# US 2019/0245705 A1 · Connected Vehicle Communication Wth Improved Misbehavior Processing > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 2019/0245705 A1 - Document ID: US20190245705A1 - Status: Published application - Kind: A1 - Application number: 16/350,582 - Filed: 2018-12-03 - Published: 2019-08-08 - Earliest claimed: 2018-02-05 - Assignees: OnBoard Security, Inc. - Applicants: OnBoard Security, Inc. - Inventors: Virendra Kumar; Wiliam Whyte; Abhishek Jain - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190245705A1 ## CPC - H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]} - H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees} - H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC} - H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)} - H04L 63/065: {for group communications (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management involving conference or group key H04L9/0833)} - H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)} - H04L 67/12: specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks - H04W 4/46: for vehicle-to-vehicle communication [V2V] - H04W 12/082: using revocation of authorisation - H04W 12/122: Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices - H04L 2209/50: Oblivious transfer - H04L 2209/84: Vehicles - H04W 4/40: for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] - H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M) - H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72) ## Abstract A form of the invention is applicable for use in conjunction with a6 security credential management system that produces and manages pseudonym digital certificates issued to vehicles and used by vehicles to establish trust in vehicle-to-vehicle communications, the security credential management system including a pseudonym certificate authority processor entity which issues pseudonym digital certificates to vehicles, a registration authority processor entity that validates, processes and forwards requests for pseudonym digital certificates to the pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, and a misbehavior authority processor entity that receives misbehavior reports from reporter vehicles that include information about the reporter vehicles and suspect misbehaving vehicles and is responsible for producing a list of revoked credentials; the pseudonym certificate processor entity and registration authority processor entity participating in producing linkage values to be contained within the issued pseudonym digital certificates, the linkage values being derived ultimately, using a one-way function, from linkage seeds thereby enabling, in predetermined circumstances, at least some of the certificates containing linkage values derived from a given linkage seed to be revoked. A method is set forth for improving operation of the security credential management system, including the following steps: in conjunction with deriving the linkage values from the linkage seeds, additionally producing encrypted linkage maps that relate, in encrypted form, linkage values with linkage seeds from which they are derived; determining particular linkage values deemed to be of interest based at least in part on information derived from misbehavior reports; and determining linkage seeds associated with the particular linkage values utilizing decryptions of the encrypted linkage maps. ## Claims ### Claim 1 For use in conjunction with a security credential management system that produces and manages pseudonym digital certificates issued to vehicles and used by vehicles to establish trust in vehicle-to-vehicle communications, said security credential management system including a pseudonym certificate authority processor entity which issues pseudonym digital certificates to vehicles, a registration authority processor entity that validates, processes and forwards requests for pseudonym digital certificates to the pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, and a misbehavior authority processor entity that receives misbehavior reports from reporter vehicles that include information about the reporter vehicles and suspect misbehaving vehicles and is responsible for producing a list of revoked credentials; said pseudonym certificate processor entity and registration authority processor entity participating in producing linkage values to be contained within the issued pseudonym digital certificates, said linkage values being derived ultimately, using a one-way function, from linkage seeds thereby enabling, in predetermined circumstances, at least some of the certificates containing linkage values derived from a given linkage seed to be revoked; a method for improving operation of said security credential management system, comprising the steps of: in conjunction with deriving said linkage values from said linkage seeds, additionally producing encrypted linkage maps that relate, in encrypted form, linkage values with linkage seeds from which they are derived; determining particular linkage values deemed to be of interest based at least in part on information derived from misbehavior reports; and determining linkage seeds associated with said particular linkage values utilizing decryptions of said encrypted linkage maps. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The method as defined by claim 1, further comprising utilizing the determined linkage seeds in a misbehavior identification process. ### Claim 3 (depends on 2) The method as defined by claim 2, wherein said misbehavior identification process is operative to determine if the misbehavior authority processor entity's revocation criteria has been satisfied and to identify which of the determined linkage seeds should be subject to revocation and published on a revocation list. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The method as defined by claim 1, wherein said step of producing encrypted linkage maps includes encrypting the linkage maps with an encryption key that is derived from a pseudonym certificate authority processor entity encryption key KPCA and a registration authority processor entity encryption key KRA. ### Claim 5 (depends on 4) The method as defined by claim 4, wherein said derived encryption key is selected from the group consisting of KPCA exclusive ORed with KRA, KPCA concatenated with KRA, a hash of (KPCA, KRA), and an encryption of KPCA with KRA as the key. ### Claim 6 (depends on 4) The method as defined by claim 4, wherein said steps of deriving linkage values from linkage seeds and producing encrypted linkage maps comprises implementing a secure two-party computation protocol between said pseudonym certificate authority processor entity and said registration authority processor entity, which includes providing private inputs that include said key KPCA from