# US 2020/0396076 A1 · Public/Private Key Biometric Authentication System

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2020/0396076 A1
- Document ID: US20200396076A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/005,941
- Filed: 2020-08-28
- Published: 2020-12-17
- Earliest claimed: 2015-11-13
- Assignees: Badge Inc.
- Applicants: Badge Inc.
- Inventors: Charles H. Herder, III; Tina P. Srivastava
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20200396076A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3231: {Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using biometrical features in a packet data network H04L63/0861)}
- G06F 21/32: using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- H04L 9/0618: {Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G06F 2221/2117: User registration
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data, and may be used to provide authentication in addition to, or in lieu of, passwords or cryptographic tokens. Various use cases are disclosed, including: enrollment, authentication, establishing and using a secure communications channel, and cryptographically signing a message.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A non-transitory computer readable storage medium encoded with instructions that, when executed by a computing facility, establish computer processes for generating a biometric public key for an individual based on biometric data of the individual, without the need for non-transient storage of the biometric data, the computer processes comprising:
receiving by a computing facility, from a transducer, a digital electronic signal that characterizes a biometric of the individual;
extracting by the computing facility, from the digital electronic signal, (a) a set of biometric values of the individual and (b), for each member of the set of biometric values of the individual, a confidence value indicating a degree of confidence that the corresponding biometric value is stable between characterizations;
using the confidence values to select, by the computing facility, only some, but not all, of the biometric values in the set extracted from the digital electronic signal, the selected biometric values being a confident subset of the set of biometric values of the individual, the confident subset excluding biometric values deemed to be unreliable as a discriminant of an identity of the individual based on the biometric;
generating, by the computing facility, a secret number;
computing, by the computing facility, the biometric public key based on the secret number and the confident subset, wherein the biometric public key verifiably characterizes both the biometric data of the individual and the secret number without the need for non-transient storage of either the confident subset or the secret number; and
storing the biometric public key in a storage facility.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 1, wherein the storage facility for storing the biometric public key is a facility selected from the group consisting of a public data source, a non-transitory data store, and a cryptographic token.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 1, wherein the computer processes further comprise:
associating, by the computing facility, the biometric public key with a one-way function of the secret number; and
storing the one-way function of the secret number in the storage facility.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 3, wherein the one-way function is a cryptographic hash function.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 1, wherein generating the secret number includes computing and storing a hash of the secret number in the storage facility.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 1, wherein the confident subset is a vector having N rows and 1 column of bits.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 6, wherein the secret number is a vector having M rows and 1 column of bits.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 7, wherein the biometric public key (i) is a vector having N rows and 1 column of bits and (ii) is computed using a matrix having N rows and M columns of bits.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 8, wherein the biometric public key is computed by multiplying the secret number and the matrix, and adding the confident subset.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 8, wherein the matrix is associated uniquely with the individual, is associated uniquely with the computing facility, or is permanently fixed as a design parameter wherein the same matrix can be used to authenticate multiple subjects or enroll multiple individuals.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 1, wherein the computer processes further comprise ensuring integrity of the transducer.

### Claim 12

A computer-implemented method of generating a biometric public key for an individual based on biometric data of the individual, without the need for non-transient storage of the biometric data, the method comprising:
receiving by a computing facility, from a transducer, a digital electronic signal that characterizes a biometric of the individual;
extracting by the computing facility, from the digital electronic signal, (a) a set of biometric values of the individual and (b), for each member of the set of biometric values of the individual, a confidence value indicating a degree of confidence that the corresponding biometric value is stable between characterizations;
using the confidence values to select, by the computing facility, only some, but not all, of the biometric values in the set extracted from the digital electronic signal, the selected biometric values being a confident subset of the set of biometric values of the individual, the confident subset excluding biometric values deemed to be unreliable as a discriminant of an identity of the individual based on the biometric;
generating, by the computing facility, a secret number;
computing, by the computing facility, the biometric public key based on the secret number and the confident subset, wherein the biometric public key verifiably characterizes both the biometric data of the individual and the secret number without the need for non-transient storage of either the confident subset or the secret number; and
storing the biometric public key in a storage facility.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

A method according to claim 12, wherein the storage facility for storing the biometric public key is a facility selected from the group consisting of a public data source, a non-transitory data store, and a cryptographic token.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

A method according to claim 12, further comprising:
associating, by the computing facility, the biometric public key with a one-way function of the secret number; and
storing the one-way function of the secret number in the storage facility.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

A method according to claim 14, wherein the one-way function is a cryptographic hash function.

