# US 2021/0344715 A1 · Intrusion detection with honeypot keys

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- Number: US 2021/0344715 A1
- Document ID: US20210344715A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/370,863
- Filed: 2021-07-08
- Published: 2021-11-04
- Earliest claimed: 2018-09-28
- Assignees: Sophos Limited
- Applicants: Sophos Limited
- Inventors: Harald Schütz; Andreas Berger; Russell Humphries; Mark D. Harris; Kenneth D. Ray
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210344715A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/1491: {using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment}
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 21/554: {involving event detection and direct action}
- G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities}
- G06F 21/62: Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- H04L 63/0263: {Rule management}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/06: {for supporting key management in a packet data network (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08)}
- H04L 63/101: {Access control lists [ACL]}
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04L 63/1441: {Countermeasures against malicious traffic (countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002)}
- H04L 63/145: {the attack involving the propagation of malware through the network, e.g. viruses, trojans or worms}
- H04W 12/121: Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
- H04W 12/122: Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

A honeypot file is cryptographically secured with a cryptographic key. The key, or related key material, is then placed on a central keystore and the file is placed on a data store within the enterprise network. Unauthorized access to the honeypot file can then be detecting by monitoring use of the associated key material, which usefully facilitates detection of file access at any time when, and from any location where, cryptographic access to the file is initiated.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer program product comprising computer executable code embodied in a non-transitory computer-readable medium that, when executing on one or more computing devices, performs the steps of:
providing a honeypot file in a file system accessible to devices in an enterprise network;
cryptographically securing the honeypot file by encrypting the honeypot file to provide a tagged file;
storing key material in a central keystore for the enterprise network, the key material for decrypting the tagged file;
detecting a retrieval of the key material from the central keystore, the retrieval associated with an attempted access of the tagged file by one of the devices; and
initiating a remedial action responsive to detecting the retrieval of the key material, the remedial action including monitoring subsequent network activity within the enterprise network by the one of the devices.

### Claim 2

A method, comprising:
providing a honeypot file in a file system accessible to a device;
cryptographically securing the honeypot file to provide a tagged file;
storing the tagged file on a data store in an enterprise network;
storing a portion of key material in a central keystore for the enterprise network, the key material used in decrypting the tagged file;
detecting a retrieval of the portion of the key material from the central keystore; and
initiating a security action responsive to the retrieval of the portion of the key material used in decrypting the tagged file.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the key material includes an asymmetric key pair.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein cryptographically securing the honeypot file includes using the key material to encrypt the honeypot file.

### Claim 5 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein cryptographically securing the honeypot file includes using the key material to digitally sign the honeypot file.

### Claim 6 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the data store includes at least one of network storage for the enterprise network and a directory on an endpoint in the enterprise network.

### Claim 7 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the central keystore includes at least one of a remote cloud resource for the enterprise network, and a third party trusted resource.

### Claim 8 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein detecting the retrieval of the portion of the key material includes at least one of detecting an opening of the tagged file and detecting an authentication of the tagged file.

### Claim 9 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the retrieval of the portion of the key material is requested from a file system extension on an endpoint that controls access to encrypted content.

### Claim 10 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the retrieval of the portion of the key material is requested from a decryption tool on an endpoint.

### Claim 11 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein initiating the security action includes identifying a device associated with decrypting the tagged file as a malicious intruder.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, wherein the security action includes at least one of blacklisting the malicious intruder from the enterprise network, redirecting the malicious intruder to a honeypot, and monitoring activities of the malicious intruder.

### Claim 13 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the security action includes triggering an alert.

### Claim 14 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the data store is on an endpoint of the enterprise network, and wherein the security action includes remediating the endpoint.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein remediating the endpoint includes at least one of quarantining the endpoint and pulling one or more keys for access to secure content on the endpoint from the endpoint.

### Claim 16 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein providing the honeypot file includes selecting a non-confidential file available on the data store and storing the tagged file on the data store as an older version of the honeypot file.

### Claim 17 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein providing the honeypot file includes providing a crawler that traverses the enterprise network to locate documents having one or more properties suitable for use as the honeypot file.

### Claim 18 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising modifying an access control list for the honeypot file to attract unauthorized, malicious users of the enterprise network by limiting the access control list to a small number of users.

### Claim 19 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising modifying an access control list for the honeypot file to attract unauthorized, malicious users of the enterprise network by including an open access user in the access control list.

### Claim 20

A system, comprising:
a data store in an enterprise network;
a central keystore for the enterprise network; and
a threat management facility executing on a processor and configured to provide a honeypot file, to cryptographically secure the honeypot file with key material, to store the cryptographically secure honeypot file on the data store, to store the key material in the central keystore, to detect use of the key material from the central keystore associated with a decryption of the honeypot file, and to initiate a remedial action responsive to the decryption.
