# US 2021/0243030 A1 · Systems And Methods To Cryptographically Verify An Identity Of An Information Handling System

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- Number: US 2021/0243030 A1
- Document ID: US20210243030A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/777,415
- Filed: 2020-01-30
- Published: 2021-08-05
- Earliest claimed: 2020-01-30
- Assignees: Dell Products L.P.
- Applicants: Dell Products L.P.
- Inventors: Charles D. Robison; Nicholas D. Grobelny; Amy C. Nelson
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210243030A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3234: {involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853)}
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L 9/0877: {using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]}
- H04L 9/0897: {involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 63/0876: {based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint}
- H04L 63/126: {the source of the received data}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Various embodiments of systems and methods are provided to bind a system identifier that uniquely identifies an information handling system (IHS) to the system platform, so that the identity of the IHS can be cryptographically verified. More specifically, the present disclosure provides methods to bind a unique system identifier to an IHS platform, and methods to cryptographically verify the identity of the IHS using the unique system identifier and a plurality of keys generated and stored with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the IHS. Systems are provided herein to perform such methods. As such, the systems and methods disclosed herein enable system identity to be irrefutably verified, thereby preventing theft and misuse of system identity.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system, comprising:
a plurality of information handling systems (IHSs), each having a unique system identifier that uniquely identifies the IHS and a trusted platform module (TPM) configured to store a private Endorsement Key (EK), an EK certificate containing a public EK, a public signing key and a private signing key; and
a first remote system configured to store an entitlement database for the plurality of IHSs, wherein for each IHS, the entitlement database associates the unique system identifier specified for the IHS with the EK certificate and the public signing key stored within the TPM of the IHS; and
a second remote system coupled, via a network, to the first remote system and to the plurality of IHSs, wherein upon receiving a verification request to verify an identity of an IHS, the second remote system is configured to communicate with the first remote system and the IHS to cryptographically verify the identity of the IHS.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system as recited in claim 1, wherein the second remote system is configured to:
receive a unique system identifier specified for the IHS along with the verification request; and
retrieve the EK certificate and the public signing key associated with the unique system identifier from the entitlement database stored within the first remote system.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The system as recited in claim 2, wherein the second remote system is further configured to:
generate a nonce;
encrypt the nonce with a public EK obtained from the EK certificate; and
transmit the encrypted nonce to the IHS.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The system as recited in claim 3, wherein the IHS is configured to:
send the verification request and the unique system identifier specified for the IHS to the second remote system;
receive the encrypted nonce from the second remote system;
decrypt the encrypted nonce using the private EK stored within the TPM;
sign the nonce and the unique system identifier using the private signing key stored within the TPM; and
transmit a signed message containing the nonce and the unique system identifier to the second remote system.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The system as recited in claim 4, wherein the second remote system is further configured to:
receive the signed message containing the nonce and the unique system identifier;
verify the nonce and the unique system identifier contained within the signed message using the public signing key retrieved from the entitlement database stored within the first remote system; and
transmit a verification response to the IHS.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The system as recited in claim 5, wherein the second remote system is configured to transmit a verification response to the IHS confirming the identity of the IHS if:
the nonce contained within the signed message matches the nonce generated by the second remote system; and
the unique system identifier contained within the signed message matches the unique system identifier sent with the verification request.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The system as recited in claim 5, wherein the second remote system is configured to transmit a verification response to the IHS denying the identity of the IHS if:
the nonce contained within the signed message does not match the nonce generated by the second remote system; or
the unique system identifier contained within the signed message does not match the unique system identifier sent with the verification request.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The system as recited in claim 5, wherein the IHS is further configured to:
receive the verification response from the second remote system; and
perform one or more actions based on the verification response.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The system as recited in claim 8, wherein if the verification response denies the identity of the IHS, the one or more actions performed by the IHS include alerting an administrator that the identity of the IHS has been modified, revoking user access to the IHS, deleting data or program code, and/or limiting functionality of the IHS.

### Claim 10

A method performed by an information handling system (IHS) to verify an identity of the IHS, the method comprising:
generating and storing a plurality of keys within a trusted platform module (TPM) of the IHS, wherein the plurality of keys includes a public signing key and a private signing key;
sending a verification request to verify the identity of the IHS, along with a unique system identifier specified for the IHS, to a remote system; and
communicating with the remote system to cryptographically verify the identity of the IHS.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method as recited in claim 10, wherein said communicating comprises:
receiving an encrypted nonce from the remote system;
decrypting the encrypted nonce using a private Endorsement Key (EK) stored within the TPM;
signing the nonce and the unique system identifier using the private signing key stored within the TPM;
transmitting a signed message containing the nonce and the unique system identifier to the remote system; and
receiving a verification response from the remote system.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The method as recited in claim 11, wherein said receiving a verification response comprises receiving a verification response from the remote system confirming the identity of the IHS if:
the nonce contained within the signed message matches the nonce received from the remote system; and
the unique system identifier contained within the signed message matches the unique system identifier sent along with the verification request.

### Claim 13 (depends on 11)

The method as recited in claim 11, wherein said receiving a verification response comprises receiving a verification response from the remote system denying the identity of the IHS if:
the nonce contained within the signed message does not match the nonce received from the remote system; or
the unique system identifier contained within the signed message does not match the unique system identifier sent along with the verification request.

### Claim 14 (depends on 11)

The method as recited in claim 11, further comprising performing one or more actions based upon the verification request received from the remote system.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method as recited in claim 14, wherein if the verification response denies the identity of the IHS, said performing one or more actions includes alerting an administrator that the identity of the IHS has been modified, revoking user access to the IHS, deleting data or program code, and/or limiting functionality of the IHS.

### Claim 16

A method performed by a remote system to verify an identity of an information handling system (IHS), the method comprising:
receiving a verification request to verify the identity of the IHS, along with a unique system identifier specified for the IHS;
using the unique system identifier to retrieve an Endorsement Key (EK) certificate and a public signing key associated with the unique system identifier from an entitlement database stored within another remote system; and
communicating with the IHS to cryptographically verify the identity of the IHS.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method as recited in claim 16, wherein said communicating comprises:
generating a nonce;
encrypting the nonce with a public EK obtained from the EK certificate; and
transmitting the encrypted nonce to the IHS.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The method as recited in claim 17, wherein said communicating further comprises:
receiving a signed message containing the nonce and the unique system identifier, wherein the signed message is generated by a trusted platform module (TPM) of the IHS using a private signing key stored within the TPM;
using the public signing key retrieved from the entitlement database to verify the nonce and the unique system identifier contained within the signed message; and
transmitting a verification response to the IHS.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The method as recited in claim 18, wherein said transmitting a verification response comprises transmitting a verification response confirming the identity of the IHS if:
the nonce contained within the signed message matches the generated nonce; and
the unique system identifier contained within the signed message matches the unique system identifier received along with the verification request.

### Claim 20 (depends on 18)

The method as recited in claim 18, wherein said transmitting a verification response comprises transmitting a verification response denying the identity of the IHS if:
the nonce contained within the signed message does not match the generated nonce; or
the unique system identifier contained within the signed message does not match the unique system identifier received along with the verification request.