# US 2021/0264020 A1 · Technology to control system call invocations within a single address space

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- Number: US 2021/0264020 A1
- Document ID: US20210264020A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/314,349
- Filed: 2021-05-07
- Published: 2021-08-26
- Earliest claimed: 2020-05-08
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Michael LeMay; Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210264020A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/52: during program execution, e.g. stack integrity {; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow}
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 2221/033: Test or assess software
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Systems, apparatuses and methods may provide for technology that stores a security monitor at a first location in an address space, wherein the security monitor is to control requests to use a security-critical instruction at a second location in the address space, and wherein the second location is in the first set of locations. The technology also installs a control instruction at an entry point to the security monitor, wherein the control instruction is to restrict indirect branch targets, and excludes the control instruction from all locations in the first set of locations that are not entry points.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computing system comprising:
a network controller;
a processor coupled to the network controller; and
a memory coupled to the processor, the memory including a set of executable program instructions, which when executed by the processor, cause the computing system to:
store a security monitor to a first set of locations in an address space, wherein the security monitor is to control requests to execute a security-critical instruction at a second location in the address space, and wherein the second location is in the first set of locations,
install a control instruction at an entry point to the security monitor, wherein the control instruction is to restrict indirect branch targets, and
exclude the control instruction from all locations in the address space in the first set of locations that are not entry points.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computing system of claim 1, wherein the set of instructions, when executed, cause the computing system to:
conduct a scan of executable binary code in an untrusted application for one or more jump instructions, and
record a set of jump targets associated with the one or more jump instructions, wherein the security monitor is stored to the first set of locations if at least one of the one or more jump instructions target unauthorized entry points within the security monitor.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The computing system of claim 2, wherein the set of instructions, when executed, cause the computing system to repeat the scan of the executable binary code if additional binary code is dynamically added.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computing system of claim 1, wherein the security-critical instruction is to be a system call.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The computing system of claim 1, wherein the control instruction is to be one of an ENDBRANCH instruction or a Branch Target Identification instruction.

### Claim 6

A semiconductor apparatus comprising:
one or more substrates; and
logic coupled to the one or more substrates, wherein the logic is implemented at least partly in one or more of configurable logic or fixed-functionality hardware logic, the logic coupled to the one or more substrates to:
store a security monitor to a first set of locations in an address space, wherein the security monitor is to control requests to execute a security-critical instruction at a second location in the address space, and wherein the second location is in the first set of locations;
install a control instruction at an entry point to the security monitor, wherein the control instruction is to restrict indirect branch targets; and
exclude the control instruction from all locations in the address space in the first set of locations that are not entry points.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The semiconductor apparatus of claim 6, wherein the logic coupled to the one or more substrates is to:
conduct a scan of executable binary code in an untrusted application for one or more jump instructions; and
record a set of jump targets associated with the one or more jump instructions, wherein the security monitor is stored to the first set of locations if at least one of the one or more jump instructions target unauthorized entry points within the security monitor.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The semiconductor apparatus of claim 7, wherein the logic coupled to the one or more substrates is to repeat the scan of the executable binary code if additional binary code is dynamically added.

### Claim 9 (depends on 6)

The semiconductor apparatus of claim 6, wherein the security-critical instruction is to be a system call.

### Claim 10 (depends on 6)

The semiconductor apparatus of claim 6, wherein the control instruction is to be one or more of an ENDBRANCH instruction or a Branch Target Identification instruction.

### Claim 11 (depends on 6)

The semiconductor apparatus of claim 6, wherein the logic coupled to the one or more substrates is to:
record in a register whether the indirect branch targets landed on the entry point; and
generate, via a system call instruction, an exception in response to one or more indirect branch targets not landing on the entry point.

### Claim 12 (depends on 6)

The semiconductor apparatus of claim 6, wherein the logic coupled to the one or more substrates is to mark one or more memory regions as unreachable by indirect branches.

### Claim 13

At least one computer readable storage medium comprising a set of instructions, which when executed by a computing system, cause the computing system to:
store a security monitor to a first location in an address space, wherein the security monitor is to control requests to execute a security-critical instruction at a second location in the address space, and wherein the second location is in the first set of locations;
install a control instruction at an entry point to the security monitor, wherein the control instruction is to restrict indirect branch targets; and
exclude the control instruction from all locations in the address space in the first set of locations that are not entry points.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the set of instructions, when executed, cause the computing system to:
conduct a scan of executable binary code in an untrusted application for one or more jump instructions; and
record a set of jump targets associated with the one or more jump instructions, wherein the security monitor is stored to the first set of locations if at least one of the one or more jump instructions target unauthorized entry points within the security monitor.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 14, wherein the set of instructions, when executed, cause the computing system to repeat the scan of the executable binary code if additional binary code is dynamically added.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the security-critical instruction is to be a system call.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the control instruction is to be one or more of an ENDBRANCH instruction or a Branch Target Identification instruction.

### Claim 18 (depends on 13)

The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the set of instructions, when executed, cause the computing to:
record in a register whether the indirect branch targets landed on the entry point; and
generate, via a system call instruction, an exception in response to one or more indirect branch targets not landing on the entry point.

### Claim 19 (depends on 13)

The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the set of instructions, when executed, cause the computing system to mark one or more memory regions as unreachable by indirect branches.

### Claim 20

A method comprising:
storing a security monitor to a first location in an address space, wherein the security monitor is to control requests to execute a security-critical instruction at a second location in the address space, and wherein the second location is in the first set of locations;
installing a control instruction at an entry point to the security monitor, wherein the control instruction is to restrict indirect branch targets; and
excluding the control instruction from all locations in the address space in the first set of locations that are not entry points.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The method of claim 20, further including:
conducting a scan of executable binary code in an untrusted application for one or more jump instructions; and
recording a set of jump targets associated with the one or more jump instructions, wherein the security monitor is stored to the first set of locations if at least one of the one or more jump instructions target unauthorized entry points within the security monitor.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The method of claim 21, further including repeating the scan of the executable binary code if additional binary code is dynamically added.

### Claim 23 (depends on 20)

The method of claim 20, wherein the security-critical instruction is a system call.

### Claim 24 (depends on 20)

The method of claim 20, wherein the control instruction is one or more of an ENDBRANCH instruction or a Branch Target Identification instruction.
