# US 2019/0245835 A1 · System and method for preventing well behaving clients from causing account lockouts in a group

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2019/0245835 A1
- Document ID: US20190245835A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/891,940
- Filed: 2018-02-08
- Published: 2019-08-08
- Earliest claimed: 2018-02-08
- Assignees: Dell Products L.P.
- Applicants: Dell Products L.P.
- Inventors: Yee Ja; Marshal F. Savage; Cyril Jose
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190245835A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04L 9/0816: {Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use}
- H04L 9/0833: {involving conference or group key (network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065)}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/3226: {using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083)}
- H04L 9/3297: {involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps}
- H04L 63/068: {using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088)}
- H04L 63/083: {using passwords (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226)}
- H04L 63/20: {for managing network security; network security policies in general (filtering policies H04L63/0227)}
- H04L 2463/121: Timestamp
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Methods and systems for account authentication in a distributed computing node group may involve sending a message to a member, the message having a first timestamp, increasing an authentication failure count, receiving a first key-exchange message from the member, the first key-exchange message having a second timestamp, evaluating the second timestamp, and determining whether to ignore the first key-exchange message based on an evaluation of the second timestamp. The first timestamp may be associated with a message received from the member prior to sending the message with the first timestamp to the member. The first key-exchange message may include a value computed by the member based on a group passcode shared with the member. The evaluation of the second timestamp may be based on at least one of a default value, the authentication failure count, or a timestamp associated with the group passcode.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for account authentication in a distributed computing node group, comprising:
sending a message to a member, the message including a first timestamp associated with a message received from the member prior to sending the message;
increasing an authentication failure count;
receiving a first key-exchange message from the member, the first key-exchange message including a value computed by the member based on a group passcode shared with the member and a second timestamp;
evaluating the second timestamp based on at least one of: a default value, the authentication failure count, or a timestamp associated with the group passcode; and
determining whether to ignore the first key-exchange message based on an evaluation of the second timestamp.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
determining whether the authentication failure count is greater than an authentication lockout threshold; and
locking out an account associated with the first key-exchange message based on a determination that the authentication failure count is greater than the authentication lockout threshold.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
sending a second key-exchange message to the member, the second key-exchange message including a first secret and a master timestamp;
determining whether the member has validated the first secret; and
increasing the authentication failure count based on a determination that the member failed to validate the first secret.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method in claim 1, further comprising:
sending a second key-exchange message to the member based on a determination not to ignore the first key-exchange message, the second key-exchange message including a first secret based on a group passcode shared with the member and a master timestamp;
receiving a third key-exchange message from the second node, third key-exchange message including a second secret in response to the second key-exchange message;
validating the second secret and generating an encryption key;
sending another message to the member, the other message encrypted with the encryption key and including a group session transport encryption key; and
receiving an encrypted message from the member, the encrypted message encrypted with a message key, the message key derived based on the group session transport encryption key.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein increasing the authentication failure count is based on a determination that an amount of time to respond to the message exceeds a timeout threshold.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method in claim 1, wherein the evaluation of the second timestamp further comprises:
determining that the second timestamp is not the default value; and
comparing the second timestamp to the timestamp associated with associated with the group passcode to determine that the second timestamp is more recent than the timestamp associated with the group passcode.

### Claim 7

An information handling system, comprising:
a processor subsystem having access to a first memory;
a management controller comprising a secondary processor having access to a second memory, the second memory including an embedded storage partition and the second memory storing instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
send a message to a member, the message having a first timestamp associated with a message received from the member prior to sending the message;
increase an authentication failure count;
receive a first key-exchange message from the member, the first key-exchange message having a value computed by the member based on a group passcode shared with the member and a second timestamp;
evaluate the second timestamp based on at least one of: a default value, the authentication failure count, or a timestamp associated with the group passcode; and
determine whether to ignore the first key-exchange message based on the evaluation of the second timestamp.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The information handling system of claim 7, further comprising instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
determine whether the authentication failure count is greater than an authentication lockout threshold; and
lock out an account associated with the first key-exchange message based on a determination that the authentication failure count is greater than the authentication lockout threshold.

