Defending side channel attacks in additive manufacturing systems

A physical process encryption system (100) for defending an additive manufacturing (“AM”) system against a side channel attack, wherein the AM system comprises a cyber domain and a physical domain having a manufacturing machine (106), wherein said encryption system (100) is machine-dependent, wherein data of the cyber domain comprises G-code as input to the manufacturing machine (106), wherein the side channel attack occurs when an attacker acquires analog emissions emanating from the machine (106) during the printing process to extract the G-code and reproduce the 3D model, wherein the encryption system (100) comprises:

• a. a random pattern generator (102) having an output, wherein the output comprises a plurality of random patterns that are machine-dependent redundant physical information;
• b. a physical process encryption module (104), operatively coupled to the random pattern generator (102), wherein the physical process encryption module (104) uses the output of the random pattern generator (102) to encrypt the physical printing process, the physical process encryption module (104) comprising:
• i. a memory storing a plurality of encryption schemes;
• and
• ii. a processor, operatively coupled to the memory, configured to use the output of the random pattern generator to execute the plurality of encryption schemes to accomplish encryption of the physical printing process (102);
• and
• c. a printer controller (108) operatively coupled to the physical process encryption module;
• wherein the G-code is passed from the cyber domain to the physical process encryption module (104), wherein the plurality of random patterns are passed from the random pattern generator (102) to the physical process encryption module (104), which then encrypts the physical printing process by embedding the plurality of random patterns into the G-code according to an encryption scheme of the a plurality of encryption schemes, wherein the G-code is then transmitted to the printer controller (108) for execution, wherein as the G-code is executed, resulting analog emissions are altered according to the machine-dependent redundant physical information embedded, thus encrypting the physical printing process and rendering G-code extracted using the altered analog emissions by the attacker ineffective for reproducing the 3D model.