# US 2019/0319802 A1 · Parallel processing techniques for hash-based signature algorithms

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- Number: US 2019/0319802 A1
- Document ID: US20190319802A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/456,004
- Filed: 2019-06-28
- Published: 2019-10-17
- Earliest claimed: 2019-06-28
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: RAFAEL MISOCZKI; Santosh Ghosh; Manoj Sastry; David Wheeler
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190319802A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/006: {involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models (network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 2209/125: Parallelization or pipelining, e.g. for accelerating processing of cryptographic operations
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

In one example an apparatus comprises a computer readable memory to store a public key associated with a signing device, communication logic to receive, from the signing device, a signature chunk which is a component of a signature generated by a hash-based signature algorithm, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk, verification logic to execute a first hash chain beginning with the signature chunk to produce at least a first computed intermediate node value, execute a second hash chain beginning with the at least one intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to produce a first computed final node value, and use the first computed intermediate node value and the first computed final computed node value to validate the signature generated by the hash-based signature algorithm. Other examples may be described.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An apparatus, comprising:
a computer readable memory to store a public key associated with a signing device;
communication logic to receive, from the signing device, a signature chunk which is a component of a signature generated by a hash-based signature algorithm, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk;
verification logic to:
execute a first hash chain beginning with the signature chunk to produce at least a first computed intermediate node value;
execute a second hash chain beginning with the at least one intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to produce a first computed final node value; and
use the first computed intermediate node value and the first computed final computed node value to validate the signature generated by the hash-based signature algorithm.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the hash-based signature algorithm comprises at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) algorithm or a WOTS+ algorithm that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the secure hash algorithm (SHA) has function comprises at least one of a SHA2-256, a SHA2-512, a SHA3-128, or a SHA3-256 hash function.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the signature comprises a total of 67 signature components, each of which is 32 bytes in length.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The apparatus of claim 1, the verifier logic to:
compare the first computed intermediate node value with the first intermediate node value received from the signing device; and
compare the first computed final node value with a portion of the public key for the signing device.

### Claim 6

A computer-implemented method, comprising:
storing a public key associated with a signing device in a computer-readable medium;
receiving, from the signing device, a signature chunk which is a component of a signature generated by a hash-based signature algorithm, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk;
executing a first hash chain beginning with the signature chunk to produce at least a first computed intermediate node value;
executing a second hash chain beginning with the at least one intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to produce a first computed final node value; and
using the first computed intermediate node value and the first computed final computed node value to validate the signature generated by the hash-based signature algorithm.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the hash-based signature algorithm comprises at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) algorithm or a WOTS+ algorithm that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function.

### Claim 8 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the secure hash algorithm (SHA) has function comprises at least one of a SHA2-256, a SHA2-512, a SHA3-128, or a SHA3-256 hash function.

### Claim 9 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the signature comprises a total of 67 signature components, each of which is 32 bytes in length.

### Claim 10 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, further comprising:
comparing the first computed intermediate node value with the first intermediate node value received from the signing device; and
comparing the first computed final node value with a portion of the public key for the signing device.

### Claim 11

A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:
storing a public key associated with a signing device in a computer-readable medium;
receiving, from the signing device, a signature chunk which is a component of a signature generated by a hash-based signature algorithm, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk;
executing a first hash chain beginning with the signature chunk to produce at least a first computed intermediate node value;
executing a second hash chain beginning with the at least one intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to produce a first computed final node value; and
using the first computed intermediate node value and the first computed final computed node value to validate the signature generated by the hash-based signature algorithm.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, wherein the hash-based signature algorithm comprises at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) algorithm or a WOTS+ algorithm that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the secure hash algorithm (SHA) has function comprises at least one of a SHA2-256, a SHA2-512, a SHA3-128, or a SHA3-256 hash function.

### Claim 14 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, wherein the signature comprises a total of 67 signature components, each of which is 32 bytes in length.

### Claim 15 (depends on 18)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18, further comprising instructions which, when executed by the processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:
comparing the first computed intermediate node value with the first intermediate node value received from the signing device; and
comparing the first computed final node value with a portion of the public key for the signing device.

### Claim 16

An apparatus, comprising:
a computer readable memory to store a private key associated with a signing device;
signature logic to generate a signature using a hash-based signature algorithm and the private key, the signature comprising at least a first signature chunk which is a component of the signature, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk; and
communication logic to send the at least a first signature chunk and the at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to a verifying device.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the hash-based signature algorithm comprises at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) algorithm or a WOTS+ algorithm that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the secure hash algorithm (SHA) has function comprises at least one of a SHA2-256, a SHA2-512, a SHA3-128, or a SHA3-256 hash function.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The apparatus of claim 18, wherein the signature comprises a total of 67 signature components, each of which is 32 bytes in length.

### Claim 20

A computer-implemented method, comprising:
storing a private key associated with a signing device in a computer-readable memory;
generating a signature using a hash-based signature algorithm and the private key, the signature comprising at least a first signature chunk which is a component of the signature, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk; and
sending the at least a first signature chunk and the at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to a verifying device.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The method of claim 20, wherein the hash-based signature algorithm comprises at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) algorithm or a WOTS+ algorithm that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The method of claim 21, wherein the secure hash algorithm (SHA) has function comprises at least one of a SHA2-256, a SHA2-512, a SHA3-128, or a SHA3-256 hash function.

### Claim 23 (depends on 22)

The method of claim 22, wherein the signature comprises a total of 67 signature components, each of which is 32 bytes in length.

### Claim 24

A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:
storing a private key associated with a signing device in a computer-readable memory;
generating a signature using a hash-based signature algorithm and the private key, the signature comprising at least a first signature chunk which is a component of the signature, and at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk; and
sending the at least a first signature chunk and the at least a first intermediate node value associated with the signature chunk to a verifying device.

### Claim 25 (depends on 24)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 24, wherein the hash-based signature algorithm comprises at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) algorithm or a WOTS+ algorithm that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function.

### Claim 26 (depends on 25)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 25, wherein the secure hash algorithm (SHA) has function comprises at least one of a SHA2-256, a SHA2-512, a SHA3-128, or a SHA3-256 hash function.

### Claim 27 (depends on 26)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 26, wherein the signature comprises a total of 67 signature components, each of which is 32 bytes in length.