said pseudonym certificate authority processor entity and said key KRA from said registration authority processor entity. ### Claim 7 (depends on 6) The method as defined by claim 6, wherein the private inputs of said pseudonym certificate processor entity further include a linkage seed input and the private inputs of the registration authority processor entity further include a vehicle identifier and at least one index relating to a time period for a linkage value. ### Claim 8 (depends on 2) The method as defined by claim 2, wherein said step of utilizing the determined linkage seeds in a misbehavior identification process is implemented by performing a secure three-party computation protocol between the pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, the registration authority processor entity, and the misbehavior authority processor entity. ### Claim 9 (depends on 3) The method as defined by claim 3, wherein said step of utilizing the determined linkage seeds in a misbehavior identification process is implemented by performing a secure three-party computation protocol between the pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, the registration authority processor entity, and the misbehavior authority processor entity. ### Claim 10 (depends on 1) The method as defined by claim 1, wherein first and second linkage authority processor entities also participate in producing linkage values, by operating to respectively and independently produce linkage seeds from which said linkage values are ultimately derived in conjunction with the participation of said pseudonym certificate processor entity and said registration authority processor entity. ### Claim 11 (depends on 10) The method as defined by claim 10, wherein said steps of deriving linkage values from linkage seeds and producing encrypted linkage maps comprises implementing a secure four-party computation protocol between said first linkage authority processor entity, said second linkage authority processor entity, said pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, and said registration authority processor entity. ### Claim 12 (depends on 11) The method as defined by claim 11 wherein said implementation of said protocol includes providing private inputs that include a key KPCA from said pseudonym certificate authority processor entity and a key KRA from said registration authority processor entity. ### Claim 13 For use in conjunction with a security credential management system that produces and manages pseudonym digital certificates issued to vehicles and used by vehicles to establish trust in vehicle-to-vehicle communications, said security credential management system including a pseudonym certificate authority processor entity which issues pseudonym digital certificates to vehicles, a registration authority processor entity that validates, processes and forwards requests for pseudonym digital certificates to the pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, and a misbehavior authority processor entity that receives misbehavior reports from reporter vehicles that include information about the reporter vehicles and suspect misbehaving vehicles and is responsible for producing a list of revoked credentials; said pseudonym certificate processor entity and registration authority processor entity participating in producing linkage values to be contained within the issued pseudonym digital certificates, said linkage values being derived ultimately, using a one-way function, from linkage seeds thereby enabling, in predetermined circumstances, at least some of the certificates containing linkage values derived from a given linkage seed to be revoked; a method for improving operation of said security credential management system, comprising: performing a misbehavior identification process by implementing a secure three-party computation protocol between the pseudonym certificate authority processor entity, the registration authority processor entity, and the misbehavior authority processor entity, said protocol being operative to determine, using misbehavior reports received at the misbehavior authority processor entity and inputs regarding the relationships between linkage values and the linkage seeds from which they are derived, to determine linkage seeds of suspect misbehaving vehicles and to apply revocation criteria to determine the linkage seeds of vehicles whose credentials are to be revoked. ### Claim 14 (depends on 13) The method as defined by claim 13, further comprising publishing, on a revocation list, said determined linkage seeds of vehicles whose credentials are to be revoked. ### Claim 15 (depends on 13) The method as defined by claim 13, wherein, in said protocol, private inputs of said misbehavior authority processor entity include a database of suspect vehicle linkage values and reporter vehicle linkage values. ### Claim 16 (depends on 15) The method as defined by claim 15, wherein, in conjunction with deriving said linkage values from said linkage seeds, additionally producing encrypted linkage maps that relate, in encrypted form, linkage values with linkage seeds from which they are derived, and wherein the linkage maps are encrypted with an encryption key that is derived from a pseudonym certificate authority processor entity encryption key KPCA and a registration authority processor entity encryption key KRA, and wherein, in said protocol, a private input of said pseudonym certificate authority processor entity is said encryption key KPCA, a private input of said registration authority processor entity is said encryption key KRA, and a further private input of said misbehavior authority processor entity is the encrypted linkage maps for the suspect vehicle linkage values and reporter vehicle linkage values. ### Claim 17 (depends on 16) The method as defined by claim 16, wherein, in said protocol, a private output of the misbehavior authority processor entity is the linkage seeds of the vehicles that satisfy the revocation criteria, and a private output of the registration authority processor entity is the vehicle identifiers of vehicles that satisfy the revocation criteria. ### Claim 18 (depends on 17) The method as defined by claim 17, wherein, in said protocol, the function to be computed comprises decryption of the encrypted linkage maps using the keys KPCA, and KRA, the application of the revocation criteria on the linkage seeds obtained from the decryption of encrypted linkage maps of suspect vehicle linkage values and reporter vehicle linkage values, the return to the misbehavior authority processor entity of the linkage seeds of vehicles that satisfy the revocation criteria, and the return to the registration authority processor entity of the vehicle identifiers of the vehicles that satisfy the revocation criteria.