# US 2022/0045997 A1 · Method, system, and computer program product for network bound proxy re-encryption and pin translation

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2022/0045997 A1
- Document ID: US20220045997A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/421,587
- Filed: 2020-01-09
- Published: 2022-02-10
- Earliest claimed: 2019-01-09
- Assignees: Visa International Service Association
- Applicants: Visa International Service Association
- Inventors: Sivanarayana Gaddam; Gaven James Watson; Rohit Sinha; Atul Luykx
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20220045997A1

## CPC

- G06Q 20/12: specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
- H04L 9/3226: {using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083)}
- G06Q 20/027: {involving a payment switch or gateway}
- G06Q 20/108: {Remote banking, e.g. home banking}
- G06Q 20/202: {Interconnection or interaction of plural electronic cash registers [ECR] or to host computer, e.g. network details, transfer of information from host to ECR or from ECR to ECR}
- G06Q 20/206: {comprising security or operator identification provisions, e.g. password entry}
- G06Q 20/3821: {Electronic credentials}
- G06Q 20/38215: {Use of certificates or encrypted proofs of transaction rights}
- G06Q 20/3823: {combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction}
- G06Q 20/3829: {involving key management}
- G06Q 20/385: {using an alias or single-use codes}
- G06Q 20/4012: {Verifying personal identification numbers [PIN]}
- G07F 7/1091: {Use of an encrypted form of the PIN}
- H04L 9/0819: {Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) (network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062)}
- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0833: {involving conference or group key (network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065)}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3073: {involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing}
- H04L 63/0471: {applying encryption by an intermediary, e.g. receiving clear information at the intermediary and encrypting the received information at the intermediary before forwarding}
- H04L 2209/56: Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
- H04L 2209/76: Proxy, i.e. using intermediary entity to perform cryptographic operations
- G06Q: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G07F: COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS (coin sorting G07D3/00; coin testing G07D5/00; {handling coins or paper currencies apart from payment activated apparatus G07D; payment architectures, schemes or protocols G06Q20/00})

## Abstract

A method, system, and computer program product generate, with a payment network, a first value (a) and a second value (ga), the second value (ga) generated based on the first value (a) and a generator value (g); generate, with the payment network, a plurality of random merchant numbers (mi) for a respective plurality of merchant banks; determine, with the payment network, a merchant product (M) based on a product of the plurality of random merchant numbers (mi); generate, with the payment network, a public key (pki) based on the second value (ga), the merchant product (M), and the random merchant number (mi) and a random key (rki) based on the merchant product (M) and the random merchant number (mi) for each respective merchant bank; and communicate, with the payment network, the public key (pki) and the random key (rki) to at least one respective merchant bank.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-implemented method comprising:
generating, with a point-of-sale (POS) terminal, a first ciphertext associated with a transaction, the first ciphertext comprising:
(i) a first ciphertext value associated with a randomly selected key (r), the first ciphertext value encrypted based on the randomly selected key (r) and a generator value (g); and
(ii) a second ciphertext value associated with a first public key (pk1) of a first pair of keys comprising a first public key (pk1) and a first secret key (sk1), the first public key (pk1) generated based on the first secret key (sk1) and the generator value (g), the second ciphertext value encrypted based on transaction data associated with the transaction and a symmetric key (K) generated based on the first public key (pk1) and the randomly selected key (r);
communicating, with the POS terminal, the first ciphertext to at least one payment gateway;
re-encrypting, with the at least one payment gateway, the first ciphertext value with a first re-encryption key to transform the first ciphertext value encrypted under the first public key (pk1) to a re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under a second public key (pk2) associated with the at least one payment gateway;
communicating, with the at least one payment gateway, the re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to at least one merchant bank;
re-encrypting, with the at least one merchant bank, the re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted with a second re-encryption key to transform the re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under the second public key (pk2) of the at least one payment gateway to a second re-encrypted first ciphertext value under a third public key (pk3) of the at least one merchant bank;
communicating, with the at least one merchant bank, the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to a payment network;
re-encrypting, with the payment network, the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted with a third re-encryption key to transform the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under the third public key (pk3) of the at least one merchant bank to a third re-encrypted first ciphertext value under a fourth public key (pk4) of the payment network;
communicating, with the payment network, the third re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to at least one consumer bank;
determining, with the at least one consumer bank, the symmetric key (K) based on the third re-encrypted first ciphertext value and a secret key of the consumer bank; and
decrypting, with the at least one consumer bank, the second ciphertext value based on the symmetric key (K) to obtain the transaction data.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein an intermediary server translates between multiple different parties by decrypting the second ciphertext value and using a portion of the transaction data to determine routing and a corresponding re-encryption key for a subsequent communication.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the transaction data includes at least one of a mobile personal identification number (PIN), a card verification number, or a card number associated therewith.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the second ciphertext value is used to encrypt a personal identification number (PIN) under the randomly selected key (r) protected by the first ciphertext value, and wherein a re-encryption generates a new ciphertext value while the second ciphertext value is unchanged.

