# US 2019/0318135 A1 · Method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit in an integrated circuit device

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- Number: US 2019/0318135 A1
- Document ID: US20190318135A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/950,207
- Filed: 2018-04-11
- Published: 2019-10-17
- Earliest claimed: 2018-04-11
- Assignees: NXP B.V.
- Applicants: NXP B.V.
- Inventors: JAN-PETER SCHAT
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190318135A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/85: interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
- G01R 31/31703: {Comparison aspects, e.g. signature analysis, comparators (concerning scan tests G01R31/318566; concerning testers G01R31/3193)}
- G01R 31/31724: {Test controller, e.g. BIST state machine (for scan test G01R31/318555)}
- G01R 31/3177: Testing of logic operation, e.g. by logic analysers
- G06F 11/26: Functional testing
- G06F 11/263: Generation of test inputs, e.g. test vectors, patterns or sequences {; with adaptation of the tested hardware for testability with external testers}
- G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities}
- G06F 21/71: to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- G01R: MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES (indicating correct tuning of resonant circuits H03J3/12)

## Abstract

A method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit device is provided. A first run of test patterns is provided to logic circuits on the integrated circuit device. Each test pattern of the first run of test patterns includes a plurality of bits, a first portion of the plurality of bits being bits that do not influence a value of a resulting first test output vector, and a second portion of the plurality of bits being bits that will influence the value of the first test output vector. The value of the first test output vector is compared to first expected values. Bit values of the first portion of the plurality of bits for each test pattern of the first run of test patterns are changed to generate a second run of test patterns. The second run of test patterns is provided to the logic circuits on the integrated circuit device. A value of the second run of test patterns is compared to second expected values.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit device, the method comprising:
providing a first run of test patterns to logic circuits on the integrated circuit device, the first run of test patterns comprising a plurality of test patterns, each test pattern of the first run of test patterns comprising a plurality of bits, a first portion of the plurality of bits being bits that do not influence a value of a resulting first test output vector, and a second portion of the plurality of bits being bits that will influence the value of the first test output vector;
outputting the first test output vector from the first run of test patterns;
comparing the value of the first test output vector to first expected values;
changing bit values of the first portion of the plurality of bits for each test pattern of the first run of test patterns to generate a second run of test patterns;
providing the second run of test patterns to the logic circuits on the integrated circuit device;
outputting a second test output vector resulting from the second run of test patterns; and
comparing a value of the second run of test patterns to second expected values.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the plurality of test patterns are generated by a self-testing circuit on the integrated circuit device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the self-testing circuit is characterized as being a logic built-in self-test (LBIST) circuit.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first portion of the plurality of bits are characterized as being don't care bits, and the second portion of the plurality of bits are characterized as being care bits.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein changing bit values further comprises using a pseudo random number generator to change the bit values.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the method is for triggering a malicious hardware circuit undetected by production testing.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first and second runs of test patterns are generated externally to the integrated circuit device using an automatic test pattern generator (ATPG).

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the logic circuits being tested are realized in a register-transfer level (RTL) design and implemented as registers and combinational logic on the integrated circuit device.

### Claim 9

A method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit device, the method comprising:
scanning in a first run of test patterns to logic circuits on the integrated circuit device using logic built-in self-test (LBIST), the first run of test patterns comprising a plurality of test patterns, each test pattern of the first run of test patterns comprising a plurality of bits, a first portion of the plurality of bits being bits that do not influence a value of a resulting first test output vector, and a second portion of the plurality of bits being bits that will influence the value of the first test output vector;
scanning out the first test output vectors from the first run of test patterns;
comparing the value of the first test output vectors to first expected values;
changing bit values of the first portion of the plurality of bits for each test pattern of the first run of test patterns to generate a second run of test patterns;
scanning in the second run of test patterns to the logic circuits on the integrated circuit device;
scanning out the second test output vectors resulting from the second run of test patterns; and
comparing a value of the second run of test patterns to second expected values.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the first portion of the plurality of bits are characterized as being don't care bits, and the second portion of the plurality of bits are characterized as being care bits.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein changing bit values further comprises using a pseudo random number generator to change the bit values.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the method is for triggering a malicious hardware circuit undetected by production testing.

### Claim 13

A method for triggering and detecting a malicious circuit on an integrated circuit device, the method comprising:
scanning in a first run of test patterns to logic circuits on the integrated circuit device using logic built-in self-test (LBIST), the first run of test patterns comprising a plurality of test patterns, each test pattern of the first run of test patterns comprising a plurality of bits, a first portion of the plurality of bits being bits that do not influence a value of a resulting first test output vector, and a second portion of the plurality of bits being bits that will influence the value of the first test output vector;
scanning out the first test output vectors from the first run of test patterns;
comparing the value of the first test output vectors to first expected values;
changing bit values of the first portion of the plurality of bits for each test pattern of the first run of test patterns to generate a second run of test patterns;
scanning in the second run of test patterns to the logic circuits on the integrated circuit device;
scanning out the second test output vectors resulting from the second run of test patterns;
comparing a value of the second run of test patterns to second expected values; and
detecting the malicious hardware in response to comparing the values of the first and second test output vectors.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein the first portion of the plurality of bits are characterized as being don't care bits, and the second portion of the plurality of bits are characterized as being care bits.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein changing bit values further comprises using a pseudo random number generator to change the bit values.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein the logic circuits being tested are realized in a register-transfer level (RTL) design and implemented as registers and combinational logic on the integrated circuit device.
