# US 2020/0266990 A1 · Communicating with a vehicle tracking device via short message service (sms) secured by single-use credentials

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- Number: US 2020/0266990 A1
- Document ID: US20200266990A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/795,924
- Filed: 2020-02-20
- Published: 2020-08-20
- Earliest claimed: 2019-02-20
- Assignees: Spireon, Inc.
- Applicants: Spireon, Inc.
- Inventors: Sarodge Dechgan; Amir Kashani; Albert R. Beukman
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20200266990A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3228: {One-time or temporary data, i.e. information which is sent for every authentication or authorization, e.g. one-time-password, one-time-token or one-time-key}
- H04L 9/0838: {Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these (network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061)}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0863: {involving passwords or one-time passwords (network architectures or network communication protocols for using one-time keys in a packet data network H04L63/067)}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 9/3297: {involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps}
- H04L 63/0838: {using one-time-passwords}
- H04W 4/029: Location-based management or tracking services
- H04W 4/14: Short messaging services, e.g. short message services [SMS] or unstructured supplementary service data [USSD]
- H04W 4/40: for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W 12/06: Authentication
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04L 2209/84: Vehicles
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

A system addresses a security vulnerability in sending commands to a vehicle tracking device via SMS test messaging. The system provides a single-use credential value for authenticating the SMS communication link before it can be used to command the vehicle tracking device. The single-use credential value, also referred to herein as a One-Time Personal Identification Number (OTPIN), is preferably time-based so that it can be used only once.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for providing secure communications between a backend server and a vehicle tracking device, comprising:
(a) generating a command message including a command to be executed by the vehicle tracking device;
(b) generating a single-use credential value based at least in part on a shared key value and a first time value, wherein the single-use credential value is valid only during a first time window having a duration of X seconds, and wherein the first time value falls within the first time window;
(c) attaching the single-use credential value to the command message;
(d) sending the command message from the backend server to the vehicle tracking device via a wireless communication network;
(e) receiving the command message at the vehicle tracking device;
(f) a processor of the vehicle tracking device generating a first expected credential value based at least in part on the shared key value and a second time value;
(g) the processor of the vehicle tracking device comparing the first expected credential value to the single-use credential value attached to the command message; and
(h) the vehicle tracking device executing the command included in the command message only if the first expected credential value matches the single-use credential value attached to the command message.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the first expected credential value matches the single-use credential value only if the second time value falls within the first time window.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein if the first expected credential value does not match the single-use credential value, the method further comprises:
(f1) the processor of the vehicle tracking device generating a second expected credential value based at least in part on the shared key value and a time value that falls within a preceding time window that immediately precedes a time window into which the second time value falls;
(g1) the processor of the vehicle tracking device comparing the second expected credential value to the single-use credential value attached to the command message; and
(h1) the vehicle tracking device executing the command included in the command message only if the second expected credential value matches the single-use credential value attached to the command message.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3 wherein the preceding time window corresponds to the first time window.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the second time value corresponds to a time at which the command message is received at the vehicle tracking device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5 wherein the time at which the command message is received at the vehicle tracking device is determined based on reference to timing signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein step (c) comprises prepending the single-use credential value to the command message.

### Claim 8

A method for providing secure communications between a backend server and a vehicle tracking device, comprising:
(a) generating a command message including a command to be executed by the vehicle tracking device;
(b) generating a single-use credential value based at least in part on a shared key value and a first time value, wherein the single-use credential value is valid only during a first time window having a duration of X seconds, and wherein the first time value falls within the first time window;
(c) attaching the single-use credential value to the command message;
(d) attaching a timestamp value to the command message, wherein the timestamp value corresponds to the first time value;
(e) sending the command message from the backend server to the vehicle tracking device via a wireless communication network;
(f) receiving the command message at the vehicle tracking device;
(g) a processor of the vehicle tracking device generating an expected credential value based at least in part on the shared key value and the timestamp value attached to the command message;
(h) the processor of the vehicle tracking device comparing the expected credential value to the single-use credential value attached to the command message; and
(i) the vehicle tracking device executing the command included in the command message only if the expected credential value matches the single-use credential value attached to the command message.

### Claim 9

A method for providing secure communications between a backend server and a vehicle tracking device, comprising:
(a) generating a command message including a command to be executed by the vehicle tracking device;
(b) generating a single-use credential value based at least in part on a shared key value and a first time value, wherein the single-use credential value is valid only during a first time window having a duration of X seconds, and wherein the first time value falls within the first time window;
(c) encrypting the command message using the single-use credential value as an encryption key;
(d) sending the command message from the backend server to the vehicle tracking device via a wireless communication network;
(e) receiving the command message at the vehicle tracking device;
(f) a processor of the vehicle tracking device generating an expected credential value based at least in part on the shared key value and a second time value;
(g) the processor of the vehicle tracking device decrypting the command message using the expected credential value as a decryption key; and
(h) the vehicle tracking device executing the command included in the command message.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9 wherein the processor of the vehicle tracking device is able to decrypt the command message only if the expected credential value matches the single-use credential value attached to the command message.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10 wherein the expected credential value matches the single-use credential value only if the second time value falls within the first time window.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9 wherein the second time value corresponds to a time at which the command message is received at the vehicle tracking device.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12 wherein the time at which the command message is received at the vehicle tracking device is determined based on reference to timing signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.
