# US 2017/0257365 A1 · System and method for hardware-based trust control management

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- Number: US 2017/0257365 A1
- Document ID: US20170257365A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/601,551
- Filed: 2017-05-22
- Published: 2017-09-07
- Earliest claimed: 2013-12-27
- Assignees: Trapezoid, Inc.
- Applicants: Trapezoid, Inc.
- Inventors: José E. Gonzalez; Michael J. Dyer; Albert Caballero
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20170257365A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0853: {using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234)}
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- H04L 63/0876: {based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint}
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04L 63/20: {for managing network security; network security policies in general (filtering policies H04L63/0227)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A trust control management method for security, operable on a computer system generates a unique Trust ID value by combining user-defined values with hardware-specific values associated with the user's computer system and storing the Trust ID value in a memory register physically associated with the hardware of the computer system. A Trust Control Suite (TCS) operable with a server OS/hypervisor maintains a database of user-defined values and list of hardware-specific value types for computer systems clustered in a trusted computing pool. An attestation procedure is performed by the trust control server combining the user-defined values with the hardware-specific values and comparing the resulting value to the user-stored Trust ID value stored in the memory register associated with a user's computer system. Depending on whether it is a match or mismatch, the TCS can determine if it is a trusted computer or not, and can take appropriate alerts and policy actions.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An integrity verification management method for a local attestation service computer and a plurality of remote computer information technology (IT) machines to be identified in a trusted computing group on a computer network, comprising:
in an initial configuration procedure performed by the local attestation service computer, in communication with a target remote IT machine to be identified in the trusted computing group:
(a) requesting a set of alphanumeric values, including hardware-specific seed values that are uniquely and unchangeably associated with specific physical hardware embodied with the target remote IT machine;
(b) generating at the local attestation service computer a unique encoded alphanumeric value (original encoded Trust ID value) by combining the set of alphanumeric values using a Trust ID encoding algorithm;
(c) storing the original encoded Trust ID value associated with the specific physical hardware for the target remote IT machine in a secure memory storage of the target remote IT machine; and
(d) storing in the local attestation service computer the set of alphanumeric values associated with the target remote IT machine together with a list of types of hardware-specific seed values associated with the specific physical hardware embodied with the target remote IT machine; and
performing, via a trust control application program of the local attestation service computer locally and independently from the target remote IT machine, a local attestation procedure for computing a Trust ID value by:
(a) requesting for retrieval the original encoded Trust ID value stored in the target remote IT machine and the hardware-specific seed values of the list of types of hardware-specific seed values associated with specific physical hardware embodied with the target remote IT machine;
(b) combining the set of alphanumeric values stored on the local attestation service computer with the hardware-specific seed values retrieved from the target remote IT machine and encoding a comparison Trust ID value using the same Trust ID encoding algorithm that was used to generate the original encoded Trust ID value; and
(c) comparing at the local attestation service computer the comparison Trust ID value with the original encoded Trust ID value retrieved from the target remote IT machine, and upon a match, determining that the target remote IT machine is a trusted IT machine in the trusted computing group, or upon a failure to match, determining that the target remote IT machine is not a trusted IT machine in the trusted computing group, then taking an appropriate security action by the trust control application program of the local attestation service computer.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the set of alphanumeric values further comprise alphanumeric values defined by a platform supplier.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 2, wherein the set of alphanumeric values further comprise alphanumeric values defined by a platform owner.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 2, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value is generated by selecting one or more of hardware-specific Seed Values, contextual values, platform supplier-specific Seed Values, and policy values.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 3, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value is generated by selecting one or more of hardware-specific Seed Values, contextual values, platform owner specific Seed Values, and policy values.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value is generated by an encoding algorithm for hash encoding and combining the set of alphanumeric values in a selected sequence.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value is stored in the secure memory storage of the remote IT machine by a provisioning tool running on the remote IT machine during the initial configuration procedure.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the local attestation procedure further comprises orchestrating alerts and policy events based on a result of the comparing step.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, further comprising storing the original encoded Trust ID value in a secure storage location physically associated with hardware of the target remote IT machine.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the set of alphanumeric values includes a geolocation value associated with a physical location of where the target remote IT machine is to be deployed in order to define its grouping with the trusted computing group associated with that geolocation.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the hardware-specific seed values include values associated with a given version of any firmware, BIOS, ROM, or other embedded code (collectively “firmware”) present on target remote IT machine.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating the original encoded Trust ID value is carried out without knowledge of a user of the target remote IT machine as a precaution against security penetration and spoofing.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value incorporates Seed Values selected from predetermined categories of Trust ID types.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value is generated to include a geotagging value for the trusted computing group.

### Claim 15 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the local attestation service computer is configured to perform the local attestation procedure as part of a Trust Control Suite.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 15, wherein the original encoded Trust ID value is generated by a TConfig module of the Trust Control Suite.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 15, wherein the Trust Control Suite is used for ensuring security for a plurality of information technology platforms in a trusted computing pool.

### Claim 18 (depends on 16)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 16, wherein the Trust Control Suite has a modular architecture having instances for respective ones of the plurality of information technology platforms in the trusted computing pool group.

### Claim 19 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the set of alphanumeric values and the list of types of hardware-specific seed values are defined by a user of the remote IT machine during the initial configuration procedure for the remote IT machine.

### Claim 20 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the comparison Trust ID value is generated by recalculation to verify a previously stored original encoded Trust ID value for each target remote IT machine.

### Claim 21 (depends on 1)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating the original encoded Trust ID value further comprises including a geotag value common to the trusted computing group with the set of alphanumeric values.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The integrity verification management method according to claim 21, further comprising decoding the original encoded Trust ID value to reveal the common geotag value.