### Claim 5

A system comprising:
a point-of-sale (POS) terminal including one or more processors, wherein the POS terminal is programmed and/or configured to:
generate a first ciphertext associated with a transaction, the first ciphertext comprising:
(i) a first ciphertext value associated with a randomly selected key (r), the first ciphertext value encrypted based on the randomly selected key (r) and a generator value (g); and
(ii) a second ciphertext value associated with a first public key (pk1) of a first pair of keys comprising a first public key (pk1) and a first secret key (sk1), the first public key (pk1) generated based on the first secret key (sk1) and the generator value (g), the second ciphertext value encrypted based on transaction data associated with the transaction and a symmetric key (K) generated based on the first public key (pk1) and the randomly selected key (r); and
communicate the first ciphertext to at least one payment gateway;
the at least one payment gateway including one or more processors, wherein the at least one payment gateway is programmed and/or configured to:
re-encrypt the first ciphertext value with a first re-encryption key to transform the first ciphertext value encrypted under the first public key (pk1) to a re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under a second public key (pk2) associated with the at least one payment gateway; and
communicate the re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to at least one merchant bank;
the at least one merchant bank including one or more processors, wherein the at least one merchant bank is programmed and/or configured to:
re-encrypt the re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted with a second re-encryption key to transform the re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under the second public key (pk2) of the at least one payment gateway to a second re-encrypted first ciphertext value under a third public key (pk3) of the at least one merchant bank; and
communicate the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to a payment network;
the payment network including one or more processors, wherein the payment network is programmed and/or configured to:
re-encrypt the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted with a third re-encryption key to transform the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under the third public key (pk3) of the at least one merchant bank to a third re-encrypted first ciphertext value under a fourth public key (pk4) of the payment network; and
communicate the third re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to at least one consumer bank; and
the at least one consumer bank including one or more processors, wherein the at least one consumer bank is programmed and/or configured to:
determine the symmetric key (K) based on the third re-encrypted first ciphertext value and a secret key of the consumer bank; and
decrypt the second ciphertext value based on the symmetric key (K) to obtain the transaction data.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5, further comprising:
an intermediary server programmed and/or configured to translate between multiple different parties by decrypting the second ciphertext value and using a portion of the transaction data to determine routing and a corresponding re-encryption key for a subsequent communication.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5, wherein the transaction data includes at least one of a mobile personal identification number (PIN), a card verification number, or a card number associated therewith.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5, wherein the second ciphertext value is used to encrypt a personal identification number (PIN) under the randomly selected key (r) protected by the first ciphertext value, and wherein a re-encryption generates a new ciphertext value while the second ciphertext value is unchanged.

### Claim 9

A computer program product comprising at least one non-transitory computer-readable medium including program instructions that, when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
generate, with a point-of-sale (POS) terminal, a first ciphertext associated with a transaction, the first ciphertext comprising:
(i) a first ciphertext value associated with a randomly selected key (r), the first ciphertext value encrypted based on the randomly selected key (r) and a generator value (g); and
(ii) a second ciphertext value associated with a first public key (pk1) of a first pair of keys comprising a first public key (pk1) and a first secret key (sk1), the first public key (pk1) generated based on the first secret key (sk1) and the generator value (g), the second ciphertext value encrypted based on transaction data associated with the transaction and a symmetric key (K) generated based on the first public key (pk1) and the randomly selected key (r);
communicate, with the POS terminal, the first ciphertext to at least one payment gateway;
re-encrypt, with the at least one payment gateway, the first ciphertext value with a first re-encryption key to transform the first ciphertext value encrypted under the first public key (pk1) to a re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under a second public key (pk2) associated with the at least one payment gateway;
communicate, with the at least one payment gateway, the re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to at least one merchant bank;
re-encrypt, with the at least one merchant bank, the re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted with a second re-encryption key to transform the re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under the second public key (pk2) of the at least one payment gateway to a second re-encrypted first ciphertext value under a third public key (pk3) of the at least one merchant bank;
communicate, with the at least one merchant bank, the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to a payment network;
re-encrypt, with the payment network, the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted with a third re-encryption key to transform the second re-encrypted first ciphertext value encrypted under the third public key (pk3) of the at least one merchant bank to a third re-encrypted first ciphertext value under a fourth public key (pk4) of the payment network;
communicate, with the payment network, the third re-encrypted first ciphertext value and the second ciphertext value to at least one consumer bank;
determine, with the at least one consumer bank, the symmetric key (K) based on the third re-encrypted first ciphertext value and a secret key of the consumer bank; and
decrypt, with the at least one consumer bank, the second ciphertext value based on the symmetric key (K) to obtain the transaction data.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The computer program product of claim 9, wherein an intermediary server translates between multiple different parties by decrypting the second ciphertext value and using a portion of the transaction data to determine routing and a corresponding re-encryption key for a subsequent communication.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The computer program product of claim 9, wherein the transaction data includes at least one of a mobile personal identification number (PIN), a card verification number, or a card number associated therewith.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The computer program product of claim 9, wherein the second ciphertext value is used to encrypt a personal identification number (PIN) under the randomly selected key (r) protected by the first ciphertext value, and wherein a re-encryption generates a new ciphertext value while the second ciphertext value is unchanged.

### Claim at position 13

-54. (canceled)
