# US 2022/0035955 A1 · Circuit configured to monitor a sensitive payload for attack detection > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 2022/0035955 A1 - Document ID: US20220035955A1 - Status: Published application - Kind: A1 - Application number: 17/276,465 - Filed: 2019-09-13 - Published: 2022-02-03 - Earliest claimed: 2018-09-17 - Assignees: Secure-Ic SAS - Applicants: Secure-Ic SAS - Inventors: Adrien FACON; Robert NGUYEN - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20220035955A1 ## CPC - G06F 21/75: by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation - G06F 21/554: {involving event detection and direct action} - G06F 21/556: {involving covert channels, i.e. data leakage between processes (inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack G06F21/755)} - G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities} - G06F 21/76: in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD] - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) ## Abstract A circuit for monitoring a circuit payload, includes a plurality of sensors distributed in the circuit, next to the predefined circuit payload; one or more memory units associated with the one or more sensors configured to store sensors' measures made by the one or more associated sensors, every p clock cycles; wherein the circuit is configured to read the sensors' measures stored in at least some of the memory units. Embodiments comprise the use of digital sensors, or analogical sensors coupled with digital converters; the use of FIFO type memory units, adjustments of the depths of the memory units; the use of Finite State Machines configured to cause the circuit to receive sensors' measures; the use of data obfuscation and/or reduction modules; the use of a signature circuit, the use of circuits configured to determine one or more attacks from the sensors' measures. ## Claims ### Claim 1 A circuit for monitoring a circuit payload, comprising: a plurality of sensors distributed in said circuit, next to said circuit payload, said sensors being configured to provide measures related to the environment of said circuit; one or more memory units associated with said one or more sensors, said memory units being configured to store sensors' measures made by said one or more associated sensors, every p clock cycles; wherein said circuit is configured to read sensors' measures stored in at least some of said memory units. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein a sensor is a digital sensor or an analogical sensor coupled with a digital converter. ### Claim 3 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein a memory unit is of FIFO type. ### Claim 4 (depends on 3) The circuit of claim 3, wherein the depth of a memory unit is a function of a predefined computation operation performed in a monitored circuit's payload. ### Claim 5 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein the circuit further comprises a Finite State Machine or FSM configured to cause the circuit to receive sensor measures at every p clock cycle. ### Claim 6 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, further comprising another Finite State Machine or FSM configured to cause the circuit to receive sensor measures during q cycles of p cycles. ### Claim 7 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein p and/or q are configurable. ### Claim 8 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein the circuit further comprises a data obfuscation module configured to obfuscate data stemming from one or more memory units. ### Claim 9 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein the circuit further comprises a data reduction module configured to filter and/or reduce the amount of data stemming from one or more sensors. ### Claim 10 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein said one more sensors and/or said one or more memory units are reprogrammable ### Claim 11 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein the circuit further comprises a signature circuit configured to determine one or more signatures from said sensor measures. ### Claim 12 (depends on 11) The circuit of claim 11, wherein the circuit has properties including physical unclonability and unique signature, while not requiring revealing said unique signature challenge and/or conditionally responding to an external challenge given predefined admissibility criteria and/or a predefined shared secret. ### Claim 13 (depends on 1) The circuit of claim 1, wherein the circuit further comprises a detection circuit configured to detect attacks from said sensors measures. ### Claim 14 (depends on 12) The circuit of claim 12, wherein the signature circuit and the detection circuit are operable in parallel. ### Claim 15 A method for determining a signature or monitoring a circuit payload, said circuit comprising: a plurality of sensors distributed in said circuit, next to the predefined circuit payload, said sensors being configured to provide measures related to the environment of said circuit; one or more memory units associated with said one or more sensors for storing sensor measures made by said one or more sensors, every p clock cycles; wherein the method comprises the steps of: reading sensors' measures stored in at least some of said memory units; and determining a signature from said sensors measures; and/or determining one or more attacks on the payload from said sensors measures.