# US 2023/0274013 A1 · Disallowing reads on files associated with compromised data encryption keys

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- Number: US 2023/0274013 A1
- Document ID: US20230274013A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/682,174
- Filed: 2022-02-28
- Published: 2023-08-31
- Earliest claimed: 2022-02-28
- Assignees: Dell Products L.P.
- Applicants: Dell Products L.P.
- Inventors: Nitin Madan; Srisailendra Yallapragada; Mahadev Karadigudda; Madhu Agrahara Gopalakrishna; Srikanth Srinivasan
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20230274013A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/6218: {to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database}
- G06F 11/1453: {using de-duplication of the data}
- G06F 16/152: {using file content signatures, e.g. hash values}
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- G06F 2221/2141: Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A method of blocking access to files encrypted with a compromised key by mapping keys and ranges of containers encrypted by the keys. Upon notification that a key is compromised, fencing a container range corresponding to data segments encrypted by the compromised key to prevent deduplication operations on the segments. The method makes a point-in-time copy of the filesystem managing the segments, wherein each file of the file system is represented as tree structure having a root level and other levels. The method iteratively inspects in a level-wise manner, each container in each level of the file trees of the files to identify containers having segments encrypted by the compromised key, and marks files corresponding to the identified containers as not readable to block the access to the files encrypted with the compromised key.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-implemented method of blocking access to files encrypted with a compromised encryption key, comprising:
maintaining a map of encryption keys and ranges of containers encrypted by respective encryption keys;
receiving an indication that an encryption key is compromised as a compromised key;
fencing a container range corresponding to data segments encrypted by the compromised key to prevent deduplication operations on the data segments;
making a point-in-time copy of the filesystem managing the data segments, wherein each file of the file system is represented as tree structure having a root level and one or more hierarchical lower levels;
iteratively inspecting, from the lowest level to a highest level, each container in each level of the file trees of the files to identify containers having segments encrypted by the compromised key for a corresponding level; and
marking files corresponding to the identified containers as not readable to block the access to the files encrypted with the compromised key.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the tree structure comprises a Merkle tree having storing fingerprints of data using a hashing method.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2 wherein data is processed as part of a deduplication backup process executed by a data storage server running a Data Domain file system (DDFS), and wherein the backup process looks up the fingerprints in a hash table constituting an index to determine if the fingerprints exist or do not exist within the hash table, and if not, compressing and encrypting corresponding data segments into compression regions for storing in the containers.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3 further comprising storing references to the identified containers in a segment reference filter as a bitmap.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4 wherein the segment reference filter comprises one of a deterministic data structure or a probabilistic data structure.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5 wherein the deterministic data structure comprises a perfect hash vector (PHVEC), and the probabilistic data structure comprises one of: a quotient filter, a Bloom filter, or a cuckoo filter.

### Claim 7 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3 wherein the bitmap correlates a container identifier (ID) with a respective encryption key ID, and fingerprints contained in each container referenced by a container ID to tabulate all the fingerprints of the containers as the bitmap.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7 further comprising marking an entry in the bitmap for each fingerprint of an identifier container having segments encrypted by the compromised key, as an impacted fingerprint.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 further comprising using the segment reference filter to enumerate and mark impacted fingerprints from a lowest level to the root level for each Merkle tree to produce a final data element indicating all fingerprints encrypted by the compromised key.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 further comprising:
re-encrypting the marked files with a new encryption key;
deleting containers containing the marked files;
unfencing the fenced container range; and
restoring an original access permission of the marked files.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10 wherein each file contains a persistent extended attribute to indicate a file access status based on encryption of any constituent data segments using a compromised key.

### Claim 12

A computer-implemented method of blocking access to files encrypted with a compromised encryption key, comprising:
defining Merkle tree structures for each file of the set of files processed by a deduplication backup system, the Merkle structure storing compression region fingerprints in a plurality of levels with a root level, and encrypted with a key;
reading a container header of containers impacted by a compromised key to identify a list of segments referred to by the impacted containers;
scanning, in a level-wise manner, containers in each Merkle tree level to find containers with segments encrypted with a compromised key by going up from a lowest to the root level using parent-child references of the Merkle tree;
marking files having segments encrypted with the compromised key as not readable to block accesses to the files; and
temporarily fencing the files having segments encrypted with the compromised key from deduplication operations of the deduplication backup system.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12 further comprising:
storing the list of segments in a segment reference filter data structure as a bitmap tabulating the containers as a horizontal array;
scanning all containers in a demarcated range to enumerate all leaf metadata segments of the files;
looking up, in the segment reference filter, every enumerated child segment to determine a positive or negative lookup; and
referring, for a positive lookup, the parent segment as an impacted segment by adding the parent segment to the segment reference filter.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13 further comprising iteratively repeating the scanning step for the demarcated range until all levels to the root level are scanned.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13 wherein the segment reference filter is a deterministic data structure, and comprises a perfect hash vector (PHVEC).

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The method of claim 15 wherein the segment reference filter is a probabilistic data structure, and comprises one of a quotient filter, a Bloom filter, or a Cuckoo filter.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16 wherein the data comprises data segments and metadata segments, and wherein the segment reference filter comprises both a PHVEC data structure and a probabilistic data structure.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17 further comprising using the PHVEC data structure to enumerate segments from an impacted container range for data segments and using the probabilistic data structure to enumerate segments from the impacted container range for metadata segments.

### Claim 19

A computer program product, comprising a non-transitory computer-readable medium having a computer-readable program code embodied therein, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform a method of blocking access to files encrypted with a compromised encryption key, comprising:
maintaining a map of encryption keys and ranges of containers encrypted by respective encryption keys;
receiving an indication that an encryption key is compromised as a compromised key;
fencing a container range corresponding to data segments encrypted by the compromised key to prevent deduplication operations on the data segments;
making a point-in-time copy of the filesystem managing the data segments, wherein each file of the file system is represented as tree structure having a root level and one or more hierarchical lower levels;
iteratively inspecting, from the lowest level to a highest level, each container in each level of the file trees of the files to identify containers having segments encrypted by the compromised key for a corresponding level; and
marking files corresponding to the identified containers as not readable to block the access to the files encrypted with the compromised key.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The computer program product of claim 19 wherein the tree structure comprises a Merkle tree having storing fingerprints of data using a hashing method, and further wherein data is processed as part of a deduplication backup process executed by a data storage server running a Data Domain file system (DDFS), and wherein the backup process looks up the fingerprints in a hash table constituting an index to determine if the fingerprints exist or do not exist within the hash table, and if not, compressing and encrypting corresponding data segments into compression regions for storing in the containers.
