# US 2019/0319807 A1 · Dynamic certificate management for a distributed authentication system

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- Number: US 2019/0319807 A1
- Document ID: US20190319807A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/989,497
- Filed: 2018-05-25
- Published: 2019-10-17
- Earliest claimed: 2018-04-12
- Assignees: Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
- Applicants: Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
- Inventors: Ryan J. FAIRFAX; Felix Stefan DOMKE
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190319807A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3265: {using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model}
- G06F 21/44: Program or device authentication
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/3236: {using cryptographic hash functions}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L 63/0876: {based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint}
- H04L 63/12: {Applying verification of the received information (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

The disclosed technology is generally directed to embedded device updates. In one example of the technology, a request for a nonce from a device is received. The nonce is sent in response to the request. An authentication request that includes the nonce, a set of measurements associated with the device, and a cryptographic signature generated from a private key associated with the device is received. The device is validated based on the authentication request. In response to successful validation of the device, a short-term certificate is generated for the device.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An apparatus, comprising:
a device including at least one memory adapted to store run-time data for the device, and at least one processor that is adapted to execute processor-executable code that, in response to execution, enables the device to perform actions, including:
receiving a request for a nonce from a device;
sending the nonce in response to the request;
receiving an authentication request that includes the nonce, a set of measurements associated with the device, and a cryptographic signature generated from a private key associated with the device;
validating the device based on the authentication request; and
in response to successful validation of the device, generating a short-term certificate for the device.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the set of measurements indicate versions of software running on the device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the set of measurements include a value of an accumulation register, wherein a hash of each software stage booted by the device is cryptographically appended to the accumulation register, and wherein validating the device includes validating the value of the accumulation register.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the short-term certificate is valid for less than forty-eight hours.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the short-term certificate serves as authentication of the device until expiration of the short-term certificate.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, the actions further including, before receiving the request for the nonce, establishing a secure sockets layer connection with the device.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the validating the device includes looking up a public key associated with the device to validate that the device is a registered device.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein validating the device includes validating that all software running on the device is trusted.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein validating the device includes using a public key associated with the private key to verify the cryptographic signature.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the set of measurements includes at least one hardware identity (ID), and wherein validating the device includes validating the at least one hardware ID.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the set of measurements includes an indication of a boot source, and wherein validating the device includes validating the boot source.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the device includes a set of independent execution environments arranged in a defense-in-depth hierarchy, including at least a first independent execution environment and a second independent execution environment; upon the device being booted, the device boots in stages such that the independent execution environments boot one at a time, with each independent execution environment after the first being validated and booted by the preceding independent execution environment; the set of measurements includes a value of an accumulation register; a hash of each independent execution environment booted by the device is cryptographically appended to the accumulation register; and wherein validating the device includes validating the value of the accumulation register.

### Claim 13

A method, comprising:
receiving, from a device, a none request;
responsive to the nonce request, communicating a one-time cryptographic nonce to the device;
receiving an authentication request that includes the one-time cryptographic nonce, a set of measurements associated with the device, and a cryptographic signature generated from a private key associated with the device;
responsive to the authentication request, authenticating the device; and
responsive to successful authentication of the device, creating a short-term client certificate for the device.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein the set of measurements include a value of an accumulation register, wherein a hash of each software stage booted by the device is cryptographically appended to the accumulation register, and wherein authenticating the device includes verifying the value of the accumulation register.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein the short-term device certificate serves as authentication of the device until expiration of the short-term client certificate.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein authenticating the device includes verifying that all software running on the device is trusted.

### Claim 17

A processor-readable storage medium, having stored thereon processor-executable code that, upon execution by at least one processor, enables actions, comprising:
receiving an authentication request that includes a nonce, a set of measurements associated with the device, and a cryptographic signature generated from a private key associated with the device;
authenticating the device based on the authentication request; and
in response to successful validation of the device, generating a short-term certificate for the device.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The processor-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the set of measurements include a value of an accumulation register, wherein a hash of each software stage booted by the device is cryptographically appended to the accumulation register, and wherein authenticating the device includes verifying the value of the accumulation register.

### Claim 19 (depends on 17)

The processor-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the short-term certificate serves as authentication of the device until expiration of the short-term certificate.

### Claim 20 (depends on 17)

The processor-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein authenticating the device includes verifying that all software running on the device is trusted.
