# US 2023/0274002 A1 · Firmware authenticity check

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- Number: US 2023/0274002 A1
- Document ID: US20230274002A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/682,928
- Filed: 2022-02-28
- Published: 2023-08-31
- Earliest claimed: 2022-02-28
- Assignees: Micron Technology, Inc.
- Applicants: Micron Technology, Inc.
- Inventors: Alessandro Orlando; Niccolo' Izzo; Danilo Caraccio
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20230274002A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/572: {Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]}
- G06F 8/654: using techniques specially adapted for alterable solid state memories, e.g. for EEPROM or flash memories
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- G06F 9/4406: {Loading of operating system}
- G06F 2221/033: Test or assess software
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Disclosed in some examples are methods, systems, and devices for authenticating a firmware object on a device and in some examples to safeguard the attestation process from the execution of malicious firmware. In some examples, a firmware update process may, in addition to updating the firmware on the device, write a hash of the authentic firmware code in a secure storage device (e.g., a register). This may be done in some examples in a protected environment (e.g., a trusted execution environment or a protected firmware update process). Upon first boot after the update, a firmware update checker compares the firmware object that is booted with the value of the secure storage device. If the values match, the alias certificate may be regenerated, and the boot continues. If the values do not match, then the alias certificate may not be regenerated, and the system may have an authenticity failure because the key and the certificate do not match.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computing device comprising:
a hardware processor;
a secure storage device;
a memory, the memory storing instructions, which when executed, cause the hardware processor to perform operations comprising:
during a first boot process of the computing device after a firmware update and before a new firmware object is executed:
reading a stored measurement value stored in the secure storage device, the stored measurement value written to the secure storage device during the firmware update;
measuring the new firmware object to produce a current firmware measurement;
determining whether the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value;
responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement does not match the stored measurement value, keeping an alias certificate a same value as prior to the firmware update; and
responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value, regenerating an alias key pair and alias certificate and booting the firmware, the alias certificate generated based upon a protected device secret and the current firmware measurement, the alias key pair and certificate used to authenticate the computing device.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the secure storage device is accessible only by a process executing within a trusted environment, and wherein the operations of reading the stored measurement value comprise reading the stored measurement value within the trusted environment.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the operations of measuring the new firmware object to produce the current firmware measurement comprises calculating a cryptographic hash of the new firmware object.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the operations of regenerating the alias certificate comprises regenerating the alias certificate according to a Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) specification and clearing the stored measurement value.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the operations further comprise:
as part of a firmware update process:
receiving the new firmware object;
measuring the new firmware object;
writing the new firmware object to a firmware memory location;
measuring the new firmware object to produce a measurement;
writing the measurement to the secure storage device; and
resetting the computing device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the operations further comprise, determine whether the secure storage device is empty, and, responsive to determining the secure storage device is empty, continuing with boot operations according to a DICE specification; and responsive to determining the secure storage device is not empty, performing the operations of reading the stored measurement value, measuring the new firmware object, and determining whether the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the computing device is a memory device.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the secure storage device is an e-fuse that is only accessible to a process running in a trusted execution environment.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value, regenerating the alias key pair.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the operations further comprise using a public key of the alias key pair and the alias certificate to authenticate with a second device.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the operations further comprise using a public key of the alias key pair and the alias certificate to authenticate with another component of the computing device.

### Claim 12

A method comprising:
using one or more processors of a computing device:
during a first boot process of the computing device after a firmware update and before a new firmware object is executed:
reading a stored measurement value stored in a secure storage device of the computing device, the stored measurement value written to the secure storage device during the firmware update;
measuring the new firmware object to produce a current firmware measurement;
determining whether the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value;
responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement does not match the stored measurement value, keeping an alias certificate a same value as prior to the firmware update;
during a second boot process of the computing device after a second firmware update and before the second firmware is executed:
reading the stored measurement value stored in the secure storage device of the computing device, the stored measurement value written to the secure storage device during the second firmware update;
measuring an installed second firmware object to produce the current firmware measurement;
determining whether the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value;
responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value, regenerating an alias key pair and alias certificate and booting the second firmware, the alias certificate generated based upon a protected device secret and the current second firmware measurement, the alias key pair and certificate used to authenticate the computing device.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the secure storage device is accessible only by a process executing within a trusted environment, and wherein reading the stored measurement value comprise reading the stored measurement value within the trusted environment.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein measuring the new firmware object to produce the current firmware measurement comprises calculating a cryptographic hash of the new firmware object.

### Claim 15

A non-transitory computer-readable medium, storing instructions, which when executed, cause a computing device to perform operations comprising:
during a first boot process of the computing device after a firmware update and before a new firmware object is executed:
reading a stored measurement value stored in a secure storage device, the stored measurement value written to the secure storage device during the firmware update;
measuring the new firmware object to produce a current firmware measurement;
determining whether the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value;
responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement does not match the stored measurement value, keeping an alias certificate a same value as prior to the firmware update; and
responsive to determining that the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value, regenerating an alias key pair and alias certificate and booting the firmware, the alias certificate generated based upon a protected device secret and the current firmware measurement, the alias key pair and certificate used to authenticate the computing device.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the secure storage device is accessible only by a process executing within a trusted environment, and wherein the operations of reading the stored measurement value comprise reading the stored measurement value within the trusted environment.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the operations of measuring the new firmware object to produce the current firmware measurement comprises calculating a cryptographic hash of the new firmware object.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the operations of regenerating the alias certificate comprises regenerating the alias certificate according to a Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) specification and clearing the stored measurement value.

### Claim 19 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the operations further comprise:
as part of a firmware update process:
receiving the new firmware object;
measuring the new firmware object;
writing the new firmware object to a firmware memory location;
measuring the new firmware object to produce a measurement;
writing the measurement to the secure storage device; and
resetting the computing device.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19, wherein the operations further comprise, determine whether the secure storage device is empty, and, responsive to determining the secure storage device is empty, continuing with boot operations according to a DICE specification; and responsive to determining the secure storage device is not empty, performing the operations of reading the stored measurement value, measuring the new firmware object, and determining whether the current firmware measurement matches the stored measurement value.
