value rj using the public encryption key ekj;
generating, by the client device Ci, based on the table R, a new table R′ comprising a new plurality of rows, wherein:
each row R′(j) of the new plurality of rows except for row R′(i) corresponds to the client device Cj of the plurality of client devices, and wherein each row R′(j) except for row R′(i) comprises:
the public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj;
a new commitment cmj′ that is based on zero and a new random value rj′; and
a new ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the new random value rj′ using the public encryption key ekj; and
the row R′(i) corresponds to the client device Ci and comprises:
a public encryption key eki corresponding to the client device Ci;
an additional commitment cmi′ that is based on negative one and an additional random value ri′; and
an additional ciphertext cti that is an encryption of the additional random value ri′ using the public encryption key eki; and
sending, by the client device Ci, the table R and the new table R′ in association with a request to perform an action related to the server for use by the server in determining whether to allow the client device Ci to perform the action based on the table R and the new table R′.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising generating, by the client device Ci, a zero knowledge proof Z attesting that, for each row n in tables R and R′:
a value committed in cmn is greater by one than a corresponding value indicated by cmni′; or
a value committed in cmn is equal to a corresponding value indicated by cmn′.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising sending, by the client device Ci, the zero knowledge proof Z to the server.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the table R, the new table R′, and the zero knowledge proof Z are components of a token used by the server in determining whether to allow the client device C; to perform the action.

### Claim 5 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising decrypting, by the client device Ci, a respective ciphertext cti included in the table R using a decryption key dki that is stored by the client device Ci in order to determine a respective random value ri.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the zero knowledge proof Z is further based on the respective random value ri.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein:
each new commitment cmj′, including the additional commitment cmi′, is generated using unlinkable homomorphic commitment; and
each new ciphertext ctj′, including the additional ciphertext cti′, is generated using unlinkable homomorphic encryption.

### Claim 8

A system for anonymous access control, the system comprising:
at least one memory; and
at least one processor coupled to the at least one memory, the at least one processor and the at least one memory configured to:
receive, by a client device Ci of a plurality of client devices, from a server, a first table R comprising a plurality of rows, wherein each row R(j) of the plurality of rows corresponds to a client device Cj of the plurality of client devices, and wherein each row R(j) comprises:
a public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj;
a commitment cmj that is based on a token budget tj of the client device Cj and a random value rj; and
a ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the random value rj using the public encryption key ekj;
generate, by the client device Ci, based on the table R, a new table R′ comprising a new plurality of rows, wherein:
each row R′(j) of the new plurality of rows except for row R′(i) corresponds to the client device Cj of the plurality of client devices, and wherein each row R′(j) except for row R′(i) comprises:
the public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj;
a new commitment cmj′ that is based on zero and a new random value rj′; and
a new ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the new random value rj′ using the public encryption key ekj; and
the row R′(i) corresponds to the client device Ci and comprises:
a public encryption key eki corresponding to the client device Ci;
an additional commitment cmi′ that is based on negative one and an additional random value ri′; and
an additional ciphertext cti that is an encryption of the additional random value ri′ using the public encryption key eki; and
send, by the client device Ci, the table R and the new table R′ in association with a request to perform an action related to the server for use by the server in determining whether to allow the client device Ci to perform the action based on the table R and the new table R′.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein the at least one processor and the at least one memory are further configured to generate, by the client device Ci, a zero knowledge proof Z attesting that, for each row n in tables R and R′:
a value committed in cmn is greater by one than a corresponding value indicated by cmn′; or
a value committed in cmn is equal to a corresponding value indicated by cmn′.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9, wherein the at least one processor and the at least one memory are further configured to send, by the client device Ci, the zero knowledge proof Z to the server.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, wherein the table R, the new table R′, and the zero knowledge proof Z are components of a token used by the server in determining whether to allow the client device Ci to perform the action.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The system of claim 9, wherein the at least one processor and the at least one memory are further configured to decrypt, by the client device Ci, a respective ciphertext cti included in the table R using a decryption key dki that is stored by the client device Ci in order to determine a respective random value ri.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The system of claim 12, wherein the zero knowledge proof Z is further based on the respective random value ri.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein:
each new commitment cmj′, including the additional commitment cmi′, is generated using unlinkable homomorphic commitment; and
each new ciphertext ctj′, including the additional ciphertext cti′, is generated using unlinkable homomorphic encryption.

### Claim 15

A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to:
receive, by a client device Ci of a plurality of client devices, from a server, a first table R comprising a plurality of rows, wherein each row R(j) of the plurality of rows corresponds to a client device Cj of the plurality of client devices, and wherein each row R(j) comprises:
a public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj;
a commitment cmj that is based on a token budget tj of the client device Cj and a random value rj; and
a ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the random value rj using the public encryption key ekj;
generate, by the client device Ci, based on the table R, a new table R′ comprising a new plurality of rows, wherein:
each row R′(j) of the new plurality of rows except for row R′(i) corresponds to the client device Cj of the plurality of client devices, and wherein each row R′(j) except for row R′(i) comprises:
the public encryption key ekj corresponding to the client device Cj;
a new commitment cmj′ that is based on zero and a new random value rj′; and
a new ciphertext ctj that is an encryption of the new random value rj′ using the public encryption key ekj; and
the row R′(i) corresponds to the client device Ci and comprises:
a public encryption key eki corresponding to the client device Ci;
an additional commitment cmi′ that is based on negative one and an additional random value ri′; and
an additional ciphertext cti that is an encryption of the additional random value ri′ using the public encryption key eki; and
send, by the client device Ci, the table R and the new table R′ in association with a request to perform an action related to the server for use by the server in determining whether to allow the client device Ci to perform the action based on the table R and the new table R′.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or more processors to generate, by the client device Ci, a zero knowledge proof Z attesting that, for each row n in tables R and R′:
a value committed in cmn is greater by one than a corresponding value indicated by cmn′; or
a value committed in cmn is equal to a corresponding value indicated by cmn′.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The non-transitory computer-readable of claim 16, wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or more processors to send, by the client device Ci, the zero knowledge proof Z to the server.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The non-transitory computer-readable of claim 17, wherein the table R, the new table R′, and the zero knowledge proof Z are components of a token used by the server in determining whether to allow the client device Ci to perform the action.

### Claim 19 (depends on 16)

The non-transitory computer-readable of claim 16, wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or more processors to decrypt, by the client device Ci, a respective ciphertext cti included in the table R using a decryption key dki that is stored by the client device Ci in order to determine a respective random value ri.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The non-transitory computer-readable of claim 19, wherein the zero knowledge proof Z is further based on the respective random value ri.
