Integrity verified paths between entities in a container-orchestration system

One or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform actions comprising:

• receiving, from a first pod of a first node, a first request to instantiate a first integrity verified path to a first network service endpoint (NSE) pod of a second node;
• providing, to the first pod, a second request for a first attestation token, the second request including a first randomly generated nonce;
• receiving, from the first pod, the first attestation token, the first attestation token being based at least in part on the first randomly generated nonce;
• verifying the first attestation token with a certificate authority (CA) server;
• providing, to the first NSE pod, a third request for a second attestation token, the third request including a second randomly generated nonce;
• receiving, from the first NSE pod, the second attestation token, the second attestation token being based at least in part on the second randomly generated nonce;
• verifying the second attestation token with the CA server;
• and
• based at least in part on the (i) verifying the first attestation token with the CA server and (ii) verifying the second attestation token with the CA server, instantiating the first integrity verified path between the first pod and the first NSE pod.

A computer-implemented method comprising:

• receiving, by a network service mesh (NSM) from a pod of a first node, a first request to instantiate an integrity verified path to a network service endpoint (NSE) pod of a second node;
• receiving, by the NSM from the pod, a first attestation token, the first attestation token being based at least in part on a first randomly generated nonce;
• verifying, by the NSM, the first attestation token with a certificate authority (CA) server;
• receiving, by the NSM from the NSE pod, a second attestation token, the second attestation token being based at least in part on a second randomly generated nonce;
• verifying, by the NSM, the second attestation token with the CA server;
• and
• based at least in part on the (i) verifying the first attestation token with the CA server and (ii) verifying the second attestation token with the CA server, instantiating, by the NSM, the integrity verified path between the pod and the NSE pod.