Attestation device custody transfer protocol

At least one non-transitory machine accessible storage medium having instructions stored thereon, the instructions when executed on a machine, cause the machine to:

• receive, from a gateway device, an instance of attestation data, wherein the instance of attestation data includes a received value and is generated, by an attestation device, from secret data corresponding to a use session of the attestation device;
• determine an expected value for the instance of attestation data based on, at least in part, the secret data corresponding to the use session of the attestation device;
• compare the expected value and the received value;
• and
• determine that the attestation device has integrity based on a determination that the expected value matches the received value;
• or
• determine that the attestation device does not have integrity based on a determination that the expected value does not match the received value.

At least one non-transitory machine accessible storage medium having instructions stored thereon, the instructions when executed on a machine, cause the machine to:

• receive, from a first gateway device, a first instance of attestation data generated by an attestation device, wherein the first instance of attestation data includes a first received value;
• determine a first expected value for the first instance of attestation data based on, at least in part, secret data associated with the attestation device;
• compare the first expected value and the first received value;
• determine that the attestation device has integrity based on a determination that the first expected value matches the first received value;
• receive, from a second gateway device, a second instance of attestation data generated by the attestation device, wherein the second instance of attestation data includes a second received value;
• determine a second expected value for the second instance of attestation data based on, at least in part, the secret data associated with the attestation device;
• compare the second expected value and the second received value;
• and
• determine that the attestation device has integrity based on a determination that the second expected value matches the second received value;
• or
• determine that the attestation device does not have integrity based on a determination that the second expected value does not match the second received value.

A system comprising:

• an attestation device comprising:
• memory;
• a hardware processor configured to:
• generate an instance of attestation data that includes a received value, wherein the instance of attestation data is generated from secret data corresponding to a use session of the attestation device, and wherein the secret data is stored in the memory on the attestation device;
• a gateway device comprising:
• a short range communications module to:
• send a signal to the attestation device;
• and
• receive the instance of attestation data from the attestation device;
• and
• an attestation module comprising:
• memory;
• and
• a hardware processor configured to:
• receive, from the gateway device, the instance of attestation data including the received value;
• determine an expected value for the instance of attestation data based on, at least in part, the secret data corresponding to the use session of the attestation device;
• compare the expected value and the received value;
• and
• determine that the attestation device has integrity based on a determination that the expected value matches the received value;
• or
• determine that the attestation device does not have integrity based on a determination that the expected value does not match the received value.