# US 2021/0173950 A1 · Data sharing between trusted execution environments

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- Number: US 2021/0173950 A1
- Document ID: US20210173950A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/111,620
- Filed: 2020-12-04
- Published: 2021-06-10
- Earliest claimed: 2019-12-06
- Applicants: TEEware Co., Ltd.
- Inventors: Nohyun Kwak; Yunjong Jeong
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210173950A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/606: {by securing the transmission between two devices or processes}
- G06F 21/70: Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/0827: {involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths (network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18)}
- H04L 9/083: {involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)}
- G06F 2221/2149: Restricted operating environment
- H04L 2463/062: applying encryption of the keys
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Disclosed is a method of sharing data among multiple processing devices incorporating a trusted execution environment. The method may include receiving a data encryption key (DEK) from a management software communicating with multiple processing devices; encrypting the received DEK using a sealing key accessible within the trusted execution environment; storing the encrypted DEK within the storage of the processing device; decrypting, using the sealing key, the stored DEK in response to a data sharing request; encrypting the data to be protected and shared using the decrypted DEK; and storing the encrypted data in a shared storage apparatus.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of sharing data among processing devices incorporating a trusted execution environment, the method comprising:
receiving a data encryption key (DEK) from a management software communicating with multiple processing devices;
encrypting the received data encryption key (DEK) using a sealing key accessible within the trusted execution environment and storing the data encryption key (DEK) within the storage of the processing device;
decrypting, using the sealing key, the stored data encryption key (DEK) in response to a data sharing request;
encrypting data to be protected and shared using the decrypted data encryption key (DEK); and
storing the encrypted data in a shared storage apparatus.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the management software generates the data encryption key (DEK) and performs remote attestation on the processing device to which the generated data encryption key (DEK) is to be transmitted.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the data encryption key (DEK) comprises:
calculating, by a processor of the processing device, a hash value of the software and processor information being executed in the processing device by the processor of the processing device,
electronically signing the hash value using a key generated from a value inherent to the processor,
transmitting the electronic signature to the management software, and
attesting, by the management software, the electronic signature received from the processor of the processing device.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein receiving the data encryption key (DEK) comprises:
establishing a secure communication channel between the processing device and the management software when the management software successfully completes attestation of the electronic signature, and
transmitting the data encryption key (DEK) generated by the management software through the established secure communication channel.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein storing the encrypted data in the shared storage apparatus comprises:
generating a sealing key from a value inherent to the processor of the processing device,
encrypting the received data encryption key (DEK) using the sealing key, and
storing the encrypted data encryption key (DEK) in a storage within the processing device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the other processing devices decrypt the encrypted data, stored in the shared storage apparatus, by using the data encryption keys (DEKs) stored in each of the processing devices.

### Claim 7

A processing device for sharing data incorporating a trusted execution environment, comprising:
a memory; and
a processor connected to the memory and configured to execute at least one instruction stored in the memory,
wherein the processor is configured to:
receive a data encryption key (DEK) from a management software communicating with multiple processing devices,
encrypt the received data encryption key (DEK) using a sealing key accessible within the trusted execution environment and store the encrypted data encryption key (DEK) in a storage within the processing device,
decrypt, using the sealing key, the stored data encryption key (DEK) in response to a data sharing request,
encrypt the data to be protected and shared using the decrypted data encryption key (DEK), and
store the encrypted data in a shared storage apparatus.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The processing device of claim 7, wherein:
the management software generates the data encryption key (DEK) and performs remote attestation on the processing device to which the data encryption key (DEK) generated by the management software is to be transmitted, and
when the processor calculates a hash value for the software and processor information being executed in the processing device, electronically signs the hash value using a key generated from a value inherent to the processor, transmits the electronic signature to the management software, and the management software attests the electronic signature received from the processor of the processing device.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The processing device of claim 8, wherein the processor is configured to:
establish a secure communication channel between the processing device and the management software when the attestation of the electronic signature is successful by the management software, and
transmit the data encryption key (DEK) generated by the management software through the established secure communication channel.

### Claim 10 (depends on 7)

The processing device of claim 7, wherein the processor is configured to:
generate a sealing key from a value inherent to the processor of the processing device,
encrypt the received data encryption key (DEK) using the sealing key, and
store the encrypted data encryption key (DEK) within the storage of the processing device.
