# US 2021/0345112 A1 · Method and apparatus for detecting and handling evil twin access points

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2021/0345112 A1
- Document ID: US20210345112A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/866,477
- Filed: 2020-05-04
- Published: 2021-11-04
- Earliest claimed: 2020-05-04
- Assignees: WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
- Applicants: WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
- Inventors: Scott Elliott; Jay Lindenauer
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210345112A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/12: Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
- H04W 12/08: Access security
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04W 12/12: Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W 12/122: Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
- H04L 2209/805: Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

Methods and apparatus for detecting and handling evil twin access points (APs). The method and apparatus employ trusted beacons including security tokens that are broadcast by trusted APs. An Evil twin AP masquerades as a trusted AP by broadcasting beacons having the same SSID as the trusted AP, as well as other header field and information elements IE in the beacon frame body containing identical information. A sniffer on the trusted AP or in another AP that is part of a Trusted Wireless Environment (TWE) receives the beacons broadcasts by other APs in the TWE including potential evil twin APs. The content in the header and one or more IEs in received beacons are examined to determine whether a beacon is being broadcast by an evil twin. Detection of the evil twin are made by one of more of differences in MAC addresses of trusted and untrusted beacons, time jitter measurements and replay detection using timestamps in the beacons, detection of missing security tokens in untrusted beacons and detection that a security token that is mimicked by an evil twin is invalid. In one aspect, the security token is stored in a vendor-specific IE in trusted beacons that is generated by employing a secret key using a cryptographic operation operating on data in the beacon prior to the vendor-specific IE.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for detecting an evil twin access point (AP), comprising:
broadcasting, from a first IEEE 802.11-based AP comprising a trusted AP having a coverage area in which a second AP comprising an IEEE 802.11-based AP is located, a first beacon comprising a trusted beacon including a service set identifier (SSID) for the trusted AP and containing a security token generated with at least one cryptographic operation employing a secret key;
receiving a second beacon including the SSID broadcast by the second AP; and
examining the content of multiple information elements (IEs) in the second beacon to detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the trusted beacon.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the evil twin AP is detected by determining the second beacon does not include a security token in the data field of a vendor-specific IE.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the first beacon includes a timestamp generated using a clock on the trusted AP and the second beacon is a copy of the first beacon including the same timestamp, and wherein the second beacon is detected to be broadcast by an evil twin AP by determining a difference between a time the second beacon is received and the timestamp in the second beacon exceeds a threshold, wherein the time the second beacon is received is detected using the clock on the trusted AP or a clock in a sniffer AP that is synchronized with the clock in the trusted AP.

### Claim 5 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the first beacon includes a timestamp generated using a clock on the trusted AP and the second beacon follows a third beacon broadcast by the second AP, wherein each of the first, second, and third beacons include a timestamp having the same value, and wherein the second beacon is detected to be broadcast by an evil twin AP by determining the second and third beacon have the same timestamp value.

### Claim 6 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by the vendor-specific IE, and wherein the secure token is generated, at least in part by:
performing a hash over all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE to generate a digest; and
encrypting data including at least the digest using the secret key.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the data field of the vendor-specific IE further comprises a nonce, and wherein the data that is encrypted with the secret key is composed of the nonce concatenated with the digest.

### Claim 8 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by the vendor-specific IE, and wherein the secure token is generated by employing a MAC (message authentication code) or an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) algorithm employing the secret key and using a message comprising all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE.

### Claim 9 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the second beacon includes data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE, further comprising:
processing the security token with the secret key to generate a first value;
processing the data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE of the second beacon with the secret key to generate a second value; and
detecting the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP when the first and second values do not match.

