# US 2021/0084038 A1 · Transparently using origin isolation to protect access tokens

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2021/0084038 A1
- Document ID: US20210084038A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/569,574
- Filed: 2019-09-12
- Published: 2021-03-18
- Earliest claimed: 2019-09-12
- Assignees: ForgeRock, Inc.
- Applicants: ForgeRock, Inc.
- Inventors: Jake Feasel
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210084038A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0884: {by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity}
- G06F 9/54: Interprogram communication
- G06F 21/6218: {to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database}
- G06F 21/629: {to features or functions of an application}
- H04L 67/2876: Pairs of inter-processing entities at each side of the network, e.g. split proxies
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

The disclosed technology teaches safely attaching an access token to a browser-based request from a first app loaded by a webpage, without exposing the token to malicious code loaded by the webpage, providing an identity proxy that transparently determines which network requests to relay and a secrets management proxy that provides access tokens transparently to the requests. The identity proxy intercepts an access request from the first app to the resource server and relays the request via the secrets management proxy, which forwards the request to the resource server with an access token, receives a response from the resource server and forwards the response to the identity proxy for return to the first app. The secrets management proxy is implemented in an iFrame that has isolated storage subject to a browser-enforced same origin policy that makes the isolated storage used by the iFrame inaccessible to malicious code on the webpage.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-implemented method of safely attaching an access token to a browser-based request to a resource server, made on behalf of a first app loaded by a webpage, without exposing the access token to a malicious app loaded by the webpage, including:
providing an identity proxy and a secrets management proxy, wherein
the identity proxy transparently determines which network requests to relay via the secrets management proxy; and
the secrets management proxy provides access token management services transparently to the request when communicating with the resource server, including providing access tokens with resource requests to the resource server;
the identity proxy intercepting an access request from the first app to the resource server, determining to reroute, and relaying the access request via the secrets management proxy;
the secrets management proxy providing the access token management services on behalf of the request for interaction with the resource server and forwarding the request to the resource server with the access token attached; and
the secrets management proxy receiving a response from the resource server and forwarding the response to the identity proxy for return to the first app.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further including passing configuration data that includes data for identifying the resource server to the secrets management proxy.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the access tokens by the secrets management proxy further includes requesting and receiving the access tokens from an authorization server.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the secrets management proxy is implemented in an iFrame that has isolated storage subject to a browser-enforced same origin policy that makes the isolated storage used by the iFrame inaccessible to malicious code on the webpage but not within the iFrame.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The computer-implemented method of claim 4, further including the secrets management proxy storing the access tokens in the isolated storage used by the iFrame.

### Claim 6 (depends on 4)

The computer-implemented method of claim 4, wherein obtaining the access tokens by the secrets management proxy further includes retrieving the access token from the isolated storage used by the iFrame.

### Claim 7 (depends on 4)

The computer-implemented method of claim 4, wherein the isolated storage used by the iFrame is accessed via one of an IndexedDB API and a local Storage API provided by the browser.

### Claim 8 (depends on 4)

The computer-implemented method of claim 4, wherein the isolated storage used by the iFrame is in dynamic memory.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the identity proxy uses one of a service worker API and an XMLHttpRequest object customization.

### Claim 10

A tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media, including program instructions loaded into memory that, when executed on processors cause the processors to implement a method of safely attaching an access token to a browser-based request to a resource server, made on behalf of a first app loaded by a webpage, without exposing the access token to a malicious app loaded by the webpage, the method including:
providing an identity proxy and a secrets management proxy, wherein
the identity proxy transparently determines which network requests to relay via the secrets management proxy; and
the secrets management proxy provides access token management services transparently to the request when communicating with the resource server, including providing access tokens to requests to the resource server;
the identity proxy intercepting a request from the first app to the resource server, determining to reroute, and relaying the request via the secrets management proxy;
the secrets management proxy providing the access token management services on behalf of the first app for interaction with the resource server and forwarding the request to the resource server with the access token attached; and
the secrets management proxy receiving a response from the resource server and forwarding the response to the identity proxy for return to the first app.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10, further including passing configuration data that includes data for identifying the resource server to the secrets management proxy.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10, wherein obtaining access tokens by the secrets management proxy further includes requesting and receiving the access tokens from an authorization server.

### Claim 13 (depends on 10)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the secrets management proxy is implemented in an iFrame that has isolated storage subject to a browser-enforced same origin policy that makes the isolated storage used by the iFrame inaccessible to malicious code on the webpage but not within the iFrame.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 13, further including the secrets management proxy storing the access tokens in the isolated storage used by the iFrame.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 13, wherein obtaining access tokens by the secrets management proxy further includes retrieving the access token from the isolated storage used by the iFrame.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 13, wherein the isolated storage used by the iFrame is accessed via one of an IndexedDB API, a local Storage API provided by the browser and dynamic memory.

### Claim 17 (depends on 10)

The tangible non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10, wherein the identity proxy uses one of a service worker API and an XMLHttpRequest object customization.

### Claim 18 (depends on 10)

A system for safely attaching an access token to a browser-based request to a resource server, made on behalf of a first app loaded by a webpage, without exposing the access token to a malicious app loaded by the webpage, the system including a processor, memory coupled to the processor and program instructions from the non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10 loaded into the memory.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, wherein the program instructions extend the method including passing configuration data that includes data for identifying the resource server to the secrets management proxy.

### Claim 20 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, wherein the secrets management proxy is implemented in an iFrame that has isolated storage subject to a browser-enforced same origin policy that makes the isolated storage used by the iFrame inaccessible to malicious code on the webpage but not within the iFrame.
