# US 2021/0176056 A1 · Chip, Private Key Generation Method, and Trusted Certification Method

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- Number: US 2021/0176056 A1
- Document ID: US20210176056A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/181,841
- Filed: 2021-02-22
- Published: 2021-06-10
- Earliest claimed: 2018-10-09
- Assignees: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
- Applicants: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
- Inventors: Heng Cai
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210176056A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0897: {involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB}
- H04L 9/3265: {using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model}
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 21/72: in cryptographic circuits
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0877: {using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 2209/12: Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A chip includes a security core module. The security core module includes a security core and a memory. The security core module prevents access of an external module that is inside the chip and that is other than the security core module, and the security core module prevents access of an external device outside the chip. The security core is configured to generate a layer 1 public key and a layer 1 private key based on a hash of a first root public key and a UDS of the chip stored in the memory; and the memory is configured to store the layer 1 private key.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A chip comprising:
an external module; and
a security core module comprising:
a memory configured to:
store a first hash of a first root public key and a unique device secret (UDS) of the chip, and
store a layer 1 private key; and
a security core configured to generate a layer 1 public key and the layer 1 private key based on the first hash,
wherein the security core module is configured to prevent access to itself by the external module and by an external device outside the chip.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The chip of claim 1, wherein the security core module comprises an address outside an address range that is accessible by the external module and the external device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The chip of claim 2, wherein the memory is further configured to:
store a second hash of a second root public key; and
store a layer 2 private key,
wherein the security core is further configured to:
generate a layer 2 public key and a layer 2 private key based on the second hash; and
sign a layer 2 certificate using the layer 1 private key,
wherein the layer 2 certificate comprises the layer 2 public key.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The chip of claim 2, wherein the security core is further configured to:
receive verification request information from a challenge device;
run, in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the layer 1 private key in order to create signed target data; and
send the signed target data to the challenge device to prompt the challenge device to verify the signed target data based on the layer 1 public key.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The chip of claim 1, wherein the memory is further configured to:
store a second hash of a second root public key; and
store a layer 2 private key,
wherein the security core is further configured to:
generate a layer 2 public key and a layer 2 private key based on the second hash, and
sign a layer 2 certificate using the layer 1 private key,
wherein the layer 2 certificate comprises the layer 2 public key.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The chip of claim 5, wherein the security core is further configured to:
sign the layer 2 certificate using the layer 1 private key; and
delete the layer 1 private key after the signing.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The chip of claim 6, wherein the security core is further configured to:
receive verification request information from a challenge device;
run, in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the layer 2 private key in order to create signed target data; and
send the signed target data to the challenge device to prompt the challenge device to verify the signed target data based on the layer 2 public key.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The chip of claim 5, wherein the security core is further configured to:
receive verification request information from a challenge device;
run, in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the layer 2 private key in order to create signed target data; and
send the signed target data to the challenge device to prompt the challenge device to verify the signed target data based on the layer 2 public key.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The chip according to claim 1, wherein the security core is further configured to:
receive verification request information from a challenge device;
run, in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the layer 1 private key in order to create signed target data; and
send the signed target data to the challenge device to prompt the challenge device to verify the signed target data based on the layer 1 public key.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The chip of claim 1, further comprising a service core configured to run service core firmware.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The chip of claim 10, further comprising:
a first input/output (I/O) interface coupled to the security core module; and
a second I/O interface coupled to the service core.

### Claim 12

A method comprising:
storing, by a memory of a security core module of a chip, a first hash of a first root public key and a unique device secret (UDS) of the chip;
generating, by a security core of the security core module, a layer 1 public key and a layer 1 private key based on the first hash;
storing, by the memory, the layer 1 private key; and
preventing, by the security core module, access to itself by an external module of the chip and by an external device outside the chip.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, further comprising:
storing, by the memory, a second hash of a second root public key and the UDS;
generating, by the security core, a layer 2 public key and a layer 2 private key based on the second hash;
storing, by the memory, the layer 2 private key; and
signing, by the security core, a layer 2 certificate using the layer 1 private key,
wherein the layer 2 certificate comprises the layer 2 public key.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, further comprising:
signing, by the security core, the layer 2 certificate using the layer 1 private key; and
deleting, by the security core after the signing, the layer 1 private key.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, further comprising:
obtaining, by the security core from a challenge device, verification request information;
running, by the security core in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the layer 2 private key in order to create signed target data; and
sending, by the security core to the challenge device, the signed target data to prompt the challenge device to verify the signed target data based on the layer 2 public key.

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, further comprising:
obtaining, by the security core from a challenge device, verification request information;
running, by the security core in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the layer 1 private key in order to create signed target data; and
sending, by the security core to the challenge device, the signed target data to prompt the challenge device to verify the signed target data based on the layer 1 public key.

### Claim 17

A method comprising:
storing, by a memory of a security core module of a chip, a private key;
obtaining, by a security core from a challenge device, verification request information, wherein the security core is in the security core module;
running, by the security core in response to the verification request information, secure firmware to sign target data based on the private key in order to create signed target data; and
sending, by the security core to the challenge device, the signed target data.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17, wherein obtaining the verification request information comprises reading, by the security core and from a storage space of the memory, the verification request information.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The method of claim 18, wherein before reading the verification request information, the method further comprises receiving, by the security core from a service core of the chip, indication information instructing the security core to read the storage space.

### Claim 20 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17, wherein the target data comprise firmware run by hardware in a target device that comprises the chip, a hash of the firmware, data generated in a running process of the target device, and data stored in the target device.
