# US 2021/0084071 A1 · Detecting potential domain name system (dns) hijacking by identifying anomalous changes to dns records

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- Number: US 2021/0084071 A1
- Document ID: US20210084071A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/572,813
- Filed: 2019-09-17
- Published: 2021-03-18
- Earliest claimed: 2019-09-17
- Assignees: Fortinet, Inc.
- Applicants: Fortinet, Inc.
- Inventors: Oleksii Mandrychenko
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210084071A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/1466: {Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks}
- G06N 5/01: Dynamic search techniques; Heuristics; Dynamic trees; Branch-and-bound
- G06N 20/00: Machine learning
- H04L 61/4511: using domain name system [DNS]
- H04L 63/0876: {based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint}
- H04L 63/12: {Applying verification of the received information (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32)}
- H04L 63/1425: {Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection}
- H04L 63/1433: {Vulnerability analysis}
- H04L 63/1483: {service impersonation, e.g. phishing, pharming or web spoofing (detection of rogue wireless access points H04W12/12)}
- H04L 63/20: {for managing network security; network security policies in general (filtering policies H04L63/0227)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06N: COMPUTING ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON SPECIFIC COMPUTATIONAL MODELS

## Abstract

Systems and methods are described for scanning or monitoring of Domain Name System (DNS) records of an entity for identifying anomalous changes to the DNS records that may be indicative of possible DNS hijacking. According to one embodiment, DNS monitoring engine running on a network security appliance protecting a private network, or implemented as a cloud-based service can be used for monitoring DNS records of the entity. Any modification in the monitored DNS record(s) can be detected within a pre-defined or configurable time-frame. The detected modification can be determined to be anomalous or not, by assigning a criticality value based on current value and previous value of one or more fields of the DNS record, one or more attributes of the DNS record and one or more derived attributes based on the DNS record.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
monitoring, by a Domain Name System (DNS) monitoring engine running on a computer system, a plurality of DNS records pertaining to one or more domains and subdomains of an entity, by obtaining DNS results from one or more DNS servers for the one or more domains and subdomains;
detecting, by the DNS monitoring engine, a modification of a DNS record of the plurality of DNS records within a pre-defined or configurable time-frame; and
responsive to said detecting, determining, by the DNS monitoring engine, whether the modification is anomalous, by assigning a criticality value to the modification based on a current value and a previous value of one or more fields of the DNS record, one or more attributes of the DNS record and one or more derived attributes based on the DNS record.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said obtaining DNS results from one or more DNS servers for the one or more domains and subdomains comprises causing a plurality of geographically distributed DNS system scanners to issue DNS queries for the one or more domains and subdomains to a plurality of DNS servers from different geographical regions.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more fields are indicative of a name of a service associated with the DNS record or a destination Internet Protocol (IP) address.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the one or more attributes are indicative of a time at which the modification was made or a record type of the DNS record.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4, wherein the one or more derived attributes include a geolocation of the current value of the destination IP, a geolocation of the previous value of the destination IP, a name of the user that allegedly made the change, or metadata associated with the user.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the metadata associated with the user comprises any or a combination of a role of the user in the entity, an email address of the user, a first name of the user and a last name of the user.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein each of the one or more fields, the one or more attributes and the one or more derived attributes is associated with a weight for purposes of assigning the criticality value.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising when the modification is determined to be anomalous, causing, by the DNS monitoring engine, an alert to be sent to a network administrator of the entity.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said assigning a criticality value to the modification comprises inputting the current value and the previous value of one or more fields of the DNS record, the one or more attributes of the DNS record and the one or more derived attributes to a machine learning algorithm implementing a decision tree.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more subdomains are obtained using an enumeration technique.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, wherein the enumeration technique comprises any or a combination of use of an Asynchronous Full Transfer Zone (AXFR) query, use of a keyword-based search for DNS records associated with the entity and obtaining a list of known DNS records associated with the entity.

### Claim 12

A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium embodying a set of instructions, which when executed by one or more processors of a computer system, causes the one or more processors to perform a method comprising:
monitoring, by a Domain Name System (DNS) monitoring engine running on the computer system, a plurality of DNS records pertaining to one or more domains and subdomains of an entity, by obtaining DNS results from one or more DNS servers for the one or more domains and subdomains;
detecting, by the DNS monitoring engine, a modification of a DNS record of the plurality of DNS records within a pre-defined or configurable time-frame; and
responsive to said detecting, determining, by the DNS monitoring engine, whether the modification is anomalous, by assigning a criticality value to the modification based on a current value and a previous value of one or more fields of the DNS record, one or more attributes of the DNS record and one or more derived attributes based on the DNS record.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 12, wherein said obtaining DNS results from one or more DNS servers for the one or more domains and subdomains comprises causing a plurality of geographically distributed DNS system scanners to issue DNS queries for the one or more domains and subdomains to a plurality of DNS servers from different geographical regions.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 12, wherein the one or more fields are indicative of a name of a service associated with the DNS record or a destination Internet Protocol (IP) address.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 14, wherein the one or more attributes are indicative of a time at which the modification was made or a record type of the DNS record.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 15, wherein the one or more derived attributes include a geolocation of the current value of the destination IP, a geolocation of the previous value of the destination IP, a name of the user that allegedly made the change, or metadata associated with the user.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, wherein the metadata associated with the user comprises any or a combination of a role of the user in the entity, an email address of the user, a first name of the user and a last name of the user.

### Claim 18 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 12, wherein each of the one or more fields, the one or more attributes and the one or more derived attributes is associated with a weight for purposes of assigning the criticality value.

### Claim 19 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 12, further comprising when the modification is determined to be anomalous, causing, by the DNS monitoring engine, an alert to be sent to a network administrator of the entity.

### Claim 20 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 12, wherein said assigning a criticality value to the modification comprises inputting the current value and the previous value of one or more fields of the DNS record, the one or more attributes of the DNS record and the one or more derived attributes to a machine learning algorithm implementing a decision tree.

### Claim 21 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 12, wherein the one or more subdomains are obtained using an enumeration technique.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium claim 21, wherein the enumeration technique comprises any or a combination of use of an Asynchronous Full Transfer Zone (AXFR) query, use of a keyword-based search for DNS records associated with the entity and obtaining a list of known DNS records associated with the entity.
