# US 2021/0334374 A1 · Systems and methods for protecting against malware attacks

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- Number: US 2021/0334374 A1
- Document ID: US20210334374A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/942,123
- Filed: 2020-07-29
- Published: 2021-10-28
- Earliest claimed: 2020-04-24
- Assignees: NetApp, Inc.
- Applicants: NetApp, Inc.
- Inventors: Jagadish Vasudeva; Prateeksha Varshney; Priya Sehgal; Mrinal K. Bhattacharjee; Amit Valjibhai Panara; Siddhartha Nandi
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210334374A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/552: {involving long-term monitoring or reporting}
- G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities}
- G06F 21/54: by adding security routines or objects to programs
- G06F 21/554: {involving event detection and direct action}
- G06F 21/568: {eliminating virus, restoring damaged files}
- G06F 21/577: {Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security}
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A method, a computing device, and a non-transitory machine-readable medium for detecting malware attacks (e.g., ransomware attacks) and mitigating data loss. In one or more embodiments, an agent is implemented in the operating system of a storage node to provide protection at the bottommost level in a data write path. The agent intercepts write requests and observes file events over time to detect anomalous behavior. For example, the agent may monitor incoming write requests and, when an incoming write request is detected, determine whether the file is associated with a malware attack risk based on an analysis of an encryption state of data in the file. If the file associated with a malware attack risk, an entry for the file is added to a file log. The agent may analyze the chi-square values for data written to the files, the file log, and the file format to determine whether a malware attack is underway.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
detecting, by an agent implemented in an operating system, an incoming request to write a file to a storage node;
determining, by the agent, that the file is associated with a malware attack risk based on an analysis of an encryption state of data in the file;
adding, by the agent, an entry for the file to a file log in response to a determination that the file is associated with the malware attack risk; and
detecting, by the agent, a presence of a malware attack based on an analysis of the file log.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the detecting comprises:
determining, by the agent, whether a number of files that are added to the file log, which includes the entry for the file, within a period of time meets a threshold.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
generating, by the agent, a snapshot in response to detecting the presence of the malware attack.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the determining comprises:
analyzing, by the agent, a recognizability of a file format of the file.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
confirming, by the agent, that the malware attack is underway based on a pattern analysis performed using the file log and a file event log that tracks file activity.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the determining comprises:
determining that the file is suspicious based on a plurality of chi-square values computed for data blocks of the file.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the file is a first file and further comprising:
preserving a second file using a deleted files directory stored in the storage node in response to a delete request for the second file.

### Claim 8

A non-transitory machine-readable medium having stored thereon instructions for performing a method comprising machine-executable code which, when executed by at least one machine, causes the at least one machine to:
detect an incoming request to write a file to a storage node;
determine that the file is associated with a malware attack risk based on an analysis of an encryption state of data in the file;
add an entry for the file to a file log in response to a determination that the file is associated with the malware attack risk;
detect a presence of a malware attack based on an analysis of the file log; and
generate a snapshot in response to detecting the presence of the malware attack.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the at least one machine determining that the file is associated with the malware attack risk comprises:
determining whether a number of files that are added to the file log, which includes the entry for the file, within a period of time meets a threshold.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the at least one machine determining that the file is associated with the malware attack risk comprises:
analyzing a recognizability of a file format of the file.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the machine-executable code further causes the at least one machine to:
confirm that the malware attack is underway based on a pattern analysis performed using the file log and a file event log that tracks file activity.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the at least one machine determining that the file is associated with the malware attack risk comprises:
determining that the file is suspicious based on a plurality of chi-square values computed for data blocks of the file with respect to at least one level of granularity.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the file is a first file and wherein the machine-executable code further causes the at least one machine to:
preserve a second file using a deleted files directory stored in the storage node in response to a delete request for the second file.

### Claim 14

A computing device comprising:
a memory containing machine-readable medium comprising machine-executable code having stored thereon instructions for performing a method of managing a parallel file system during input/output (I/O) operation; and
a processor coupled to the at least one memory, the at least one processor configured to execute the machine-executable code to cause the processor to:
detect an incoming request to write a file to a storage node;
determine that the file is associated with a malware attack risk based on a plurality of chi-square values computed for data blocks of the file;
add an entry for the file to a file log in response to a determination that the file is associated with the malware attack risk; and
detect a presence of a malware attack based on an analysis of the file log.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The computing device of claim 14, wherein the processor detecting the presence of the malware attack comprises determining whether a number of files that are added to the file log, which includes the entry for the file, within a period of time meets a threshold.

### Claim 16 (depends on 14)

The computing device of claim 14, wherein the at least one processor is configured to execute the machine-executable code to cause the processor to generate a snapshot in response to detecting the presence of the malware attack.

### Claim 17 (depends on 14)

The computing device of claim 14, wherein the at least one processor is configured to execute the machine-executable code to cause the processor to analyze a recognizability of a file format of the file.

### Claim 18 (depends on 14)

The computing device of claim 14, wherein the processor determine that the file is associated with the malware attack risk comprises determining that the file is suspicious based on a plurality of chi-square values computed for data blocks of the file.

### Claim 19 (depends on 14)

The computing device of claim 14, wherein the file is a first file and wherein the at least one processor is configured to execute the machine-executable code to cause the processor to preserve a second file using a deleted files directory stored in the storage node in response to a delete request for the second file.

### Claim 20 (depends on 14)

The computing device of claim 14, wherein the entry added to the file log identifies a file name, a path, and encrypted block numbers.
