# US 2022/0027864 A1 · Analysis Method for Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual Recycling Channels

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- Number: US 2022/0027864 A1
- Document ID: US20220027864A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/196,252
- Filed: 2021-03-09
- Published: 2022-01-27
- Earliest claimed: 2020-07-27
- Assignees: Harbin University Of Commerce
- Applicants: Harbin University of Commerce
- Inventors: Shizhen Bai; Xuelian Zhang
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20220027864A1

## CPC

- G06Q 10/30: Administration of product recycling or disposal
- G06Q 10/06315: {Needs-based resource requirements planning or analysis}
- G06Q 30/0206: {Price or cost determination based on market factors}
- Y02W 90/00: Enabling technologies or technologies with a potential or indirect contribution to greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions mitigation
- G06Q: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- Y02W: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO WASTEWATER TREATMENT OR WASTE MANAGEMENT

## Abstract

The present disclosure provides an analysis method for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with dual recycling channels. The analysis method includes: step S1: constructing recycling function models for dual recycling channels; step S2: constructing a decision model for a non-subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels and a decision model for a subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels respectively; step S3: obtaining optimal decisions of a manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform in the non-subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels and optimal decisions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform in the subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels; and step S4: determining an influence law of a subsidy on the optimal decisions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform in the CLSC with dual recycling channels through a comparative analysis.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An analysis method for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with dual recycling channels, wherein the analysis method comprises the following steps:
step S1: constructing recycling function models for dual recycling channels based on a consumer's preference over a recycling mode of an online recycling platform and transaction costs of the consumer in a recycling mode of a retailer.
step S2: constructing a decision model for a non-subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels and a decision model for a subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels respectively based on the recycling function models;
step S3: solving the decision model for the non-subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels and the decision model for the subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels respectively by using a backward induction method, to obtain optimal decisions of a manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform in the non-subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels and optimal decisions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform in the subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels;
step S4: determining an influence law of a subsidy on the optimal decisions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform in the CLSC with dual recycling channels through a comparative analysis according to a solution result of step S3; and
step S5: adjusting an amount of the subsidy according to an analysis result of step S4, and establishing a fund allocation and monitoring system to monitor the allocation of a subsidy fund to the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The analysis method for a CLSC with dual recycling channels according to claim 1, wherein in step 1, the recycling function models for dual recycling channels are constructed as follows:
step S101: assuming that different consumers have different perceived value v of a same waste product and obey a uniform distribution in [0,Qo], wherein Qo represents a total number of consumers in a recycling market; Qi represents a recycling volume in a recycling mode i; i=r,t, which respectively represent the recycling mode of the retailer and the recycling mode of the online recycling platform; deriving a consumer utility in the recycling mode of the retailer as Ur=pr−v−k and a consumer utility in the recycling mode of the online recycling platform as Ut=pt-ϕv according to a recycling form of the consumer in dual recycling channels, wherein ϕ represents a consumer's preference coefficient, ϕ>1; k represents a transaction cost of the consumer participating in recycling through the retailer, pr and pt respectively represent a recycling price of the retailer and a recycling price of the online recycling platform, b>pr, b>pt; b represents a transfer payment price paid by the manufacturer to the retailer and the online recycling platform for buying back a waste product from the retailer and the online recycling platform;
step S102: constructing recycling function models according to the consumer utility functions in the recycling mode of the retailer and the recycling mode of the online recycling platform determined in step S101:
a recycling volume of the retailer:
Q
r
=
ϕ
⁡
(
p
r
-
k
)
-
p
t
ϕ
-
1
(
1
)
a recycling volume of the online recycling platform:
Q
t
=
p
t
-
p
r
+
k
ϕ
-
1
(
2
)
a total recycling volume of a system: Q=pr−k (3).

