# US 2018/0027600 A1 · Private vehicle-to-vehicle communication

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- Number: US 2018/0027600 A1
- Document ID: US20180027600A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/218,945
- Filed: 2016-07-25
- Published: 2018-01-25
- Earliest claimed: 2016-07-25
- Assignees: Ford Global Technologies, LLC
- Applicants: Ford Global Technologies, LLC
- Inventors: James Martin Lawlis; Omar Makke; Haysam M. Kadry
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20180027600A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- G06V 20/62: Text, e.g. of license plates, overlay texts or captions on TV images
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 63/0421: {Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer}
- H04L 63/06: {for supporting key management in a packet data network (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08)}
- H04L 63/0876: {based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint}
- H04W 4/70: Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
- H04W 12/02: Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
- H04W 12/04: Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W 12/047: without using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W 76/14: Direct-mode setup
- H04L 63/0435: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06)}
- H04L 67/12: specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
- H04L 2209/805: Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
- H04L 2209/84: Vehicles
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06V: IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

Systems and methods are disclosed for private vehicle-to-vehicle communication. An example disclosed vehicle communication system includes sensors to monitor a target vehicle, and a controller. The example controller generates a pseudo-anonymous identifier based on an identifier and an attribute of the target vehicle. Additionally, the controller broadcasts a first message including the pseudo-anonymous identifier, a random number, and a public key. In response to receiving a second message including the identifier and the random number, the example controller broadcasts a third message encrypted with a symmetric key included in the second message.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A vehicle communication system comprising:
sensors to monitor a target vehicle; and
a controller to:
generate a pseudoanonymous identifier based on an identifier and an attribute of the target vehicle;
broadcast a first message including the pseudo-anonymous identifier, a random number, and a public key; and
in response to receiving a second message including the identifier and the random number, broadcast a third message encrypted with a symmetric key included in the second message.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The vehicle communication system of claim 1, wherein the sensors include a camera and an ultrasonic sensor.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The vehicle communication system of claim 1, wherein the identifier of the target vehicle is a license plate number and the attribute of the target vehicle is speed.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The vehicle communication system of claim 1, wherein to generate the pseudoanonymous identifier, the controller is to generate a hash of the identifier and the attribute of the target vehicle with a one-way hash function.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The vehicle communication system of claim 1, including in response to receiving a second message, the controller is to decrypt the second message with a private key corresponding to the public key to determine the identifier and the random number included in the second message.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The vehicle communication system of claim 1, wherein the second message includes the symmetric key.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The vehicle communication system of claim 1, wherein the controller is to broadcast the third message without verifying an identity of the target vehicle with a trusted authority.

### Claim 8

A method to establish private communication with a target vehicle comprising:
generating, with a processor, a pseudo-anonymous identifier based on an identifier and an attribute of the target vehicle;
broadcasting a first message including the pseudo-anonymous identifier, a random number, and a public key; and
in response to receiving a second message including the identifier and the random number, broadcasting a third message encrypted with a symmetric key included in the second message.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the identifier of the target vehicle is obtained with a camera and the attribute of the target vehicle is obtained with an ultrasonic sensor.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the identifier of the target vehicle is a license plate number and the attribute of the target vehicle is speed.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein generating the pseudo-anonymous identifier includes generating a hash of the identifier and the attribute of the target vehicle with a one-way hash function.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, including, in response to receiving a second message, decrypting the second message with a private key corresponding to the public key to determine the identifier and the random number included in the second message.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the second message includes the symmetric key.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, including broadcasting the third message without verifying an identity of the target vehicle with a trusted authority.

### Claim 15

A method to privately communicate between a first and second vehicle comprising:
generating, by the first vehicle, a first pseudoanonymous identifier based on a discernible identifier and a measurable attribute of the second vehicle;
broadcasting, by the first vehicle, an initial message that includes the first pseudoanonymous identifier, a random number, and a public key;
comparing, by the second vehicle, the first pseudoanonymous identifier to a second pseudoanonymous identifier generated by the second vehicle based the discernible identifier and measurable attribute of the second vehicle;
in response to a match, generating, by the second vehicle, an response message encrypted with the public key, the response message including the random number, the discernible identifier of the second vehicle, and a symmetric key;
communicating, by the first vehicle, with second vehicle using the symmetric key when the random number and the discernible identifier of the second vehicle in the response message match the discernible identifier used to generate the first pseudoanonymous identifier and the random number in the initial message.
