# US 2019/0379540 A1 · Unmanaged secure inter-application data communications

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- Number: US 2019/0379540 A1
- Document ID: US20190379540A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/004,013
- Filed: 2018-06-08
- Published: 2019-12-12
- Earliest claimed: 2018-06-08
- Assignees: VMware, Inc.
- Applicants: VMware, Inc.
- Inventors: Eugene Liderman; Stephen Louis Turner; Simon Brooks
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190379540A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- G06F 9/4843: {by program, e.g. task dispatcher, supervisor, operating system}
- G06F 9/54: Interprogram communication
- G06F 21/33: using certificates
- G06F 21/44: Program or device authentication
- G06F 21/606: {by securing the transmission between two devices or processes}
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Aspects of secure inter-application data communications are described. In one example, a first application executing on a computing device obtains an identity certificate. The identity certificate can include a unique identifier of the computing device and a public key of the first application. To obtain the public keys of other applications executing on the computing device, the first application can query a management computing environment using the identity certificate. Once the computing device is authenticated by the management computing environment, the management computing environment can store the public key of the first application and return any public keys of other applications executing on the computing device. Once the public keys have been exchanged between the applications, the applications can encrypt and sign data packages for secure data communications between each other.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for secure data sharing between applications in a computing device, comprising:
obtaining, by a first application executed by the computing device, an identity certificate associated with the first application, wherein the identity certificate comprises: a unique identifier associated with the computing device, and a public key associated with the first application;
authenticating the first application with a management computing environment using the identity certificate associated with the first application;
obtaining, from the management computing environment, a public key associated with a second application executed by the computing device;
causing the public key associated with the second application to be stored in a key store of the computing device;
causing, by the first application, an encrypted data package to be generated using the public key associated with the second application; and
causing, by the first application, the encrypted data package to be communicated to the second application through an inter-application communication process.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
prior to causing the encrypted data package to be generated, confirming a revocation status of the public key associated with the second application through a certificate status protocol communication; and
causing the revocation status of the public key associated with the second application to be cached in the key store of the computing device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method according to claim 2, further comprising:
causing the revocation status to be cached for a length of time based on a time to live (TTL) parameter received through the certificate status protocol communication.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, wherein the encrypted data package includes a signature of the first application.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method according to claim 4, further comprising:
generating, by the first application, a key pair, the key pair comprising the public key associated with the first application and a private key associated with the first application; and
signing a hash of data in the encrypted data package with the private key associated with the first application to generate the signature of the first application.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, wherein obtaining the identity certificate for the first application comprises sending a certificate signing request to a certificate authority.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
receiving, by the first application, a second encrypted data package, the second encrypted data package being generated by a second application executed by the computing device; and
decrypting the second encrypted data package using a private key associated with the first application.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method according to claim 7, further comprising:
verifying a signature of the second application to determine an identity of second the application.

### Claim 9

A non-transitory computer-readable medium embodying program code for secure data sharing between applications that, when executed by a computing device, directs the computing device to at least:
obtain, by a first application executed by the computing device, an identity certificate associated with the first application, wherein the identity certificate comprises: a unique identifier associated with the computing device, and a public key associated with the first application;
authenticate the first application with a management computing environment using the identity certificate associated with the first application;
obtain, from the management computing environment, a public key associated with a second application executed by the computing device;
cause the public key associated with the second application to be stored in a key store of the computing device;
cause, by the first application, an encrypted data package to be generated using the public key associated with the second application; and
cause, by the first application, the encrypted data package to be communicated to the second application through an inter-application communication process.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 9, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
confirm a revocation status of the public key associated with the second application through a certificate status protocol communication; and
cause the revocation status of the public key associated with the second application to be cached in the key store of the computing device.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 10, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
cause the revocation status to be cached for a length of time based on a time to live (TTL) parameter received through the certificate status protocol communication.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 9, wherein the encrypted data package includes a signature of the first application.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 12, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
generate, by the first application, a key pair, the key pair comprising the public key associated with the first application and a private key associated with the first application; and
sign a hash of data in the encrypted data package with the private key associated with the first application to generate the signature of the first application.

### Claim 14 (depends on 9)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 9, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
receive, by the first application, a second encrypted data package, the second encrypted data package being generated by a second application executed by the computing device; and
decrypt the second encrypted data package using a private key associated with the first application.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium according to claim 14, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
verify a signature of the second application to determine an identity of second the application.

### Claim 16

A computing device for secure data sharing between applications, comprising:
a memory device configured to store computer-readable instructions thereon; and
at least one processing device configured, through execution of the computer-readable instructions, to direct the computing device to at least:
obtain, by a first application executed by the computing device, an identity certificate associated with the first application, wherein the identity certificate comprises: a unique identifier associated with the computing device, and a public key associated with the first application;
authenticate the first application with a management computing environment using the identity certificate associated with the first application;
obtain, from the management computing environment, a public key associated with a second application executed by the computing device;
cause the public key associated with the second application to be stored in a key store of the computing device;
cause, by the first application, an encrypted data package to be generated using the public key associated with the second application; and
cause, by the first application, the encrypted data package to be communicated to the second application through an inter-application communication process.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The computing device according to claim 16, wherein the computing device is further configured to at least:
confirm a revocation status of the public key associated with the second application through a certificate status protocol communication; and
cause the revocation status of the public key associated with the second application to be cached in the key store of the computing device.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The computing device according to claim 17, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
cause the revocation status to be cached for a length of time based on a time to live (TTL) parameter received through the certificate status protocol communication.

### Claim 19 (depends on 16)

The computing device according to claim 16, wherein the encrypted data package includes a signature of the first application.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The computing device according to claim 19, wherein the computing device is further directed to at least:
generate, by the first application, a key pair, the key pair comprising the public key associated with the first application and a private key associated with the first application; and
sign a hash of data in the encrypted data package with the private key associated with the first application to generate the signature of the first application.
