# US 2017/0257399 A1 · Systems and methods involving aspects of hardware virtualization such as hypervisor, detection and interception of code or instruction execution including api calls, and/or other features

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- Number: US 2017/0257399 A1
- Document ID: US20170257399A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/462,706
- Filed: 2017-03-17
- Published: 2017-09-07
- Earliest claimed: 2014-05-15
- Assignees: Lynx Software Technologies, Inc.
- Applicants: Lynx Software Technologies, Inc.
- Inventors: Edward T. Mooring; Craig Howard
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20170257399A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/20: {for managing network security; network security policies in general (filtering policies H04L63/0227)}
- G06F 9/455: Emulation; Interpretation; Software simulation, e.g. virtualisation or emulation of application or operating system execution engines
- G06F 9/45545: {Guest-host, i.e. hypervisor is an application program itself, e.g. VirtualBox}
- G06F 9/45558: {Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects}
- G06F 9/50: Allocation of resources, e.g. of the central processing unit [CPU]
- G06F 9/5077: {Logical partitioning of resources; Management or configuration of virtualized resources (specific details on emulation or internal functioning of virtual machines G06F9/455)}
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04L 69/00: Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass (networks security protocols H04L9/40; wireless communication networks H04W)
- G06F 2009/45587: {Isolation or security of virtual machine instances}
- G06F 2009/45591: {Monitoring or debugging support}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Systems, methods, computer readable media and articles of manufacture consistent with innovations herein are directed to computer virtualization, computer security and/or memory access. According to some illustrative implementations, innovations herein may utilize and/or involve a separation kernel hypervisor which may include the use of a guest operating system virtual machine protection domain, a virtualization assistance layer, and/or a instruction execution detection/interception mechanism (which may be proximate in temporal and/or spatial locality to malicious code, but isolated from it). The instruction execution detection/interception mechanism may perform processing, inter alia, for detection and/or notification of, and actions upon by a monitoring guest, code execution by a monitored guest involving predetermined physical memory locations, such as API calls. Such actions may include interception of API calls within the monitored guest and simulation thereof by the monitoring guest or another authorized guest.

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

-4. (canceled)

### Claim 5

A method for processing information securely, the method comprising:
partitioning hardware platform resources via a separation kernel hypervisor into a plurality of guest operating system virtual machine protection domains each including a virtual machine; and
isolating and/or securing the domains in time and/or space from each other.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising one or more of:
hosting/processing at least one detection mechanism, each which may be different from each other, that executes within one or more of the plurality of guest operating system virtual machine protection domains via the separation kernel hypervisor;
implementing at least one routine and/or component to prohibit the guest operating system virtual machine protection domains from tampering with, corrupting, and/or bypassing the detection mechanism; and/or
executing the detection mechanism while preventing interference and/or bypassing/corrupting/tampering by the plurality of guest operating system virtual machine protection domains;
providing a list of memory locations of an authorized guest to another guest;
associating each of a plurality of physical memory locations with a respective specification of execution context information upon access to the each of the plurality of physical memory locations; and
providing the execution context information to the another guest.

### Claim at position 4

-34. (canceled)

### Claim 35 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
hosting a first mechanism to copy contents of the physical memory location into a private memory location.

### Claim 36 (depends on 35)

The method of claim 35, further comprising:
hosting a second mechanism to overwrite the location with an instruction to trap into the separation kernel hypervisor; and
processing an exception due to execution attempts of the overwritten location by the associated virtual machine.

### Claim 37 (depends on 36)

The method of claim 36, further comprising:
hosting a third mechanism to determine whether the physical memory location is accessed.

### Claim 38 (depends on 37)

The method of claim 37, further comprising:
pausing or resuming execution of the virtual machine;
replacing the overwritten instruction with a stored copy; and
allowing the virtual machine to execute the instruction.

### Claim 39 (depends on 38)

The method of claim 38, further comprising:
trapping back into the virtualization assistance layer;
overwriting the instruction with a trapping instruction; and
sending a notification of memory access and the specification to the another guest.

### Claim 40 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
monitoring code in at least one of the guest operating system virtual machine protection domains to detect suspect code;
wherein the monitoring of code includes instrumented execution and/or debugging, a unit test, and/or a regression test.

### Claim 41 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising one or more of:
implementing at least one routine and/or component to prohibit the guest operating systems from tampering with, corrupting, and/or bypassing the detection mechanism(s); and
executing the detection mechanism(s) while preventing interference and/or bypassing/corrupting/tampering by the plurality of guest operating systems.

### Claim 42 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein:
the plurality of guest operating system virtual machine protection domains includes corresponding guest operating systems; and
wherein isolating the loss of security in one of the guest operating system virtual machine protection domains to the one lost security domain such that security is not broken in all the domains.

### Claim 43 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
moving virtualization processing to virtual hardware platforms within each guest operating system protection domain so that substantially all analysis and security testing is performed within each guest operating system protection domain such that the separation kernel hypervisor is of reduced size and/or complexity.

### Claim 44 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
detecting in each of the domains their own suspect code as a function of the isolated domains; or wherein viewing the virtual hardware platform within each domain as separate hardware by a guest such that bypass is prevented.

### Claim 45 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
monitoring, via one or more detection mechanism(s), for suspect code;
wherein the detection mechanism(s) include subcomponents and/or subroutines configured for monitoring of guest operating system memory access.

### Claim 46 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
monitoring, via one or more detection mechanism(s), for suspect code;
wherein the detection mechanism(s) include subcomponents and/or subroutines configured for monitoring actions of the guest operating system including observation, detection, and/or tracking of code, data, execution flow, and/or resource utilization at runtime.

### Claim 47 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
monitoring, via detection mechanism(s), for suspect code;
ascertaining where code is at least one of operating, hiding, halted, stalled, infinitely looping, making no progress beyond intended execution, stored, once-active, extinct/not present but having performed suspect and/or malicious action, in a position to maliciously affect a resource under control of a hypervisor guest.

### Claim 48 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
executing one or more detection mechanism(s) while preventing interference and/or corruption/tampering/bypassing by the plurality of guest operating system virtual machine protection domains.

### Claim 49 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
monitoring, via one or more detection mechanism(s), for suspect code;
wherein the detection mechanism(s) include subcomponents and/or subroutines configured for monitoring actions of the guest operating system including mitigation, prevention, and/or modification of code, data, execution flow, and/or resource utilization at runtime, as detected by the detection mechanism.

### Claim 50 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
monitoring, via one or more detection mechanism(s), for suspect code;
wherein the detection mechanism(s) include subcomponents and/or subroutines configured for monitoring actions of the guest operating system including reporting upon of THE suspect code, data, execution flow, and/or resource utilization at runtime, as detected by the detection mechanism.

### Claim 51 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
enforcing policy for activities monitored by detection mechanism(s) within the guest operating system virtual machine protection domain.

### Claim 52 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising:
providing a virtualization assistance layer associated with one or more of the guest operating system virtual machine protection domains;
wherein the virtualization assistance layer virtualizes portions of the hardware platform resources including a virtual CPU/ABI, a virtual chipset ABI, a set of virtual devices, a set of physical devices, and/or firmware exported to the corresponding guest operating system.

### Claim at position 23

-64. (canceled)
