# US 2019/0097793 A1 · Secure pki communications for "machine-to-machine" modules, including key derivation by modules and authenticating public keys

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- Number: US 2019/0097793 A1
- Document ID: US20190097793A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 16/200,118
- Filed: 2018-11-26
- Published: 2019-03-28
- Earliest claimed: 2013-09-27
- Assignees: Network-1 Technologies, Inc.
- Applicants: Network-1 Technologies, Inc.
- Inventors: John A. Nix
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20190097793A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- G06F 21/33: using certificates
- G06F 21/35: communicating wirelessly
- H04J 11/00: Orthogonal multiplex systems, {e.g. using WALSH codes}(H04J13/00 takes precedence)
- H04L 9/006: {involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models (network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/0662: {with particular pseudorandom sequence generator}
- H04L 9/0816: {Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use}
- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- H04L 9/085: {Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes}
- H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3066: {involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves}
- H04L 9/32: including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system {or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials}
- H04L 9/321: {involving a third party or a trusted authority}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3249: {using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 12/2854: {Wide area networks, e.g. public data networks}
- H04L 63/0272: {Virtual private networks}
- H04L 63/0435: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06)}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 63/045: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14)}
- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04L 63/0807: {using tickets, e.g. Kerberos (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213)}
- H04L 63/166: {at the transport layer}
- H04L 67/04: specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
- H04W 8/082: {for traffic bypassing of mobility servers, e.g. location registers, home PLMNs or home agents}
- H04W 12/02: Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
- H04W 12/03: Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W 12/04: Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W 12/041: Key generation or derivation
- H04W 12/06: Authentication
- H04W 40/005: {Routing actions in the presence of nodes in sleep or doze mode}
- H04W 52/0216: {using a pre-established activity schedule, e.g. traffic indication frame}
- H04W 52/0235: {where the received signal is a power saving command}
- H04W 52/0277: {according to available power supply, e.g. switching off when a low battery condition is detected}
- H04W 76/27: Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
- H04W 80/04: Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
- G06F 2221/2105: Dual mode as a secondary aspect
- G06F 2221/2107: File encryption
- G06F 2221/2115: Third party
- H04L 63/0464: {using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it}
- H04L 63/123: {received data contents, e.g. message integrity}
- H04L 2209/24: Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
- H04L 2209/72: Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04L 2209/805: Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
- H04L 2463/102: applying security measure for e-commerce
- H04W 4/70: Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
- H04W 24/04: Arrangements for maintaining operational condition
- H04W 84/12: WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
- H04W 88/12: Access point controller devices
- Y02D 30/70: in wireless communication networks
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04J: MULTIPLEX COMMUNICATION (transmission in general H04B; peculiar to transmission of digital information H04L5/00; systems for the simultaneous or sequential transmission of more than one television signal H04N7/08; in exchanges H04Q11/00; stereophonic systems H04S)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- Y02D: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE

## Abstract

Methods and systems are provided for efficient and secure “Machine-to-Machine” (M2M) between modules and servers. A module can communicate with a server by accessing the Internet, and the module can include a sensor and/or actuator. The module and server can utilize public key infrastructure (PKI) such as public keys to encrypt messages. The module and server can use private keys to generate digital signatures for datagrams sent and decrypt messages received. The module can internally derive pairs of private/public keys using cryptographic algorithms and a set of parameters. A server can use a shared secret key to authenticate the submission of derived public keys with an associated module identity. For the very first submission of a public key derived the module, the shared secret key can comprise a pre-shared secret key which can be loaded into the module using a pre-shared secret key code.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A module for securely communicating over a wireless network comprises:
(1) at least one processor; and
(2) a first non-transitory computer-readable memory operatively connected to the one or more processors, the non-transitory computer-readable memory having stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors cause the one or more processors to perform a method comprising steps of:
(a) recording in the first non-transitory computer-readable memory, at least the following:
(i) a first set of parameters for a secure hash algorithm;
(ii) a second set of parameters for an elliptic curve algorithm; and
(iii) a first public key which corresponds to a first private key;
(b) deriving a module private key and a corresponding module public key using the second set of parameters;
(c) generating a first shared secret key using a first elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and based at least in part, on the first public key;
(d) sending, to a first computing device which is connected to the wireless network, a first message including the derived module public key, wherein at least a portion of the first message is encrypted using a third set of parameters that is based on a symmetric ciphering algorithm and the derived first shared secret key;
(e) receiving, from the first computing device, a second message comprising encrypted data, which is encrypted, by the first computing device, using the symmetric ciphering algorithm and a derived second shared secret key, wherein the second shared secret key is derived by the first computing device using a second elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange based at least, in part, on the derived module public key; and
(f) decrypting the encrypted data using the third set of parameters and the derived second shared secret key.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the first public key is received upon connecting to the wireless network.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable memory has stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors cause the one or more processors to, between steps (2)(b) and (2)(d), generate a first secure hash of the first public key using the first set of parameters; and wherein the message in step (2)(d) comprises the first secure hash.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The module of claim 3, wherein the first secure hash utilizes a SHA-256 hash algorithm.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable memory has stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors cause the one or more processors to after step (2)(f), generate a first secure hash of the module public key using the first set of parameters; and wherein the encrypted data comprises the first secure hash.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The module of claim 5, wherein the first secure hash utilizes a SHA-256 hash algorithm.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein a symmetric ciphering key is derived using at least the first shared secret key and a first random number.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The module of claim 7, wherein the symmetric ciphering key is derived also using the second shared secret key and a second random number.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable memory has stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors cause the one or more processors to perform steps of:
(g) generating a configuration request;
(h) transmitting to the first computing device, the configuration request; and
(i) receiving encrypted configuration information.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a wireless handset.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a mobile phone handset.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a tablet computer.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a laptop computer.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a payment terminal.

### Claim 15 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a tracking device.

### Claim 16 (depends on 1)

The module of claim 1, wherein the module is a circuit board with a radio.