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The analysis method for a CLSC with dual recycling channels according to claim 2, wherein in step 2, the CLSC with dual recycling channels is composed of the manufacturer, the retailer, the online recycling platform and the consumer; the manufacturer serves as a leader of the game and is responsible for production and remanufacturing with a new material and a reusable part, with a unit cost being cn and cr respectively, Δ=cn−cr>0; a product is wholesaled to the retailer at a wholesale price of w; the retailer is responsible for selling the product to the consumer at a price of p.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The analysis method for a CLSC with dual recycling channels according to claim 3, wherein
the decision model for the non-subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels comprises:
an objective function of the manufacturer:
max
⁢
∏
m
N
(
w
N
,
b
N
)
=
(
w
N
-
c
n
)
⁢
(
a
-
p
N
)
+
(
Δ
-
b
N
)
⁢
(
p
r
N
-
k
)
⁢
⁢
s
.
t
.
⁢
p
r
N
-
k
>
p
t
N
ϕ
(
4
)
an objective function of the retailer:
max
⁢
∏
r
N
(
p
N
,
p
r
N
)
=
(
p
N
-
w
N
)
⁢
(
a
-
p
N
)
+
(
b
N
-
p
r
N
)
⁡
[
ϕ
⁡
(
p
r
N
-
k
)
-
p
t
N
]
ϕ
-
1
(
5
)
an objective function of the online rec cling platform:
max
⁢
∏
t
N
(
p
t
N
)
=
(
b
N
-
p
t
N
)
⁢
(
p
t
N
-
p
r
N
+
k
ϕ
-
1
)
(
6
)
these models are solved as follows:
first, finding a first-order derivative of Eq. (6) with respect to ptN according to the backward induction method, and equating to 0 to yield
p
t
N
=
b
N
+
p
r
N
-
k
2
;
then, substituting ptN into Eq. (5) to find a first-order partial derivative with respect to pN and prN and equating to 0 to yield
p
N
=
a
+
w
N
2
⁢
⁢
and
⁢
⁢
p
r
N
=
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
b
N
+
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
k
-
k
2
⁢
(
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
substituting ptN, pN and prN into Eq. (4), and applying Kuhn-Tucker (K-T) conditions, then:
L
=
(
w
N
-
c
n
)
⁢
(
a
-
p
N
)
+
(
Δ
-
b
N
)
⁢
(
p
r
N
-
k
)
+
λ
⁡
(
p
r
N
-
k
-
p
t
N
ϕ
)
s
.
t
.
⁢
p
r
N
-
k
>
p
t
N
ϕ
;
∂
L
∂
w
N
=
a
+
c
n
-
2
⁢
w
N
2
=
0
;
∂
L
∂
b
N
=
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
-
2
⁢
b
N
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
2
⁢
(
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
+
λ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
2
⁢
⁢
ϕ
=
0
;
λ
⁡
[
4
⁢
⁢
ϕ
2
⁢
b
N
-
6
⁢
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
b
N
+
2
⁢
b
N
-
4
⁢
⁢
ϕ
2
⁢
k
+
4
⁢
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
k
-
k
4
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
]
=
0
,
λ
≥
0
;
according to the K-T conditions:
(
1
)
⁢
⁢
if
⁢
⁢
λ
=
0
,
w
N
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
,
b
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δ
⁢
⁢
ϕ
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
;
⁢
⁢
(
2
)
⁢
⁢
if
⁢
⁢
λ
>
0
,
w
N
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
,
b
N
*
=
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
2
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
,
wherein in this case, QrN*=0, that is, the retailer has no recycling volume; however, this situation does not exist; therefore, an optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer is
w
N
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
,
and an optimal transfer payment price of the manufacturer is
b
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
;
substituting
w
N
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
⁢
⁢
and
⁢
⁢
b
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
into pN and prN to obtain an optimal sales price of the retailer as
p
N
*
=
3
⁢
a
+
c
n
4
and an optimal recycling price of the retailer as
p
r
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
+
3
⁢
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
substituting
b
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
and
⁢
⁢
p
r
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
+
3
⁢
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
into ptN to obtain an optimal recycling price of the online recycling platform as
p
t
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
⁡
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
substituting these optimal solutions into DN, QrN and QtN to obtain an optimal market demand
D
N
*
=
a
-
c
n
4
,
an optimal recycling volume of the retailer
Q
r
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
+
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
and an optimal recycling volume of the online recycling platform
Q
t
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
,
wherein D=a−p; D represents a market demand; p represents a sales price; a represents a potential maximum possible market demand; summing
Q
r
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
+
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
⁢
and
Q
t
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
to obtain an optimal recycling volume of the system
Q
N
*
=
2
⁢
Δϕ
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
finally, obtaining:
an optimal profit of the manufacturer:
∏
m
N
*
⁢
=
(
a
-
c
n
)
2
8
⁢
2
+
[
2
⁢
Δϕ
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
]
2
16
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
(
7
)
an optimal profit of the retailer:
∏
r
N
*
⁢
=
(
a
-
c
n
)
2
1
⁢
6
+
[
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
+
1
)
-
2
⁢
Δ
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
]
2
3
⁢
2
⁢
ϕ
2
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
(
8
)
an optimal profit of the online recycling platform:
∏
t
N
*
⁢
=
[
2
⁢
Δϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
]
2
64
⁢
ϕ
2
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
2
(
9
)