### Claim 9 (depends on 7)

The information handling system of claim 7, further comprising instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
send a second key-exchange message to the member, the second key-exchange message having a first secret and a master timestamp;
determine whether the member has validated the first secret; and
increase the authentication failure count based on a determination that the member failed to validate the first secret.

### Claim 10 (depends on 7)

The information handling system of claim 7, further comprising instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
send a second key-exchange message to the member based on a determination not to ignore the first key-exchange message, the second key-exchange message including a first secret based on a group passcode shared with the member and a master timestamp;
receive a third key-exchange message from the second node, third key-exchange message including a second secret in response to the second key-exchange message;
validate the second secret and generate an encryption key;
send another message to the member, the other message encrypted with the encryption key and including a group session transport encryption key; and
receive an encrypted message from the member, the encrypted message encrypted with a message key, the message key derived based on the group session transport encryption key.

### Claim 11 (depends on 7)

The information handling system of claim 7, wherein the increase of the authentication failure count is based on a determination that an amount of time to respond to the first message exceeds a timeout threshold.

### Claim 12 (depends on 7)

The information handling system of claim 7, wherein the evaluation of the second timestamp further comprises:
a determination that the second timestamp is not the default value;
a comparison between the second timestamp and the timestamp associated with the group passcode; and
a determination that the second timestamp is more recent than the timestamp associated with the group passcode based on the comparison between the second timestamp and the timestamp associated with the group passcode.

### Claim 13 (depends on 7)

The information handling system of claim 7, wherein the timestamp associated with the group passcode indicates when the group passcode was changed.

### Claim 14

A management controller for an information handling system having a primary processor and a primary memory, the management controller comprising a secondary processor having access to a secondary memory, the secondary memory including an embedded storage partition and the secondary memory storing instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
send a message to a member, the message having a first timestamp associated with a message received from the member prior to sending the message;
increase an authentication failure count;
receive a first key-exchange message from the member, the first key-exchange message having a value computed by the member based on a group passcode shared with the member and a second timestamp;
evaluate the second timestamp based on at least one of: a default value, the authentication failure count, or a timestamp associated with the group passcode; and
determine whether to ignore the first key-exchange message based on the evaluation of the second timestamp.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The management controller of claim 14, further comprising instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
determine whether the authentication failure count is greater than an authentication lockout threshold; and
lock out an account associated with the second message based on a determination that the authentication failure count is greater than the authentication lockout threshold.

### Claim 16 (depends on 14)

The management controller of claim 14, further comprising instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
send a second key-exchange message to the member, the second key-exchange message having a first secret and a master timestamp;
determine whether the member has validated the first secret; and
increase the authentication failure count based on a determination that the member failed to validate the first secret.

### Claim 17 (depends on 14)

The management controller of claim 14, further comprising instructions executable by the secondary processor to:
send a second key-exchange message to the member based on a determination not to ignore the first key-exchange message, the second key-exchange message including a first secret based on a group passcode shared with the member and a master timestamp;
receive a third key-exchange message from the second node, third key-exchange message including a second secret in response to the second key-exchange message;
validate the second secret and generate an encryption key;
send another message to the member, the other message encrypted with the encryption key and including a group session transport encryption key; and
receive an encrypted message from the member, the encrypted message encrypted with a message key, the message key derived based on the group session transport encryption key.

### Claim 18 (depends on 14)

The management controller of claim 14, wherein the increase of the authentication failure count is based on a determination that an amount of time to respond to the first message exceeds a timeout threshold.

### Claim 19 (depends on 14)

The management controller of claim 14, wherein the evaluation of the second timestamp further comprises:
a determination that the second timestamp is not the default value;
a comparison between the second timestamp and the timestamp associated with the group passcode; and
a determination that the second timestamp is more recent than the timestamp associated with the group passcode based on the comparison between the second timestamp and the timestamp associated with the group passcode.

### Claim 20 (depends on 14)

The management controller of claim 14, wherein the timestamp associated with the group passcode indicates when the group passcode was changed.
