# US 2020/0394302 A1 · Attack detection device, computer readable medium, and attack detection method

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2020/0394302 A1
- Document ID: US20200394302A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 17/009,188
- Filed: 2020-09-01
- Published: 2020-12-17
- Earliest claimed: 2018-04-24
- Assignees: Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
- Applicants: Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
- Inventors: Shoei NASHIMOTO; Daisuke SUZUKI
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20200394302A1

## CPC

- G01D 3/08: with provision for safeguarding the apparatus, e.g. against abnormal operation, against breakdown
- G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities}
- G01C 9/02: Details
- G01C 21/16: by integrating acceleration or speed, i.e. inertial navigation
- G01C 25/00: Manufacturing, calibrating, cleaning, or repairing instruments or devices referred to in the other groups of this subclass (testing, calibrating or compensating compasses G01C17/38)
- G01D 21/00: Measuring or testing not otherwise provided for
- G01P 21/00: Testing or calibrating of apparatus or devices covered by the preceding groups
- G06F 21/554: {involving event detection and direct action}
- G06F 21/567: {using dedicated hardware}
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G01D: MEASURING NOT SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEASURING TWO OR MORE VARIABLES NOT COVERED IN A SINGLE OTHER SUBCLASS; TARIFF METERING APPARATUS; MEASURING OR TESTING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- G01C: MEASURING DISTANCES, LEVELS OR BEARINGS; SURVEYING; NAVIGATION; GYROSCOPIC INSTRUMENTS; PHOTOGRAMMETRY OR VIDEOGRAMMETRY (measuring liquid level G01F; radio navigation, determining distance or velocity by use of propagation effects, e.g. Doppler effects, propagation time, of radio waves, analogous arrangements using other waves G01S)
- G01P: MEASURING LINEAR OR ANGULAR SPEED, ACCELERATION, DECELERATION, OR SHOCK; INDICATING PRESENCE, ABSENCE, OR DIRECTION, OF MOVEMENT (measuring or recording blood flow A61B5/02, A61B8/06; monitoring speed or deceleration of electrically-propelled vehicles B60L3/00; vehicle lighting systems adapted to indicate speed B60Q1/54; determining position or course in navigation, measuring ground distance in geodesy or surveying G01C; combined measuring devices for measuring two or more variables of movement G01C23/00; measuring velocity of sound G01H; measuring velocity of light G01J7/00; measuring direction or velocity of solid objects by reception or emission of radiowaves or other waves and based on propagation effects, e.g. Doppler effect, propagation time, direction of propagation, G01S; measuring speed of nuclear radiation G01T; measuring acceleration of gravity G01V; {measuring or recording the speed of trains B61L23/00; speed indicators incorporated in motor vehicles B60K35/00; measuring frequency or phase G01R; traffic control G08G})

## Abstract

A correlation calculation unit (21) receives magnetic data and acceleration data, which are sensor data, from a sensor fusion unit (12a), and calculates a correlation value. An attack determination unit (22) acquires the correlation value from the correlation calculation unit (21), and acquires, as error data, a gravity vector error and a geomagnetic vector error that are calculated in the process of sensor fusion from the sensor fusion unit (12a). The attack determination unit (22) determines the presence or absence of an attack on an inclination sensor module (1a) by comparing the correlation value with a threshold value corresponding to the correlation value and comparing the error data with a threshold value corresponding to the error data.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An attack detection device comprising:
processing circuitry to:
acquire respective intermediate values of a plurality of physical quantities during execution of a sensor fusion algorithm that calculates an output by combining the plurality of physical quantities observed by a plurality of sensors of different types, the sensor fusion algorithm calculating the respective intermediate values of the plurality of physical quantities, and changing the output using the respective intermediate values; and
determine whether there is an attack on at least one sensor of the plurality of sensors by comparing each of the respective intermediate values with an intermediate-value threshold value, which is a threshold value.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The attack detection device according to claim 1,
wherein the respective intermediate values are respective error data of the plurality of physical quantities observed by the plurality of sensors of different types.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The attack detection device according to claim 1,
wherein the processing circuitry acquires sensor data of two sensors of the plurality of sensors, calculates a similarity between two sets of sensor data, and
determines whether there is an attack on at least one sensor of the plurality of sensors by comparing a similarity threshold value, which is a threshold value, with the similarity.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The attack detection device according to claim 2,
wherein the processing circuitry acquires sensor data of two sensors of the plurality of sensors, calculates a similarity between two sets of sensor data, and
determines whether there is an attack on at least one sensor of the plurality of sensors by comparing a similarity threshold value, which is a threshold value, with the similarity.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The attack detection device according to claim 3,
wherein types of physical quantities that can be observed by the two sensors are different from each other.

### Claim 6 (depends on 4)

The attack detection device according to claim 4,
wherein types of physical quantities that can be observed by the two sensors are different from each other.

### Claim 7 (depends on 3)

The attack detection device according to claim 3,
wherein the processing circuitry calculates a correlation value as the similarity.

### Claim 8 (depends on 4)

The attack detection device according to claim 4,
wherein the processing circuitry calculates a correlation value as the similarity.

### Claim 9 (depends on 5)

The attack detection device according to claim 5,
wherein the processing circuitry calculates a correlation value as the similarity.

### Claim 10 (depends on 6)

The attack detection device according to claim 6,
wherein the processing circuitry calculates a correlation value as the similarity.

### Claim 11 (depends on 3)

The attack detection device according to claim 3,
wherein the processing circuitry weights the intermediate-value threshold value, depending on a type of each of the intermediate values, and weights the similarity threshold value, depending on types of the two sets of sensor data.

### Claim 12 (depends on 4)

The attack detection device according to claim 4,
wherein the processing circuitry weights the intermediate-value threshold value, depending on a type of each of the intermediate values, and weights the similarity threshold value, depending on types of the two sets of sensor data.

### Claim 13

A non-transitory computer readable medium storing an attack detection program for causing a computer to execute:
a process of acquiring respective intermediate values of a plurality of physical quantities during execution of a sensor fusion algorithm that calculates an output by combining the plurality of physical quantities observed by a plurality of sensors of different types, the sensor fusion algorithm calculating the respective intermediate values of the plurality of physical quantities, and changing the output using the respective intermediate values; and
a process of determining whether there is an attack on at least one sensor of the plurality of sensors by comparing each of the respective intermediate values with an intermediate-value threshold value, which is a threshold value.

### Claim 14

An attack detection method comprising:
acquiring respective intermediate values of a plurality of physical quantities during execution of a sensor fusion algorithm that calculates an output by combining the plurality of physical quantities observed by a plurality of sensors of different types, the sensor fusion algorithm calculating the respective intermediate values of the plurality of physical quantities, and changing the output using the respective intermediate values; and
determining whether there is an attack on at least one sensor of the plurality of sensors by comparing each of the respective intermediate values with an intermediate-value threshold value, which is a threshold value.
