# US 2021/0064786 A1 · Authentication of Medical Device Computing Systems by Using Metadata Signature

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2021/0064786 A1
- Document ID: US20210064786A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/560,534
- Filed: 2019-09-04
- Published: 2021-03-04
- Earliest claimed: 2019-09-04
- Assignees: Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
- Applicants: Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
- Inventors: Norbert Leinfellner; Joseph Edwin Inase Manakkil; Paolo Pochendorfer
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20210064786A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/73: by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
- G06F 21/70: Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F 21/71: to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F 21/76: in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
- H04L 9/0819: {Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) (network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062)}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/3226: {using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083)}
- H04L 63/083: {using passwords (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226)}
- G06F 21/30: Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 63/0876: {based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint}
- H04L 2209/34: Encoding or coding, e.g. Huffman coding or error correction
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Computer code embedded in an electronic component (e.g., a processor, a sensor, etc.) of a medical device, such as a dialysis machine, can be authenticated by comparing a metadata signature derived from the computer code of the electronic component to a key derived from a pre-authenticated code associated with the electronic component. The metadata signature can be derived by running an error-check/error-correct algorithm (e.g., SHA256) on the computer code of the electronic component. A use of the metadata signature enables detection of any unauthorized changes to the computer code as compared to the pre-authenticated code.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-implemented method comprising:
requesting, by a security authentication engine (SAE) of a computing system and from an electronic component of the computing system, a metadata signature specific to the electronic component;
receiving, by the SAE, the metadata signature from the electronic component, the metadata signature being derived from an error-check/error-correct code paired with a computer code embedded in the electronic component;
encrypting, by the SAE, the metadata signature to generate a first encrypted metadata; and
determining, by the SAE, that the first encrypted metadata substantially matches a first key associated with the electronic component and stored in the SAE, and in response:
providing, by the SAE, the first key to the electronic component as a validation key to be used by the electronic device in communications with other electronic components of the computing system.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first key is stored in a lookup table, the lookup table including a plurality of keys, each key of the plurality of keys being associated with a respective electronic component of the computing system.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first key is part of a key pair associated with the electronic component, the key pair including a second key, and
wherein the SAE requests the metadata signature by sending a message that includes the second key to the electronic component.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the metadata signature is generated by decrypting the second key based on the computer code embedded in the electronic component.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the computing system includes a plurality of subsystems and the electronic component resides on a first subsystem of the plurality of subsystems, and
wherein the SAE requests the metadata signature in response to determining that the first subsystem is a valid subsystem of the computing system.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the determining that the first subsystem is a valid system comprises:
receiving, by the SAE and from the electronic component, a first identification data of the first subsystem;
encrypting, by the SAE, the identification data to generate a first encrypted identification data; and
determining, by the SAE, that the first encrypted identification data is listed in a lookup table stored on the SAE, the lookup table including a plurality of encrypted identifications associated with the plurality of subsystems.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the metadata signature is a checksum obtained by running the error-check/error-correct code on the computer code embedded in the electronic component.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first key is removed from the electronic component upon a shutdown or a reboot of the computing system.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the computing system is a peritoneal dialysis machine or a hemodialysis machine.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising determining, by the SAE, that the first encrypted metadata does not substantially match any key stored in the lookup table, and in response communicating with a central security system to verify whether an authorized change was made on the computer code of the electronic component.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, further comprising:
receiving a message from the central security system confirming that an authorized change was made on the computer code; and
storing a new key in the lookup table for the electronic component, the new key being generated based on the metadata signature.

### Claim 12

A non-transitory, computer-readable medium storing one or more instructions executable by a computer system to perform operations comprising:
requesting, from an electronic component of the computing system, a metadata signature specific to the electronic component;
receiving the metadata signature from the electronic component, the metadata signature being derived from an error-check/error-correct code paired with a computer code embedded in the electronic component;
encrypting the metadata signature to generate a first encrypted metadata; and
determining that the first encrypted metadata substantially matches a first key associated with the electronic component and stored in the SAE, and in response:
providing the first key to the electronic component as a validation key to be used by the electronic device in communications with other electronic components of the computing system.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the first key is stored in a lookup table, the lookup table including a plurality of keys, each key of the plurality of keys being associated with a respective electronic component of the computing system.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the first key is part of a key pair associated with the electronic component, the key pair including a second key, and
wherein the SAE requests the metadata signature by sending a message that includes the second key to the electronic component.

### Claim 15 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the computing system includes a plurality of subsystems and the electronic component resides on a first subsystem of the plurality of subsystems, and
wherein the SAE requests the metadata signature in response to determining that the first subsystem is a valid subsystem of the computing system

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the determining that the first subsystem is a valid system comprises:
receiving, from the electronic component, a first identification data of the first subsystem;
encrypting the identification data to generate a first encrypted identification data; and
determining that the first encrypted identification data is listed in a lookup table stored on the SAE, the lookup table including a plurality of encrypted identifications associated with the plurality of subsystems.

### Claim 17

A system, comprising:
a security authentication engine (SAE) comprising one or more field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA); and
a computer-readable storage device coupled to the SAE and having instructions stored thereon which, when executed by the SAE, cause the SAE to perform operations comprising:
requesting, from an electronic component of the computing system, a metadata signature specific to the electronic component;
receiving the metadata signature from the electronic component, the metadata signature being derived from an error-check/error-correct code paired with a computer code embedded in the electronic component;
encrypting the metadata signature to generate a first encrypted metadata; and
determining that the first encrypted metadata substantially matches a first key associated with the electronic component and stored in the SAE, and in response:
providing, by the SAE, the first key to the electronic component as a validation key to be used by the electronic device in communications with other electronic components of the computing system.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The system of claim 17, wherein the first key is stored in a lookup table, the lookup table including a plurality of keys, each key of the plurality of keys being associated with a respective electronic component of the computing system.

### Claim 19 (depends on 17)

The system of claim 17, wherein the first key is part of a key pair associated with the electronic component, the key pair including a second key, and
wherein the SAE requests the metadata signature by sending a message that includes the second key to the electronic component.

### Claim 20 (depends on 17)

The system of claim 17, wherein the computing system includes a plurality of subsystems and the electronic component resides on a first subsystem of the plurality of subsystems, and
wherein the SAE requests the metadata signature in response to determining that the first subsystem is a valid subsystem of the computing system by:
receiving, from the electronic component, a first identification data of the first subsystem;
encrypting the identification data to generate a first encrypted identification data; and
determining that the first encrypted identification data is listed in a lookup table stored on the SAE, the lookup table including a plurality of encrypted identifications associated with the plurality of subsystems.
