# US 2019/0377879 A1 · Secure boot with resistance to differential power analysis and other external monitoring attacks

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- Number: US 2019/0377879 A1
- Document ID: US20190377879A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/240,671
- Filed: 2019-01-04
- Published: 2019-12-12
- Earliest claimed: 2009-12-04
- Assignees: Cryptography Research, Inc.
- Applicants: Cryptography Research, Inc.
- Inventors: Paul C. Kocher; Pankaj Rohatgi; Joshua M. Jaffe
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190377879A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- G06F 8/71: Version control (security arrangements therefor G06F21/57); Configuration management
- G06F 9/44505: {Configuring for program initiating, e.g. using registry, configuration files}
- G06F 12/1408: {by using cryptography (for digital transmission H04L9/00)}
- G06F 21/556: {involving covert channels, i.e. data leakage between processes (inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack G06F21/755)}
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F 21/76: in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
- H04L 9/003: {for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]}
- H04L 9/0631: {Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms}
- H04L 9/085: {Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/16: the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
- H04L 9/3236: {using cryptographic hash functions}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- G06F 21/755: {with measures against power attack}
- G06F 2212/402: Encrypted data
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G06F 2221/2107: File encryption
- G06F 2221/2125: Just-in-time application of countermeasures, e.g., on-the-fly decryption, just-in-time obfuscation or de-obfuscation
- G06F 2221/2145: Inheriting rights or properties, e.g., propagation of permissions or restrictions within a hierarchy
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/0869: {for achieving mutual authentication (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273)}
- H04L 2209/24: Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
- H04L 2209/56: Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
- H04L 2463/061: applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A computing device includes a secure storage hardware to store a secret value and processing hardware comprising at least one of a cache or a memory. During a secure boot process the processing hardware loads untrusted data into at least one of the cache or the memory of the processing hardware, the untrusted data comprising an encrypted data segment and a validator, retrieves the secret value from the secure storage hardware, derives an initial key based at least in part on an identifier associated with the encrypted data segment and the secret value, verifies, using the validator, whether the encrypted data segment has been modified, and decrypts the encrypted data segment using a first decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a decrypted data segment responsive to verifying that the encrypted data segment has not been modified.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computing device comprising:
secure storage hardware to store a secret value; and
processing hardware coupled to the secure storage hardware, the processing hardware comprising at least one of a cache or a memory, wherein during a secure boot process the processing hardware is to:
load untrusted data into at least one of the cache or the memory of the processing hardware, the untrusted data comprising an encrypted data segment and a validator;
retrieve the secret value from the secure storage hardware;
derive an initial key based at least in part on an identifier associated with the encrypted data segment and the secret value;
verify, using the validator, whether the encrypted data segment has been modified; and
decrypt the encrypted data segment using a first decryption key derived from the initial key to produce a decrypted data segment responsive to verifying that the encrypted data segment has not been modified.
