# US 2016/0365982 A1 · System and method for secure end-to-end messaging system

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- Number: US 2016/0365982 A1
- Document ID: US20160365982A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 15/224,073
- Filed: 2016-07-29
- Published: 2016-12-15
- Earliest claimed: 2015-05-07
- Applicants: Bogart Associates
- Inventors: Timothy Tutt; John Richard Sherwood
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20160365982A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/3066: {involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/045: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14)}
- H04L 67/02: based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
- H04L 63/068: {using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088)}
- H04L 63/168: {above the transport layer}
- H04L 2209/24: Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
- H04L 2209/72: Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

The present invention provides an efficient secure end-to-end messaging system utilizing encrypted ephemeral messages. The method comprises the steps of using a combination of HTTPS for transport security, using symmetric key cryptography with rotating temporary keys for individual message security, and using elliptic curve cryptography for key derivation and message authentication. The key rotation scheme used provides forward secrecy between messages and sessions.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of securely transferring data during a communications session, comprising:
connecting to a communications server by sending a request over HTTPS with a registration header including a current key signature and an initialization vector;
initiating a communications session in response to the request, wherein the communications session includes only users who sent the current key signature;
receiving a list of all communications session users and their initialization vectors from the server; and
broadcasting an encrypted message to the communications session, wherein the initialization vector (IVec) is part of the encrypted message's payload.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising sending a resynchronization message to allow a new user into the communications session.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the resynchronization message includes said current key signature and the initialization vector.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising creating a subsequent key signature by concatenating the initialization vector (IVec) with said current key signature and hashing the result.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4, further comprising broadcasting a subsequent encrypted message to the communications session, wherein a new initialization vector (IVec) containing said subsequent key signature is part of the encrypted message's payload.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein connecting to the communications server further comprises a challenge response sequence.

### Claim 7

A non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium, comprising program instructions that when executed on one or more computers cause the one or more computers to perform:
connecting to a communications server by sending a request over HTTPS with a registration header including a key signature and an initialization vector;
initiating a communications session among users in response to said request, wherein the communications session includes only clients who send the key signature;
receiving a list of all communications session clients and their initialization vectors from the server; and
broadcasting an encrypted message to the communications session, wherein the initialization vector (IVec) is part of the encrypted message's payload.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 7, wherein each message in the communications session uses a rotating key.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 8, further comprising sending a resynchronization message to allow a new user into the communications session.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 9, wherein the resynchronization message includes said key signature and initialization vector.

### Claim 11 (depends on 7)

The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 7, further comprising creating a subsequent key signature by concatenating the initialization vector (IVec) with the key signature and hashing the result.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, further comprising broadcasting a subsequent encrypted message to the communications session, wherein a new initialization vector (IVec) containing the subsequent key signature is part of the encrypted message's payload.

### Claim 13 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, wherein connecting to the server further comprises a challenge response sequence.

### Claim 14 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, wherein the communications session will issue challenges to the client at random intervals and the client is disconnected from the communications session if they do not respond within a predetermined amount of time.

### Claim 15

A method of securely transferring data during a communications session, comprising:
connecting to a communications server by sending a request over a communications protocol by providing a client id and a server key;
validating the connection by a challenge response sequence;
initiating a communications session by either randomly generating a symmetric key or generating a key based on a user provided passphrase;
broadcasting an encrypted message to a set of communications participants, the encrypted message comprising a randomly generated salt used for calculating the next key for the session.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The method of claim 15, wherein the challenge response sequence further comprises a random 4-byte string challenge selected by the server to which the client must respond.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, wherein the server continues to validate that the client is valid with every message sent.

### Claim 18 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, wherein the server will issue challenges to the client at random intervals that the client must respond to.

### Claim 19 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, wherein the communications device behaves as both a client and a server.
