# US 2016/0241399 A1 · Efficient Privacy-Preserving Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption and Broadcast Encryption

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- Number: US 2016/0241399 A1
- Document ID: US20160241399A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 14/216,202
- Filed: 2014-03-17
- Published: 2016-08-18
- Earliest claimed: 2013-03-15
- Assignees: Arizona Board of Regents on behalf of Arizona State University
- Inventors: Dijiang HUANG; Zhibin ZHOU
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20160241399A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/0833: {involving conference or group key (network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065)}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- H04L 9/3073: {involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing}
- H04L 63/0421: {Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A new construction of CP-ABE, named Privacy Preserving Constant CP-ABE (PPC-CP-ABE) that significantly reduces the ciphertext to a constant size with any given number of attributes is disclosed. PPCCP-ABE leverages a hidden policy construction such that the recipients' privacy is preserved efficiently. A Privacy Preserving Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (PP-AB-BE) scheme is disclosed. PP-AB-BE is flexible because a broadcasted message can be encrypted by an expressive hidden access policy, either with or without explicit specifying the receivers. PP-AB-BE significantly reduces the storage and communication overhead. Also, PP-AB-BE attains minimal bound on storage overhead for each user to cover all possible subgroups in the communication system.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for providing attribute-based encryption of a message comprising:
generating a public key PK and a master key MK, each public key PK being mapped to an attribute value;
generating a private key for a user based on the public key PK, the master key MK and a user's attribute list L;
specifying an access policy W by assigning an attribute for each available attribute; and
producing cyphertext CT utilizing the public key PKs of the attribute values of the access policy W and a message M as input, wherein the ciphertext associates an anonymized access policy W, and wherein only a user with an attribute list L satisfying the access policy W can decrypt the cyphertext CT.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said access policy enforces hidden conjunctive access policies with wildcards in constant ciphertext size.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the user's attribute list L is defined in accordance with the following definition:
Definition 1: A user's attribute list is defined as L={L[i]i ε[1,k]}, where L[i]ε{Ai+, Ai−} and k is the number of attributes in the universe. □

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said method utilizes a hidden AND-gate policy constructed in accordance with the following definition:
Definition 2: Let W={W[i]}iε[1,k] be an AND-gate access policy, where W[i]ε{Ai+, Ai−,Ai*}. We use the notation L|=W to denote that the attribute list L of a user satisfies W, as:
L|=WW⊂L∪{Ai*}iε[i,k].□

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said method utilizes an anonymized AND-gate policy constructed in accordance with the following definition:
Definition 3. Let W=W∩{Ai*}iε[i,k] be an anomymized AND-gate access policy.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein an anonymity set of a blinded policy W is a set of access policies which are identically blinded to W.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising decrypting ciphertext CT using the public key PK, the private key SK of the user and the ciphertext CT if the user's attribute list L satisfies the anonymized access policy W.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, wherein said decryption includes the step of constructing a local guess of access policy {hacek over (W)}.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein said step of constructing a local guess utilizes the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Construct local guess {tilde over (W)}
Initialize {tilde over (W)} = W
for i = 1 to k do
if W[i] == Ai* then
{tilde over (W)}[i] = Lu[i];
end if
end for
return {tilde over (W)};

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said method is utilized for broadcast encryption.

### Claim 11

A method of encrypting a message M for broadcast, comprising:
issuing each user an n-bit binary ID, wherein N represents the number of users and n=log N;
assigning each user bit-assignment attributes to represent bit values in their ID; choosing m descriptive attributes for the system;
generating public and private keys utilizing n and m;
specifying an access policy W utilizing either descriptive attributes or bit-assignment attributes; and
encrypting the message M utilizing an encryption algorithm utilizing public key and the access policy.

### Claim 12

A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a program causing a computer to execute the following process:
generating a public key PK and a master key MK, each public key PK being mapped to an attribute value;
generating a private key for a user based on the public key PK, the master key MK and a user's attribute list L;
specifying an access policy W by assigning an attribute for each available attribute; and
producing cyphertext CT utilizing the public key PKs of the attribute values of the access policy W and a message M as input, wherein the ciphertext associates an anonymized access policy W, and wherein only a user with an attribute list L satisfying the access policy W can decrypt the cyphertext CT.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 12, wherein said access policy enforces hidden conjunctive access policies with wildcards in constant ciphertext size.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 12, wherein the user's attribute list L is defined in accordance with the following definition:
Definition 1: A user's attribute list is defined as L={L[i]iε[1,k]}, where L[i]ε{Ai+, Ai−} and k is the number of attributes in the universe. □

### Claim 15 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 12, wherein said method utilizes a hidden AND-gate policy constructed in accordance with the following definition:
Definition 2. Let W={W[i]}iε[1,k] be an AND-gate access policy, where W[i]ε{Ai+, Ai−, Ai*}. We use the notation L|=W to denote that the attribute list L of a user satisfies W, as:
L|=WW⊂L∪{Ai*}iε[1,k].□

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 12, wherein said method utilizes an anonymized AND-gate policy constructed in accordance with the following definition:
Definition 3. Let W=W∩{Ai*}iε[1,k] be an anomymized AND-gate access policy.

### Claim 17 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 12, wherein an anonymity set of a blinded policy W is a set of access policies which are identically blinded to W.

### Claim 18 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 12, further comprising instructions for decrypting ciphertext CT using the public key PK, the private key SK of the user and the ciphertext CT if the user's attribute list L satisfies the anonymized access policy W.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 18, wherein said decryption includes the step of constructing a local guess of access policy {hacek over (W)}.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 19, wherein said step of constructing a local guess utilizes the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Construct local guess {tilde over (W)}
Initialize {tilde over (W)} = W
for i = 1 to k do
if W[i] == Ai* then
{tilde over (W)}[i] = Lu[i];
end if
end for
return {tilde over (W)};
