# US 2022/0045994 A1 · Fast oblivious transfers

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- Number: US 2022/0045994 A1
- Document ID: US20220045994A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/510,235
- Filed: 2021-10-25
- Published: 2022-02-10
- Earliest claimed: 2019-02-12
- Assignees: Visa International Service Association
- Applicants: Visa International Service Association
- Inventors: Daniel Siegfried Werner Masny; Peter Byerley Rindal
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20220045994A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 9/0819: {Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) (network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062)}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/3073: {involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 63/06: {for supporting key management in a packet data network (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08)}
- H04L 2209/50: Oblivious transfer
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Systems, methods, and computing device readable media for implementing fast oblivious transfer between two computing devices may improve data security and computational efficiency. The various aspects may use random oracles with or without key agreements to improve the security of oblivious transfer key exchanges. Some techniques may include public/private key strategies for oblivious transfer, while other techniques may use key agreements to achieve simultaneous and efficient cryptographic key exchange.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for performing a privacy-preserving multi-party computation, the method comprising performing, by a sender device:
generating a first private key d using a random number generator;
generating a first public key c using a cryptographic function;
sending the first public key c to a receiver device;
receiving a first value r0 and a second value r1 from the receiver device;
generating a first key k0 using the first value r0 and a first hash output by operating a hash function H on the second value r1 to obtain a first intermediate result, wherein the cryptographic function operates on the first intermediate result using the first private key d to generate the first key k0, wherein the hash function H corresponds to the cryptographic function;
generating a second key k1 using the second value r1 and a second hash output by operating the hash function H on the first value r0 to obtain a second intermediate result, wherein the cryptographic function operates on the second intermediate result using the first private key d to generate the second key k1;
sending an encrypted program to the receiver device, wherein the receiver device executes the encrypted program to generate an encrypted output value;
receiving the encrypted output value; and
decrypting the encrypted output value using a corresponding key.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein generating the first public key c using the cryptographic function comprises: raising a value g to a power of d to produce the first public key c.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first value r0 is randomly generated by the receiver device using a random number generator.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the second value r1 is generated by the receiver device, by subtracting a hash output of executing the hash function H on the first value r0 from a value g raised to a power of a randomly generated number a.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted program is keyed to either the first value r0 or the second value r1.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first public key c raised to a power of a randomly generated number a is equal to one of the first key k0 or the second key k1.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the hash function H is a random oracle.

### Claim 8

A system for performing a privacy-preserving multi-party computation, the system comprising:
one or more processors; and
a non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions that, when executed, cause the one or more processors to perform a method comprising:
generating a first private key d using a random number generator;
generating a first public key c using a cryptographic function;
sending the first public key c to a receiver device;
receiving a first value r0 and a second value r1 from the receiver device;
generating a first key k0 using the first value r0 and a first hash output by operating a hash function H on the second value r1 to obtain a first intermediate result, wherein the cryptographic function operates on the first intermediate result using the first private key d to generate the first key k0, wherein the hash function H corresponds to the cryptographic function;
generating a second key k1 using the second value r1 and a second hash output by operating the hash function H on the first value r0 to obtain a second intermediate result, wherein the cryptographic function operates on the second intermediate result using the first private key d to generate the second key k1;
sending an encrypted program to the receiver device, wherein the receiver device executes the encrypted program to generate an encrypted output value;
receiving the encrypted output value; and
decrypting the encrypted output value using a corresponding key.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein generating the first public key c using the cryptographic function comprises: raising a value g to a power of d to produce the first public key c.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein the first value r0 is randomly generated by the receiver device using a random number generator.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein the second value r1 is generated by the receiver device, by subtracting a hash output of executing the hash function H on the first value r0 from a value g raised to a power of a randomly generated number a.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein the encrypted program is keyed to either the first value r0 or the second value r1.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein the first public key c raised to a power of a randomly generated number a is equal to one of the first key k0 or the second key k1.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The system of claim 8, wherein the hash function H is a random oracle.

### Claim 15

A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a plurality of instructions that, when executed, cause a computer system to perform a method comprising:
generating a first private key d using a random number generator;
generating a first public key c using a cryptographic function;
sending the first public key c to a receiver device;
receiving a first value r0 and a second value r1 from the receiver device;
generating a first key k0 using the first value r0 and a first hash output by operating a hash function H on the second value r1 to obtain a first intermediate result, wherein the cryptographic function operates on the first intermediate result using the first private key d to generate the first key k0, wherein the hash function H corresponds to the cryptographic function;
generating a second key k1 using the second value r1 and a second hash output by operating the hash function H on the first value r0 to obtain a second intermediate result, wherein the cryptographic function operates on the second intermediate result using the first private key d to generate the second key k1;
sending an encrypted program to the receiver device, wherein the receiver device executes the encrypted program to generate an encrypted output value;
receiving the encrypted output value; and
decrypting the encrypted output value using a corresponding key.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein generating the first public key c using the cryptographic function comprises: raising a value g to a power of d to produce the first public key c.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the first value r0 is randomly generated by the receiver device using a random number generator.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the second value r1 is generated by the receiver device, by subtracting a hash output of executing the hash function H on the first value r0 from a value g raised to a power of a randomly generated number a.

### Claim 19 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the encrypted program is keyed to either the first value r0 or the second value r1.

### Claim 20 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the first public key c raised to a power of a randomly generated number a is equal to one of the first key k0 or the second key k1.
