# US 2018/0026950 A1 · Leveraging transport-layer cryptographic material

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- Number: US 2018/0026950 A1
- Document ID: US20180026950A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/712,005
- Filed: 2017-09-21
- Published: 2018-01-25
- Earliest claimed: 2015-10-02
- Assignees: Amazon Technologies, Inc.
- Applicants: Amazon Technologies, Inc.
- Inventors: Muhammad Wasiq; Nima Sharifi Mehr
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20180026950A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 63/0478: {applying multiple layers of encryption, e.g. nested tunnels or encrypting the content with a first key and then with at least a second key (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14)}
- H04L 63/06: {for supporting key management in a packet data network (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08)}
- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04L 63/166: {at the transport layer}
- H04L 63/168: {above the transport layer}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A client application cryptographically protects application data using an application-layer cryptographic key. The application-layer cryptographic key is derived from cryptographic material provided by a cryptographically protected network connection. The client exchanges the cryptographically protected application data with a service application via the cryptographically protected network connection. The client and service applications acquire matching application-layer cryptographic keys by leveraging shared secrets negotiated as part of establishing the cryptographically protected network connection. The shared secrets may include information that is negotiated as part of establishing a TLS session such as a pre-master secret, master secret, or session key. The application-layer cryptographic keys may be derived in part by applying a key derivation function, a one-way function or a cryptographic hash function to the shared secret information.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-implemented method comprising:
establishing a communication channel between a first application and a second application using a cryptographically protected transport layer;
acquiring a shared secret and a session key that are produced as a result of establishing the communication channel using the cryptographically protected transport layer;
deriving an application-layer cryptographic key based at least in part on the shared secret;
receiving encrypted application data from the second application, the encrypted application data encrypted with the application-layer cryptographic key and the session key;
decrypting the encrypted application data with the session key to produce intermediate encrypted data;
decrypting the intermediate encrypted data with the application-layer cryptographic key to recover plain text application data; and
providing the plain text application data to the first application.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:
encrypting a plaintext reply with the application-layer cryptographic key and the session key to produce an encrypted reply; and
sending an encrypted reply to the second application via the communication channel.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising applying a key derivation function to a the shared secret to produce the application-layer cryptographic key.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein:
the communication channel is a cryptographically protected communication channel that exchanges data using a symmetric cryptographic key; and
the symmetric cryptographic key is based at least in part on the shared secret.

### Claim 5

A computer system, comprising:
one or more processors; and
memory storing instructions that, if executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to:
establish a connection to an application on another computer system in accordance with a cryptographically protected communication protocol;
acquire a shared secret and a session key that are produced as a result of establishing the connection in accordance with the cryptographically protected communication protocol, the shared secret accessible to the application and the system;
derive an application-layer cryptographic key based at least in part on the shared secret;
receive encrypted application data from the application, the encrypted application data encrypted with the application-layer cryptographic key and the session key; and
acquire plain text application data by at least decrypting the encrypted application data with the session key and the application-layer cryptographic key.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein:
the cryptographically protected communication protocol is a version of the transport layer security protocol; and
the application-layer key matches a transport layer security session key associated with the transport layer security session.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the system to:
derive an additional application-layer key based at least in part on the shared secret and a pre-shared secret associated with an application; and
provide the additional application-layer key to an additional application.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the system to:
identify a piece of application data;
generate encrypted application data by encrypting the piece of application data with the application-layer key and the session key; and
transmit the piece of application data to the application via the connection.

### Claim 9 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the system to:
receive encrypted application data from a transport layer that implements the cryptographically protected communication protocol; and
decrypt the encrypted application data with the application-layer key.

### Claim 10 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the system to:
store a copy of the application-layer key;
receive a digital signature from the application; and
verify the digital signature using the copy of the application-layer key.

### Claim 11 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the system to:
receive the encrypted application data via the connection, the encrypted application data encrypted with a public cryptographic key of an asymmetric key pair; and
decrypt the encrypted application data using a private key of the asymmetric key pair.

### Claim 12 (depends on 5)

The computer system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the system to:
decrypt the encrypted application data with the session key to produce intermediate encrypted data;
encrypt the intermediate encrypted data with a second session key associated with a cryptographically protected communication session to produce re-encrypted data; and
send the re-encrypted data over the cryptographically protected communication session.

### Claim 13

A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions that, as a result of being executed by one or more processors of a computer system, cause the computer system to at least:
establish a network connection between a first application on the computer system and a second application on another computer system, the network connection being in accordance with a cryptographically protected communication protocol, the network connection having an associated session key and a shared secret;
determine a cryptographic key based at least in part on the shared secret;
receive encrypted application data from the second application, the encrypted application data encrypted with the cryptographic key and the session key; and
acquire plain text application data by at least decrypting the encrypted application data with the session key and the cryptographic key.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein:
the cryptographically protected communication protocol exchanges data using a symmetric cryptographic key; and
the shared secret is a generated as part of a diffie-hellman key exchange algorithm.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the cryptographic key is derived at least in part by applying a key stretching function to the shared secret.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further include instructions that cause the computer system to verify the encrypted application data by verifying a digital signature on the encrypted application data.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that, as a result of being executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to:
identify a characteristic of the shared secret; and
select a key-generation algorithm to generate the cryptographic key based at least in part on the characteristic of the shared secret.

### Claim 18 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that, as a result of being executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to:
identify a cryptographic algorithm used to generate the encrypted application data; and
generate the cryptographic key from the shared secret using a key generation algorithm that is based at least in part on the cryptographic algorithm.

### Claim 19 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the encrypted application data is received as a parameter of a Web page within a Uniform Resource Identifier.

### Claim 20 (depends on 13)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein:
the application is a plugin operating in a Web browser; and
the cryptographic key is stored in a memory accessible to the plugin.
