# US 2022/0035923 A1 · Technologies for secure hardware and software attestation for trusted i/o

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- Number: US 2022/0035923 A1
- Document ID: US20220035923A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/451,922
- Filed: 2021-10-22
- Published: 2022-02-03
- Earliest claimed: 2015-07-20
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Pradeep M. Pappachan; Reshma Lal; Bin Xing; Siddhartha Chhabra; Vincent R. Scarlata; Steven B. McGowan
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20220035923A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 13/28: using burst mode transfer, e.g. direct memory access {DMA}, cycle steal (G06F13/32 takes precedence)
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Technologies for trusted I/O attestation and verification include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device collects hardware attestation information associated with statically attached hardware I/O components that are associated with a trusted I/O usage protected by the cryptographic engine. The computing device verifies the hardware attestation information and securely enumerates one or more dynamically attached hardware components in response to verification. The computing device collects software attestation information for trusted software components loaded during secure enumeration. The computing device verifies the software attestation information. The computing device may collect firmware attestation information for firmware loaded in the I/O controllers and verify the firmware attestation information. The computing device may collect application attestation information for a trusted application that uses the trusted I/O usage and verify the application attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

-20. (canceled)

### Claim 21

An apparatus, comprising:
a cryptographic engine to secure one or more direct memory access (DMA) channels;
a secure, non-volatile memory to store persistently a first platform device identifier associated with the apparatus; and
a security subsystem, comprising a secure processing element to:
collect attestation information of one or more hardware or software components of the apparatus;
send the attestation information to a remote verification service;
securely enumerate one or more dynamically attached hardware I/O components;
load a secure bus enumerator for the one or more dynamically attached hardware I/O components; and
initialize one or more protected direct memory access (DMA) channels associated with a trusted I/O usage of the security subsystem and protected by the cryptographic engine.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The apparatus of claim 21, the secure processing element to:
discover one or more the statically attached hardware I/O components.

### Claim 23 (depends on 22)

The apparatus of claim 22, the secure processing element to:
generate one or more secure enclave reports, wherein each secure enclave report is indicative of a cryptographic measurement of a trusted software component.

### Claim 24 (depends on 21)

The apparatus of claim 21, the secure processing element to:
determine one or more hardware I/O devices of the I/O subsystem;
determine, based on the attestation information, that the one or more hardware I/O devices required is reachable via a secure I/O path from a trusted application associated with the I/O subsystem; and
verify an identity of a trusted software component associated with each secure I/O path.

### Claim 25 (depends on 21)

The apparatus of claim 21, the secure processing element to:
verify at least a portion of the attestation information by a trusted application executing on apparatus.

### Claim 26 (depends on 21)

The apparatus of claim 21, further comprising a firmware attestation module, executed by the secure processing element, to (i) collect firmware attestation information associated with one or more I/O controllers of the computing device, and (ii) verify the firmware attestation information.

### Claim 27 (depends on 21)

The apparatus of claim 21, further comprising an application attestation module, executed by the secure processing element, to (i) collect application attestation information associated with a trusted application of the computing device, wherein the trusted application uses the trusted I/O usage, and (ii) verify the application attestation information.

### Claim 28

A processor-implemented method, comprising:
securing, in a cryptographic engine, one or more direct memory access (DMA) channels;
storing, in a secure, non-volatile memory, a first platform device identifier associated with the apparatus; and
in a security subsystem comprising a secure processing element:
collecting attestation information of one or more hardware or software components of the apparatus;
sending the attestation information to a remote verification service;
securely enumerating one or more dynamically attached hardware I/O components;
loading a secure bus enumerator for the one or more dynamically attached hardware I/O components; and
initializing one or more protected direct memory access (DMA) channels associated with a trusted I/O usage of the security subsystem and protected by the cryptographic engine.

### Claim 29 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, further comprising:
discovering one or more the statically attached hardware I/O components.

### Claim 30 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29, further comprising:
generating one or more secure enclave reports, wherein each secure enclave report is indicative of a cryptographic measurement of a trusted software component.

### Claim 31 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, further comprising:
determining one or more hardware I/O devices of the I/O subsystem;
determining, based on the attestation information, that the one or more hardware I/O devices required is reachable via a secure I/O path from a trusted application associated with the I/O subsystem; and
verifying an identity of a trusted software component associated with each secure I/O path.

### Claim 32 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, further comprising:
verifying at least a portion of the attestation information by a trusted application executing on apparatus.

### Claim 33 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, further comprising:
collecting firmware attestation information associated with one or more I/O controllers of the computing device; and
verifying the firmware attestation information.

### Claim 34 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, further comprising:
collecting application attestation information associated with a trusted application of the computing device, wherein the trusted application uses the trusted I/O usage; and
verifying the application attestation information.

### Claim 35

One or more non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising one or more instructions that when executed on at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
securing, in a cryptographic engine, one or more direct memory access (DMA) channels;
storing, in a secure, non-volatile memory, a first platform device identifier associated with the apparatus; and
in a security subsystem comprising a secure processing element:
collecting attestation information of one or more hardware or software components of the apparatus;
sending the attestation information to a remote verification service;
securely enumerating one or more dynamically attached hardware I/O components;
loading a secure bus enumerator for the one or more dynamically attached hardware I/O components; and
initializing one or more protected direct memory access (DMA) channels associated with a trusted I/O usage of the security subsystem and protected by the cryptographic engine.

### Claim 36 (depends on 35)

The computer-readable medium of claim 35, comprising one or more instructions that when executed on the at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
discovering one or more the statically attached hardware I/O components.

### Claim 37 (depends on 36)

The computer-readable medium of claim 36, comprising one or more instructions that when executed on the at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
generating one or more secure enclave reports, wherein each secure enclave report is indicative of a cryptographic measurement of a trusted software component.

### Claim 38 (depends on 35)

The computer-readable medium of claim 35, comprising one or more instructions that when executed on the at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
determining one or more hardware I/O devices of the I/O subsystem;
determining, based on the attestation information, that the one or more hardware I/O devices required is reachable via a secure I/O path from a trusted application associated with the I/O subsystem; and
verifying an identity of a trusted software component associated with each secure I/O path.

### Claim 39 (depends on 35)

The computer-readable medium of claim 35, comprising one or more instructions that when executed on the at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
verifying at least a portion of the attestation information by a trusted application executing on apparatus.

### Claim 40 (depends on 35)

The computer-readable medium of claim 35, comprising one or more instructions that when executed on the at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
collecting firmware attestation information associated with one or more I/O controllers of the computing device; and
verifying the firmware attestation information.

### Claim 41 (depends on 35)

The computer-readable medium of claim 35, comprising one or more instructions that when executed on the at least one processor configure the at least one processor to perform one or more operations, comprising:
collecting application attestation information associated with a trusted application of the computing device, wherein the trusted application uses the trusted I/O usage; and
verifying the application attestation information.
