# US 2017/0285171 A1 · Method for authenticating signals received from a constellation of satellites

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- Number: US 2017/0285171 A1
- Document ID: US20170285171A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/508,376
- Filed: 2015-09-02
- Published: 2017-10-05
- Earliest claimed: 2014-09-05
- Assignees: Centre National D'Etudes Spatiales
- Applicants: Centre National D'Etudes Spatiales
- Inventors: Lionel RIES
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20170285171A1

## CPC

- G01S 19/215: {issues related to spoofing}
- H04K 1/00: Secret communication
- G01S: RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- H04K: SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION

## Abstract

The positioning signals broadcast by the GNSS constellations on civilian frequencies are likely to be counterfeited, while the use of authentic signals is becoming increasingly critical for certain applications. According to the invention, the authentication of GNSS signals is performed by analysis of consistency between the measurements of parameters characteristic of the signals (direction of arrival, amplitude, phase) and their state model, said state model taking account of an emulation by software and electronic means of displacements of the phase centre of the antenna and/or of the main lobe of the radiation pattern. Advantageously, these displacements are generated by a pseudo-random code. Advantageously, the analysis of consistency between measurements and models is a multiple-criterion analysis, the combination of criteria being chosen as a function of a reception quality indicator and/or of a presumed location.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for authenticating GNSS signals received by a receiver, said method comprising:
generating control sequences emulating one or more of a scanning and a displacement of a reception cone by at least one GNSS signal reception antenna;
transmitting raw RF signals at the output of the at least one GNSS signal reception antenna to an authentication circuit logic configured to authenticate said raw RF signals;
acquiring, in-phase with the control sequences, raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data comprising one or more data representative of a phase angle, a phase centre, an amplitude or a carrier power;
transmitting to the authentication circuit logic a message containing said raw data representative of said GNSS signals;
producing by the authentication circuit logic of a GNSS signal authentication certificate by a processing receiving as input at least said raw RF signals at the output of said at least one reception antenna and said raw data representative of said GNSS signals.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the control sequences are generated by a pseudo-random code produced by an encryption key.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the message transmitted to the authentication circuit logic also comprises PVT data to locate the receiver.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the scanning of a reception cone comprises a generation of attenuated signals in at least one direction of said cone.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the displacement of a reception cone of said signal comprises a switchover between at least two antennas.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the raw RF signals at the output of said at least one GNSS signal reception antenna are digitized before transmission to the authentication circuit logic.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the digitized RF signals at the output of the digitization step are encrypted by at least a first part of the encryption key, before transmission to the authentication circuit logic.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said raw data representative of the GNSS signals are encrypted by at least a second part of said encryption key, before transmission to the authentication circuit logic.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if the latter satisfies a test of consistency TC1 of phase measurements and/or of phase measurement differences between signals of different satellite axes with a model deduced from the control sequences emulating the scanning and/or the displacement of a reception cone.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if the latter satisfies a test of consistency TC2 of the directions of arrival measured by the receiver with expected directions determined by a model deduced from the control sequences emulating the scanning and/or the displacement of a reception cone.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if the latter satisfies a test of consistency TC3 of the powers, amplitudes and/or signal-to-noise ratios measured in directions of arrival measured by the receiver with expected powers, amplitudes and/or signal-to-noise ratios in expected directions, these parameters being determined by a model deduced from the control sequences emulating the scanning and/or the displacement of a reception cone.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the production of the GNSS signal authentication certificate is performed only if a test of consistency TC is satisfied, said test being defined by a linear combination of the tests of consistency TC1, TC2 and TC3, the weightings of said tests TC1, TC2 and TC3 being defined as a function of one or more of a GNSS signal reception quality indicator and of a position of the receiver module estimated by a localization procedure not using the GNSS signals.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the localization procedure not using the GNSS signals is one or more of a terrain mapping, an inertial unit measurement, an identification of a radio communication network cell or of a Wifi terminal.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising, when there is an index of presence of non-authentic GNSS signals, analyzing the inter-channel correlation peaks on the raw signals at the output of said at least one reception antenna.

### Claim 15

A system for authenticating GNSS signals comprising:
one or more antenna arrangements, each antenna arrangement comprising at least one reception antenna;
one or more GNSS signal receivers, each receiver configured to supply as output raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data comprising one or more data representative of a phase angle, a phase centre, an amplitude or a carrier power;
one or more processing circuit logics configured to generate a control sequence emulating one or more of a scanning or a displacement of a cone of reception of said signals by the antenna arrangement, said control sequences in-phase with the supply of the raw data representative of said GNSS signals;
authentication circuit logic configured to produce a GNSS signal authentication certificate by a processing receiving as input at least raw RF signals at the output of said at least one reception antenna and said raw data representative of said GNSS signals.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The system of claim 15, comprising a server, said server to manage encryption keys and at least some of the functions of the at least one authentication circuit logic.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The system of claim 15, wherein at least one or more of the antenna arrangements or the receivers are located in terrestrial motor vehicles.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The system of claim 15, comprising a plurality of processing circuit logics, at least some of the receivers being installed in a vicinity of electronic payment terminals.

### Claim 19

A GNSS signal reception antenna unit, comprising:
an antenna configured to receive GNSS signals;
a set of electronic components configured to emulate one or more of a scanning or a displacement of a reception cone of said antenna under the control of a sequence generated by a pseudo-random code as digital input for said unit at different points in time;
an analogue/digital converter configured to supply to at least one analogue or digital output a sampling of the raw RF signals.

### Claim 20

A GNSS signal authentication equipment, comprising:
a digital port configured to receive encryption keys;
signal processing logic configured to acquire, at a predetermined sampling frequency:
raw RF signals at the output of at least one GNSS signal reception antenna,
raw data representative of said GNSS signals, said raw data comprising one or more data representative of a phase angle, a phase centre, an amplitude or a carrier power.
A processing circuit configured to:
generate a pseudo-random code from an encryption key, said code being itself configured to generate a control sequence emulating one or more of a scanning or a displacement of a reception cone by said at least one GNSS signal reception antenna, said control sequence in-phase with the acquisition of the raw data representative of said GNSS signals;
acquire or produce a variables state model at the output of the signal processing logic, said state model being adapted to the control sequence;
execute at least one test of consistency between at least a part of the data measured at the output of the signal processing logic and their state model.
