# US 2017/0257348 A1 · System and method for integrated header, state, rate and content anomaly prevention for session initiation protocol

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- Number: US 2017/0257348 A1
- Document ID: US20170257348A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/604,299
- Filed: 2017-05-24
- Published: 2017-09-07
- Earliest claimed: 2013-03-23
- Assignees: Fortinet, Inc.
- Applicants: Fortinet, Inc.
- Inventors: Hemant Kumar Jain; Venkata Yallapragada; Bhavin Shah; Radhika Palepu
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20170257348A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/1425: {Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection}
- H04L 63/0227: {Filtering policies (mail message filtering H04L51/212)}
- H04L 63/0236: {Filtering by address, protocol, port number or service, e.g. IP-address or URL}
- H04L 63/0245: {Filtering by information in the payload}
- H04L 63/0254: {Stateful filtering}
- H04L 63/14: {for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic}
- H04L 63/1408: {by monitoring network traffic (monitoring network traffic per se H04L43/00)}
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04L 63/1441: {Countermeasures against malicious traffic (countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002)}
- H04L 63/1458: {Denial of Service}
- H04L 63/162: {at the data link layer}
- H04L 63/164: {at the network layer}
- H04L 63/166: {at the transport layer}
- H04L 63/168: {above the transport layer}
- H04L 65/1104: Session initiation protocol [SIP]
- H04L 2463/142: Denial of service attacks against network infrastructure
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Methods and systems for an integrated solution to the rate based denial of service attacks targeting the Session Initiation Protocol are provided. According to one embodiment, header, state, rate and content anomalies are prevented and network policy enforcement is provided for session initiation protocol (SIP). A hardware-based apparatus helps identify SIP rate-thresholds through continuous and adaptive learning. The apparatus can determine SIP header and SIP state anomalies and drop packets containing those anomalies. SIP requests and responses are inspected for known malicious contents using a Content Inspection Engine. The apparatus integrates advantageous solutions to prevent anomalous packets and enables a policy based packet filter for SIP.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
receiving, by a packet interface of a denial of service (DoS) attack mitigation appliance associated with a private network, inbound/outbound packets; and
protecting, by the DoS attack mitigation appliance, a Session Initiation Protocol (IP) server within the private network from being flooded by:
classifying, by a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) classifier of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, SIP packets of the inbound/outbound packets as either SIP requests or SIP responses;
classifying, by a SIP header classifier of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, various components of SIP protocol headers of the SIP requests and the SIP responses;
identifying, by a per source flood checking module of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, a particular source Internet Protocol (IP) as an attacker by detecting SIP requests from the particular source Internet Protocol (IP) address exceeding a predetermined request threshold;
identifying, by a method floods module of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, one or more SIP methods under attack by tracking a plurality of individual types of SIP requests observed and for each type of SIP request of the plurality of individual types of SIP requests comparing a number of SIP requests received of the type of SIP request with a corresponding predetermined threshold;
identifying, by a SIP user-agent (UA) flood module of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, occurrence of a SIP UA flood by comparing a number of UA headers in INVITE requests of the SIP requests to a predetermined UA threshold;
identifying, by a SIP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) flood module of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, occurrence of a SIP URI flood by comparing a number of SIP URIs in the INVITE requests to a predetermined URI threshold; and
during a period in which a particular SIP method is identified as being under attack, dropping, by the DoS attack mitigation appliance, subsequent SIP requests originated by the particular source IP address;
during a period in which the occurrence of a SIP UA flood has been identified, dropping, by the DoS attack mitigation appliance, subsequent INVITE requests originated by the particular source IP address; and
during a period in which the occurrence of a SIP URI flood has been identified, dropping, by the DoS attack mitigation appliance, subsequent INVITE requests originated by the particular source IP address.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving, via a host interface of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, the corresponding predetermined threshold for each type of SIP request of the plurality of individual types of SIP requests, the predetermined UA threshold, the predetermined request threshold and the predetermined URI threshold.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising determining, by a SIP state anomaly engine of the DoS attack mitigation appliance, existence of layer 2, 3, 4, and 7 header and state anomalies, including one or more of (i) an absence of one or more mandatory headers; (ii) a Command Sequence (CSeq) header in a SIP request exceeding a first predetermined threshold; (iii) a mismatch between a CSeq header method and a method name in a corresponding request line; (iv) a Max-Forward header in the SIP request having a value exceeding a second predetermined threshold; and (v) an opcode anomaly.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising determining and estimating, by a SIP rate anomaly engine of the DoS mitigation appliance, rate thresholds for parameters of layers 2, 3, 4, and 7.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4, further comprising determining rate anomalies for the parameters.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising determining, by a SIP policy engine, existence of policy violations in the inbound/outbound packets.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the policy violations involve the inbound/outbound packets containing specific request or response parameters.

### Claim 8 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the policy violations involve the inbound/outbound packets containing specific CALL-ID, From tag, To tag, To-URI, CSeq or user-agent header values.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising inspecting, by a content inspection engine of the DoS mitigation appliance, the SIP requests and the SIP responses for malicious content.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the content inspection engine identifies existence of content patterns of intrusion in SIP protocol packets.
