# US 2023/0362654 A1 · Malicious black hole node detection and circumvention

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- Number: US 2023/0362654 A1
- Document ID: US20230362654A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/353,772
- Filed: 2023-07-17
- Published: 2023-11-09
- Earliest claimed: 2020-09-03
- Assignees: Cisco Technology, Inc.
- Applicants: Cisco Technology, Inc.
- Inventors: Lele Zhang; Yajun Xia; Chuanwei Li; Li Zhao
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20230362654A1

## CPC

- H04W 12/122: Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
- G16Y 30/10: Security thereof
- H04L 43/0829: Packet loss
- H04L 43/16: Threshold monitoring
- H04L 63/1408: {by monitoring network traffic (monitoring network traffic per se H04L43/00)}
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04W 4/70: Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
- H04W 12/63: Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
- H04W 12/66: {Trust-dependent, e.g. using trust scores or trust relationships}
- H04W 24/08: Testing, {supervising or monitoring} using real traffic
- H04W 64/00: Locating users or terminals {or network equipment} for network management purposes, e.g. mobility management
- H04L 2463/143: Denial of service attacks involving systematic or selective dropping of packets
- H04W 84/18: Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- G16Y: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS [IoT]
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A method includes determining a number of drops of a plurality of messages sent to a first node of a plurality of nodes within a mesh network. Based at least in part on the number of drops of the plurality of messages exceeding a threshold number of drops for a time period, decrementing a first rating assigned to the first node to a second rating assigned to the first node. Based at least in part on the second rating being below a rating threshold, determining that the first node is a potentially malicious node. Based at least in part on a first distance to the first node being larger than a distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node. The method may further include ending communications with the first node.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A device comprising:
one or more processors; and
one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operations comprising:
determining a number of drops of a plurality of messages sent to a first node of a plurality of nodes within a mesh network;
based at least in part on the number of drops of the plurality of messages exceeding a threshold number of drops for a time period, decrementing a first rating assigned to the first node to a second rating assigned to the first node;
based at least in part on the second rating being below a rating threshold, determining that the first node is a potentially malicious node;
based at least in part on a first distance to the first node being larger than a distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node; and
ending communications with the first node.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, the operations further comprising:
sending a first request to the first node for first location information of the first node;
sending a second request to at least a second node for second location information of the at least the second node;
receiving the first location information of the first node from the first node;
receiving the second location information of the at least the second node from the at least the second node;
determining a distance threshold based at least in part on a second distance indicated by the second location information;
determining that the first distance to the first node is greater than or equal to the distance threshold; and
based at least in part on the first distance to the first node being larger than the distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The device of claim 2, the operations further comprising selecting a parent node from the plurality of nodes other than the first node based on a presumption that any of the plurality of nodes other than the first node are non-malicious.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The device of claim 2, wherein the distance threshold is at least two times a radius of a wireless communication distance of at least the second node.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The device of claim 3, the operations further comprising reporting the first node as being the malicious node to at least a third node of the plurality of nodes or a network control device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the mesh network is a wireless network, a wireless mesh network, or a wireless sensor network.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, the operations further comprising:
determining that an intermediary node exists within a network route to the first node; and
based at least in part on a determination that the intermediary node exists within the network route to the first node, instructing the intermediary node to perform the operations of claim 1.

### Claim 8

A method comprising:
determining a number of drops of a plurality of messages sent to a first node of a plurality of nodes within a mesh network;
based at least in part on the number of drops of the plurality of messages exceeding a threshold number of drops for a time period, decrementing a first rating assigned to the first node to a second rating assigned to the first node;
based at least in part on the second rating being below a rating threshold, determining that the first node is a potentially malicious node;
based at least in part on a first distance to the first node being larger than a distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node; and
ending communications with the first node.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8, 10)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
determining that an intermediary node exists within a network route to the first node; and
based at least in part on a determination that an intermediary node exists within the network route to the first node, instructing the intermediary node to perform the method of claim 10.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
sending a first request to the first node for first location information of the first node;
sending a second request to at least a second node for second location information of the at least the second node;
receiving the first location information of the first node from the first node;
receiving the second location information of the at least the second node from the at least the second node;
determining the distance threshold based at least in part on a second distance indicated by the second location information;
determining that the first distance to the first node is greater than or equal to the distance threshold; and
based at least in part on the first distance to the first node being larger than the distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the distance threshold is two times a radius of a wireless communication distance of at least the second node.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the first location information and the second location information are determined via at least one of a distance vector-hop (DV-Hop) algorithm, an approximate point in triangulation (APIT) algorithm, or a centroid localization algorithm.

### Claim 13 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, further comprising selecting a parent node from the plurality of nodes other than the first node based on a presumption that any of the plurality of nodes other than the first node are non-malicious.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, further comprising reporting the first node as being the malicious node to at least a third node of the plurality of nodes or a network control device.

### Claim 15

A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed, cause one or more processors to perform operations, comprising:
determining a number of drops of a plurality of messages sent to a first node of a plurality of nodes within a mesh network;
based at least in part on the number of drops of the plurality of messages exceeding a threshold number of drops for a time period, decrementing a first rating assigned to the first node to a second rating assigned to the first node;
based at least in part on the second rating being below a rating threshold, determining that the first node is a potentially malicious node;
based at least in part on a first distance to the first node being larger than a distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node; and
ending communications with the first node.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, the operations further comprising:
sending a first request to the first node for first location information of the first node;
sending a second request to at least a second node for second location information of at least the second node;
receiving the first location information of the first node from the first node;
receiving the second location information of at least the second node from at least the second node;
determining the first distance to the first node and the distance threshold defined by a second distance to at least the second node; and
based at least in part on a determination that the first distance to the first node is larger than the distance threshold, identifying that the first node is a malicious node.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, the operations further comprising selecting a parent node from the plurality of nodes other than the first node based on a presumption that any of the plurality of nodes other than the first node are non-malicious.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, the operations further comprising:
determining that an intermediary node exists within a network route to the first node; and
based at least in part on a determination that the intermediary node exists within the network route to the first node, instructing the intermediary node to perform the operations of claim 15.

### Claim 19 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, the operations further comprising reporting the first node as being the malicious node to at least a third node of the plurality of nodes or a network control device.

### Claim 20 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein:
the plurality of nodes include sensory devices within the mesh network to sense at least one environmental event at locations where the plurality of nodes are located; and
the mesh network includes a low-power and lossy network (LLN).