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

A method according to claim 12, wherein generating the secret number includes computing and storing a hash of the secret number in the storage facility.

### Claim 17 (depends on 12)

A method according to claim 12, wherein the confident subset is a vector having N rows and 1 column of bits.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

A method according to claim 17, wherein the secret number is a vector having M rows and 1 column of bits.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

A method according to claim 18, wherein the biometric public key (i) is a vector having N rows and 1 column of bits and (ii) is computed using a matrix having N rows and M columns of bits.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

A method according to claim 19, wherein the biometric public key is computed by multiplying the secret number and the matrix, and adding the confident subset.

### Claim 21 (depends on 19)

A method according to claim 19, wherein the matrix is associated uniquely with the individual, is associated uniquely with the computing facility, or is permanently fixed as a design parameter wherein the same matrix can be used to authenticate multiple subjects or enroll multiple individuals.

### Claim 22 (depends on 12)

A method according to claim 12, further comprising ensuring integrity of the transducer.

### Claim 23

A non-transitory computer readable storage medium encoded with instructions that, when executed by a computing facility, establish computer processes for using biometric data to authenticate a subject as an individual whose biometric data has been previously obtained using a first transducer, without the need for non-transient storage of the biometric data, the computer processes comprising:
receiving by a computing facility, from a second transducer coupled to the computing facility, a digital electronic signal that characterizes a biometric of the subject;
extracting by the computing facility, from the digital electronic signal, (a) a set of biometric values of the subject and (b), for each member of the set of biometric values of the subject, a confidence value indicating a degree of confidence that the corresponding biometric value is stable between characterizations;
using the confidence values to select, by the computing facility, only some, but not all, of the biometric values in the set extracted from the digital electronic signal, the selected biometric values being a confident subset of the set of biometric values of the subject, the confident subset excluding biometric values deemed to be unreliable as a discriminant of an identity of the subject based on the biometric;
receiving by the computing facility, from a storage facility, a biometric public key that was computed based on a secret number and the biometric data of the individual that has been previously obtained using the first transducer, wherein the biometric public key verifiably characterizes both the biometric data of the individual and the secret number without the need for non-transient storage of either the biometric data of the individual or the secret number;
computing, by the computing facility, a candidate value for the secret number using the biometric public key and the confident subset;
performing an authentication process by determining whether the candidate value for the secret number is deemed equivalent to the secret number characterized by the biometric public key; and
authenticating the subject as the individual when the candidate value for the secret number is deemed equivalent to the secret number.

### Claim 24 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the computer processes further comprise receiving, by the computing facility from the storage facility, a one-way function of the secret number, wherein authenticating the subject as the individual includes applying the one-way function to the candidate value for the secret number and comparing the result to the received one-way function of the secret number.

### Claim 25 (depends on 24)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 24, wherein the one-way function is a cryptographic hash function.

### Claim 26 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the biometric public key includes data comprising a bitwise exclusive OR of (a) a vector of biometric values of the individual, with (b) a matrix product of a matrix with a representation of the secret number as a vector of bits.

### Claim 27 (depends on 26)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 26, wherein the matrix is associated uniquely with the individual, or is associated uniquely with the computing facility, or is permanently fixed as a design parameter wherein the same matrix can be used to authenticate multiple subjects.

### Claim 28 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the computer processes further comprise, using, by the computing facility, biometric data pertaining to a different measurable characteristic to authenticate a second subject as a second individual whose biometric data has been previously obtained.

### Claim 29 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the computer processes further comprise decrypting, by the computing facility using the candidate value for the secret number, encrypted cipher text received by a computing device in which the computing facility is disposed.

### Claim 30 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the computer processes further comprise digitally signing a message, by the computing facility, using the candidate value for the secret number.

### Claim 31 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the computer processes further comprise:
receiving encrypted firmware for booting a computing device in which the computing facility is disposed, by the computing facility, from a memory of the computing device;
decrypting, by the computing facility using the candidate value for the secret number, the encrypted firmware to produce decrypted firmware; and
providing the decrypted firmware by the computing facility to a computing processor of the computing device.

### Claim 32 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 23, wherein the computer processes further comprise executing a cryptographic algorithm that operates on the secret number, by the computing facility, responsive to a request message from an application executing on a computing processor of a computing device in which the computing facility is disposed.