### Claim 10

An access point (AP), comprising:
at least one IEEE 802.11 radio configured to support at least one PHY (Physical layer) and MAC (Media Access Channel layer) defined by an IEEE 802.11 PHY standard;
a processor, operatively coupled to the at least one IEEE 802.11 radio;
memory, coupled to the processor; and
logic configured to,
generate a security token using at least one cryptographic operation employing a secret key;
broadcast a first beacon comprising a first trusted beacon including a service set identifier (SSID) for the AP and containing the security token;
receive a second beacon including the SSID broadcast by a second AP; and
examine the content of multiple information elements (IEs) in the second beacon to detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The AP of claim 10, wherein at least a portion of the logic includes one or more software modules comprising instructions configured to be executed on the processor.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The AP of claim 10, wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the first beacon.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, wherein the evil twin AP is detected by determining the second beacon does not include a security token in the data field of a vendor-specific IE.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, further comprising a clock, wherein the first beacon includes a timestamp generated using the clock and the second beacon is a copy of the first beacon including the same timestamp, and wherein the second beacon is detected to be broadcast by an evil twin AP by determining a difference between a time of the clock the second beacon is received and the timestamp in the second beacon exceeds a threshold.

### Claim 15 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, further comprising a clock, wherein the first beacon includes a first timestamp generated using the clock and the second beacon follows a third beacon broadcast by the second AP that is received by the AP, and wherein the logic is further configured to:
extract a second timestamp for the third beacon;
extract a third timestamp from the second beacon; and
detect the second beacon and third beacon are broadcast by an evil twin AP by determining the first, second, and third timestamps are the same.

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by the vendor-specific IE, and wherein the secure token is generated by:
employing a hash or cryptographic hash over all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE to create a digest; and
encrypting data including at least the digest using the secret key.

### Claim 17 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, wherein the data field of the vendor-specific IE further comprises a nonce, and wherein the data that is encrypted with the secret key is composed of the nonce concatenated with the digest.

### Claim 18 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by the vendor-specific IE, and wherein the secure token is generated by employing a MAC (message authentication code) or an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) algorithm employing the secret key and using a message comprising all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE.

### Claim 19 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, wherein the second beacon includes data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE, and wherein the logic is further configured to:
process the security token with the secret key to generate a first value;
process the data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE of the second beacon with the secret key to generate a second value; and
detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP when the first and second values do not match.

### Claim 20

A non-transitory machine-readable medium having instructions stored thereon comprising one or more software modules that are configured to be executed on a processor in a first IEEE 802.11 access point (AP) to enable the first IEEE 802.11 AP to:
generate a security token using at least one cryptographic operation employing a secret key;
generate a beacon frame including a service set identifier (SSID) for the first IEEE 802.11 AP and including the security token, the beacon frame to be broadcast as a first beacon comprising a first trusted beacon by the first IEEE 802.11 AP; and
examine content in multiple information elements (IEs) in a second beacon that is broadcast by a second IEEE 802.11 AP and received by the first IEEE 802.11 AP to detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 20, wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the first beacon, and wherein the evil twin AP is detected by determining the second beacon does not include a security token in the data field of a vendor-specific IE in the second beacon.

### Claim 22 (depends on 20)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 20, wherein execution of the instructions on the processor further enables the first IEEE 802.11 AP to:
include a timestamp generated using the clock on the first IEEE 802.11 AP in the first beacon;
extract a timestamp from the second beacon; and
detect the second beacon was broadcast from an evil twin AP by,
determining the timestamps in the first beacon and second beacon are the same; and
determining a difference between a current time of the clock on the first IEEE 802.11 AP and the timestamps exceeds a threshold.

### Claim 23 (depends on 20)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 20, wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE, and wherein the secure token is generated by:
employing a hash or cryptographic hash over all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE to create a digest; and
encrypting data including at least the digest using the secret key.

### Claim 24 (depends on 20)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 20, wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE, and wherein the secure token is generated by employing a MAC (message authentication code) or an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) algorithm employing the secret key and using a message comprising all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE.

### Claim 25 (depends on 12)

The AP of claim 12, wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the first beacon, wherein the second beacon includes data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE, and wherein execution of the instructions further enables the first IEEE 802.11 AP to:
process the security token with the secret key to generate a first value;
process the data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE of the second beacon with the secret key to generate a second value; and
detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP when the first and second values do not match.