wherein, a superscript N represents non-subsidized; * represents an optimal solution; Πi represents a profit of an enterprise i; i=m,r,t, which represent the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform, respectively; b represents a transfer payment price; w represents a wholesale price.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The analysis method for a CLSC with dual recycling channels according to claim 3, wherein
the decision model for the subsidized CLSC with dual recycling channels comprises:
an objective function of the manufacturer:
max
(
w
Y
,
b
Y
)
⁢
∏
m
Y
=
(
w
Y
-
c
n
)
⁢
(
a
-
p
Y
)
+
(
Δ
+
g
-
b
Y
)
⁢
(
p
r
Y
-
k
)
⁢
⁢
s
.
t
.
⁢
p
r
Y
-
k
>
p
t
Y
ϕ
(
10
)
an objective function of the retailer:
max
(
p
Y
,
p
r
Y
)
⁢
∏
t
Y
=
(
p
Y
-
w
Y
)
⁢
(
a
-
p
Y
)
+
(
b
Y
-
p
r
Y
)
⁡
[
ϕ
⁡
(
p
r
Y
-
k
)
-
p
t
Y
]
ϕ
-
1
(
11
)
an objective function of the online recycling platform:
max
(
p
t
Y
)
⁢
∏
t
Y
=
(
b
Y
-
p
t
Y
)
⁢
(
p
t
Y
-
p
r
Y
+
k
ϕ
-
1
)
(
12
)
these models are solved as follows:
first, finding a first-order derivative of Eq. (12) with respect to piY according to the backward induction method, and equating to 0 to yield
p
t
Y
=
b
Y
+
p
r
Y
-
k
2
;
then, substituting ptY. into Eq. (11) to find a first-order partial derivative with respect to pY and prY, and equating to 0 to yield
p
Y
=
a
+
w
Y
2
⁢
⁢
and
⁢
⁢
p
r
Y
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
b
Y
+
2
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
k
-
k
2
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
substituting ptY, pY and prY, into Eq. (10), and applying K-T conditions, then:
L
=
(
w
Y
-
c
n
)
⁢
(
a
-
p
Y
)
+
(
Δ
+
g
-
b
Y
)
⁢
(
p
r
Y
-
k
)
+
λ
(
p
Y
-
k
-
p
t
Y
ϕ
)
s
.
t
.
⁢
p
r
Y
-
k
>
p
t
Y
ϕ
;
∂
L
∂
w
Y
=
a
+
c
n
-
2
⁢
w
Y
2
=
0
;
∂
L
∂
b
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
-
2
⁢
b
+
g
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
2
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
+
λ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
2
⁢
ϕ
=
0
;
λ
⁡
[
4
⁢
ϕ
2
⁢
b
-
6
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
b
+
2
⁢
b
-
4
⁢
ϕ
2
⁢
k
+
4
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
k
-
k
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
]
=
0
,
λ
≥
0.
according to the K-T conditions:
if
⁢
⁢
λ
=
0
,
b
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
,
w
Y
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
;
(
1
)
if
⁢
⁢
λ
>
0
,
w
Y
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
,
b
Y
*
=
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
2
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
,
(
2
)
wherein in this case, QrY*=0, that is, the retailer has no recycling volume; therefore, an optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer is
w
Y
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
,
and an optimal transfer payment price of the manufacturer is
b
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
;
substituting
w
Y
*
=
a
+
c
n
2
⁢
⁢
and
⁢
⁢
⁢
b
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
into pY and prY to obtain an optimal sales price of the retailer as
p
Y
*
=
3
⁢
a
+
c
n
4
and an optimal recycling price of the retailer as
p
r
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
+
3
⁢
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
substituting
b
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
ϕ
⁢
⁢
and
⁢
⁢
p
r
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
+
3
⁢
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
into ptY to obtain an optimal recycling price of the online recycling platform as
p
t
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
⁢
⁢
g
⁢
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
substituting these optimal solutions into DY, QrY and QtY to obtain an optimal market demand
D
Y
*
=
a
-
c
n
4
,
an optimal recycling volume of the retailer
Q
r
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
+
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
and an optimal recycling volume of the online recycling platform
Q
t
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
summing
Q
r
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
+
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
⁢
and
Q
t
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
8
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
to obtain an optimal total recycling volume of the system
Q
Y
*
=
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
4
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
;
finally, obtaining:
an optimal profit of the manufacturer:
∏
m
Y
*
⁢
=
(
a
-
c
n
)
2
8
⁢
2
+
[
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
-
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
]
2
16
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
(
13
)
an optimal profit of the retailer:
∏
r
Y
*
⁢
=
(
a
-
c
n
)
2
1
⁢
6
+
[
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
ϕ
+
1
)
-
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
]
2
32
⁢
ϕ
2
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
(
14
)
an optimal profit of the online recycling platform:
∏
t
Y
*
⁢
=
[
2
⁢
ϕ
⁡
(
Δ
+
g
)
⁢
(
ϕ
-
1
)
+
k
⁡
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
3
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
]
2
64
⁢
ϕ
2
⁡
(
ϕ
-
1
)
⁢
(
2
⁢
ϕ
-
1
)
2
(
15
)
wherein, a superscript Y represents subsidized; * represents an optimal solution; Πi represents a profit of an enterprise i; i=m,r,t, which represent the manufacturer, the retailer and the online recycling platform, respectively; b represents a transfer payment price; w represents a wholesale price; g represents a fixed subsidy given based on a quantity of waste electrical and electronic products dismantled and processed by the manufacturer.
