# US 2019/0377878 A1 · Secure Drive

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- Number: US 2019/0377878 A1
- Document ID: US20190377878A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/006,185
- Filed: 2018-06-12
- Published: 2019-12-12
- Earliest claimed: 2018-06-12
- Assignees: The United States of America as represented by the Secretary of the Navy
- Applicants: United States of America, as represented by the Secretary of the Navy
- Inventors: Christopher Heagney
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190377878A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- G06F 11/1441: {Resetting or repowering}
- G06F 12/0238: {Memory management in non-volatile memory, e.g. resistive RAM or ferroelectric memory}
- G06F 12/0638: {Combination of memories, e.g. ROM and RAM such as to permit replacement or supplementing of words in one module by words in another module (address formation of the next microinstruction G06F9/26; masking faults in memories by using spares or by reconfiguring G11C29/70)}
- G06F 12/1408: {by using cryptography (for digital transmission H04L9/00)}
- G06F 21/76: in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
- G06F 21/79: in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- G06F 2212/1052: Security improvement
- G06F 2212/7202: Allocation control and policies
- G06F 2212/7204: Capacity control, e.g. partitioning, end-of-life degradation
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

An apparatus and method of a secure drive is provided. The system includes a gate array, a non-volatile memory drive, and a power source. The non-volatile memory drive has secure, operational, and persistent memory spaces. The secure memory space is programmed with an encryption key and an encrypted disk image. In response to a power cycle, the gate array reads the encrypted disk image from the secure memory, authenticates the disk image using the encryption key, decrypts the encrypted disk image, and writes the decrypted disk image to the operational memory. The decrypted disk image is used to boot a computer. The computer is booted to a known good state each time the power is cycled.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A memory drive of a computer comprising:
a gate array;
a non-volatile memory drive, comprising a secure memory, an operational memory, and a persistent memory, wherein the secure memory is programmed with a public encryption key and an encrypted disk image;
a power source; and
wherein the gate array reads the encrypted disk image from the secure memory, decrypts the encrypted disk image, creating a decrypted disk image, and writes the decrypted disk image to the operational storage in response a first power cycle;
wherein the decrypted disk image is used to boot a computer; and
wherein the computer is booted to a known good state each time the power is cycled.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The memory drive of claim 1, wherein the encrypted disk image is updated by a user;
wherein the user loads a secure image and a new encryption key to the operational memory space;
wherein the new encryption key comprises a user generated symmetric encryption key encrypted using a user generated private encryption key and the public encryption key; and
wherein, in response to a second power cycle, the gate array reads the new encryption key, authenticates using the user generated private encryption key and the public encryption key, retrieves the new user generated symmetric encryption key, and writes the secure image from operational memory over the encrypted disk image on the secure memory.

### Claim 3

A method of booting a computer program, the method comprising:
providing power to a computer having a secure drive, wherein the secure drive comprises a gate array and a non-volatile memory drive, wherein the non-volatile memory drive comprises a secure memory, an operational memory, and a persistent memory;
receiving, by the gate array, an encrypted disk image, wherein the encrypted disk image is stored on the secure memory;
authenticating, by the gate array, the encrypted disk image, wherein a public-private key pair exchange is provided to the gate array, and a symmetric encryption key is used to decrypt the encrypted disk image, creating a decrypted disk image; and
writing, by the gate array, the decrypted disk image to the operational memory; and
booting, by the gate array, the decrypted disk image on the computer, wherein the computer is booted to a known good state when power is cycled.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the encrypted disk image is an operating system.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the decrypted disk image is overwritten from the operational memory during power on.

### Claim 6 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the encrypted disk image is updated, the method comprising:
loading, by a user, a secure disk image and an encryption key to the operational memory;
in response to a power cycle, receiving, by the gate array, the secure disk image and the encryption key;
authenticating, by the gate array, the public-private key pair; and
in response to a positive authentication, encrypting and writing, by the gate array, the secure image on the operational memory over the encrypted disk image on the secure memory.
