# US 2017/0251022 A1 · Policy-enabled encryption keys having complex logical operations

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- Number: US 2017/0251022 A1
- Document ID: US20170251022A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/439,077
- Filed: 2017-02-22
- Published: 2017-08-31
- Earliest claimed: 2016-02-26
- Assignees: Fornetix LLC
- Applicants: Fornetix LLC
- Inventors: Charles White; Stephen Edwards
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20170251022A1

## CPC

- G06F 1/3296: by lowering the supply or operating voltage
- H04L 63/20: {for managing network security; network security policies in general (filtering policies H04L63/0227)}
- G06F 1/324: by lowering clock frequency
- G06F 21/604: {Tools and structures for managing or administering access control systems}
- G06F 21/6209: {to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself}
- H02M 1/14: Arrangements for reducing ripples from DC input or output
- H04L 9/0836: {using tree structure or hierarchical structure}
- H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)}
- H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H02M: APPARATUS FOR CONVERSION BETWEEN AC AND AC, BETWEEN AC AND DC, OR BETWEEN DC AND DC, AND FOR USE WITH MAINS OR SIMILAR POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS; CONVERSION OF DC OR AC INPUT POWER INTO SURGE OUTPUT POWER; CONTROL OR REGULATION THEREOF (transformers H01F; dynamo-electric converters H02K47/00; controlling transformers, reactors or choke coils, control or regulation of electric motors, generators or dynamo-electric converters H02P)

## Abstract

Examples described herein relate to a system for orchestrating a security object, including a memory and processor configured to define a plurality of complex policies in a database, wherein the complex policies comprises one or more of EQUAL policy, ONE-OF policy, MEMBER OF policy, NULL policy, NOT-NULL policy, GREATER-THAN policy, GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy, LESS-THAN policy, or LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy, receive the security object and at least one object attribute associated with the security object, determine acceptability of the security object based, at least in part, on the at least one object attribute and at least one of the plurality of complex policies corresponding to the at least one object attribute, and distribute the security object to at least one communication device associated with the processor when the security object is determined to be acceptable, wherein the at least one communication device establishes communication based, at least in part, on the security object.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for evaluating an encryption key based on complex policies, the method comprising:
defining complex policies for evaluating a key attribute of the encryption key, wherein the complex policies comprises one or more of EQUAL policy, ONE-OF policy, MEMBER OF policy, NULL policy, NOT-NULL policy, GREATER-THAN policy, GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy, LESS-THAN policy, or LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy; and
evaluating the encryption key based on the key attribute and the complex policies.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the complex policies are more complex than BOOLEAN policies.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the EQUAL policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is equivalent or identical to a policy value.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the ONE-OF policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is a member of a set.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the MEMBER-OF policy is used to evaluate a parentage of the key attribute of the encryption key.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein:
the NULL policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is set to NULL; and
the NOT-NULL policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is set to a non-NULL value.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein:
the GREATER-THAN policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is greater than a policy value; and
the GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is greater than or equal to a policy value.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein:
the LESS-THAN policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is less than a policy value; and
the LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is less than or equal to a policy value.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the key attribute comprises a descriptive string attribute.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the key attribute comprises one or more of a key size, creation, deletion, date created, date deleted, object group, encryption mask, name, key name.

### Claim 11

A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising computer-readable instructions such that, when executed, causes a processor to:
define complex policies for evaluating a key attribute of the encryption key, wherein the complex policies comprises one or more of EQUAL policy, ONE-OF policy, MEMBER OF policy, NULL policy, NOT-NULL policy, GREATER-THAN policy, GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy, LESS-THAN policy, or LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy; and
evaluate the encryption key based on the key attribute and the complex policies.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, wherein the complex policies are more complex than BOOLEAN policies.

### Claim 13

A system for orchestrating a security object, the system comprising:
a memory; and
a processor configured to
define a plurality of complex policies in a database, wherein the complex policies comprises one or more of EQUAL policy, ONE-OF policy, MEMBER OF policy, NULL policy, NOT-NULL policy, GREATER-THAN policy, GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy, LESS-THAN policy, or LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy;
receive the security object and at least one object attribute associated with the security object;
determine acceptability of the security object based, at least in part, on the at least one object attribute and at least one of the plurality of complex policies corresponding to the at least one object attribute; and
distribute the security object to at least one communication device associated with the processor when the security object is determined to be acceptable, wherein the at least one communication device establishes communication based, at least in part, on the security object.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein the EQUAL policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is equivalent or identical to a policy value.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein the ONE-OF policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is a member of a set.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein the MEMBER-OF policy is used to evaluate a parentage of the key attribute of the encryption key.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein:
the NULL policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is set to NULL; and
the NOT-NULL policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is set to a non-NULL value.

### Claim 18 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein:
the GREATER-THAN policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is greater than a policy value; and
the GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is greater than or equal to a policy value.

### Claim 19 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein:
the LESS-THAN policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is less than a policy value; and
the LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy is used to evaluate whether the key attribute of the encryption key is less than or equal to a policy value.

### Claim 20 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the complex policies are more complex than BOOLEAN policies.
