# US 2017/0374049 A1 · Distributed key secret for rewritable blockchain

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- Number: US 2017/0374049 A1
- Document ID: US20170374049A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/684,721
- Filed: 2017-08-23
- Published: 2017-12-28
- Earliest claimed: 2016-05-23
- Assignees: Accenture Global Solutions Limited; GSC Secrypt, LLC
- Applicants: Accenture Global Solutions Limited; GSC Secrypt, LLC
- Inventors: Guiseppe Ateniese; Michael T. Chiaramonte; David Treat; Bernardo Magri; Daniele Venturi
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20170374049A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)}
- G06F 3/0619: {in relation to data integrity, e.g. data losses, bit errors}
- G06F 3/0622: {in relation to access}
- G06F 3/0659: {Command handling arrangements, e.g. command buffers, queues, command scheduling}
- G06F 3/0673: {Single storage device}
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 21/64: Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
- H04L 9/0618: {Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation}
- H04L 9/0637: {Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM]}
- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- H04L 9/085: {Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3221: {interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/3226: {using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083)}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 2209/46: Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
- H04L 2209/56: Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A system includes circuitry for rewriting blockchains in a non-tamper-evident or tamper-evident operation using a key secret held in portions by multiple individually untrusted parties. The blockchains may include a series of blocks secured by integrity codes that may prevent non-tamper-evident rewrites by non-trusted parties that are not in possession of the key secret or individually-untrusted parties in possession of only a portion of the key secret. In some cases, multiple individually-untrusted parties may combine their portions into the key secret. As a group, the multiple individually-untrusted parties may perform non-tamper-evident operation with respect to at least one integrity code within the blockchain.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
receiving, at processing circuitry, a first portion of a key secret via a key secret exchange protocol;
combining, with the processing circuitry, the first portion with a second portion of the key secret to obtain the key secret;
determining, with the processing circuitry, to rewrite original data in a selected block of a blockchain with altered data that is different than the original data previously stored in the selected block; and
determining, with the processing circuitry and using the key secret, collision data:
the collision data including the altered data,
the collision data coding-consistent with a previously determined integrity output stored within a specific block of the blockchain that follows the selected block, and
the previously determined integrity output generated responsive to and coding-consistent with the original data.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, where the specific block follows the selected block within the blockchain.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, where the specific block comprises a block adjacent to the selected block within the blockchain.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, where receiving the first portion of the key secret via the key secret exchange protocol comprises:
receiving the first portion of the key secret via a public key exchange protocol.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, where receiving the first portion of the key secret via the key secret exchange protocol comprises:
performing the key secret exchange protocol under authority of multiple individually-untrusted parties.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
accessing the second portion of the key secret in a protected memory prior to combining the first and second portions of the key secret.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
granting, using the key secret, a third portion of the key secret to a previously untrusted party.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, where granting the third portion of the key secret comprises:
decrypting, using the key secret, a cache storing multiple portions of the key secret.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, where determining to rewrite the original data in the selected block of the blockchain with the altered data comprises:
determining to remove a detectable rewrite artifact left by performing a rewrite without access to the first portion, the second portion, or both.

### Claim 10

A system comprising:
communication interface circuitry configured to receive, at processing circuitry, a first portion of a key secret via a key secret exchange protocol; and
rewrite circuitry in data communication with the communication interface circuitry, the rewrite circuitry configured to:
combine the first portion with a second portion of the key secret to obtain the key secret;
determine to rewrite original data in a selected block of a blockchain with altered data that is different than the original data previously stored in the selected block; and
determine, using the key secret, collision data including the altered data, the collision data coding-consistent with a previously determined integrity output stored within a specific block of the blockchain that follows the selected block, the previously determined integrity output generated responsive to and coding-consistent with the original data.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the specific block follows the selected block within the blockchain.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the specific block comprises a block adjacent to the selected block within the blockchain.

### Claim 13 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the communication interface circuitry is configured to:
receive the first portion of the key secret via the key secret exchange protocol by receiving the first portion of the key secret via a public key exchange protocol.

### Claim 14 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the communication interface circuitry is configured to:
receive the first portion of the key secret the key secret exchange protocol by performing the key secret exchange protocol under authority of multiple individually untrusted parties.

### Claim 15 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the rewrite circuitry is further configured to:
access the second portion of the key secret in a protected memory prior to combining the first and second portions of the key secret.

### Claim 16 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the rewrite circuitry is further configured to:
grant, using the key secret, a third portion of the key secret to a previously untrusted party.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The system of claim 16, where the rewrite circuitry is configured to:
grant the third portion of the key secret by decrypting, using the key secret, a cache storing multiple portions of the key secret.

### Claim 18 (depends on 10)

The system of claim 10, where the rewrite circuitry is configured to:
determine to rewrite the original data in the selected block of the blockchain with the altered data by determining to remove a detectable rewrite artifact left by performing a rewrite without access to the first portion, the second portion, or both.

### Claim 19

A product comprising:
a machine-readable medium other than a transitory signal; and
instructions stored on the machine-readable medium, the instructions configured to, when executed, cause a machine to:
receive, at processing circuitry, a first portion of a key secret via a key secret exchange protocol;
combine, with the processing circuitry, the first portion with a second portion of the key secret to obtain the key secret;
determine, with the processing circuitry, to rewrite original data in a selected block of a blockchain with altered data that is different than the original data previously stored in the selected block; and
determine, with the processing circuitry and using the key secret, collision data including the altered data, the collision data coding-consistent with a previously determined integrity output stored within a specific block of the blockchain that follows the selected block, the previously determined integrity output generated responsive to and coding-consistent with the original data.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The product of claim 19, where the instructions configured to cause the machine to determine to rewrite the original data in the selected block of the blockchain with the altered data by:
determining to remove a detectable rewrite artifact left by performing a rewrite without access to the first portion, the second portion, or both.
