# US 2015/0281259 A1 · System and method for strategic anti-malware monitoring

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- Number: US 2015/0281259 A1
- Document ID: US20150281259A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 14/738,216
- Filed: 2015-06-12
- Published: 2015-10-01
- Earliest claimed: 2012-07-05
- Assignees: Tenable Network Security, Inc.
- Applicants: Tenable Network Security, Inc.
- Inventors: Marcus J. Ranum; Ron Gula
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20150281259A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/145: {the attack involving the propagation of malware through the network, e.g. viruses, trojans or worms}
- G06F 16/903: Querying (for retrieval from the web G06F16/953)
- G06F 21/564: {by virus signature recognition}
- H04L 61/4511: using domain name system [DNS]
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04L 63/1433: {Vulnerability analysis}
- H04L 67/02: based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
- H04L 67/10: in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network (software deployment G06F8/60; multiprogramming arrangements G06F9/46)
- G06F 21/56: Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

The system and method described herein may leverage active network scanning and passive network monitoring to provide strategic anti-malware monitoring in a network. In particular, the system and method described herein may remotely connect to managed hosts in a network to compute hashes or other signatures associated with processes running thereon and suspicious files hosted thereon, wherein the hashes may communicated to a cloud database that aggregates all known virus or malware signatures that various anti-virus vendors have catalogued to detect malware infections without requiring the hosts to have a local or resident anti-virus agent. Furthermore, running processes and file system activity may be monitored in the network to further detect malware infections. Additionally, the network scanning and network monitoring may be used to detect hosts that may potentially be participating in an active botnet or hosting botnet content and audit anti-virus strategies deployed in the network.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system for detecting botnet participation in a network, comprising:
one or more scanners configured to identify an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with a remote host in the network, a Domain Name System (DNS) IP address used on the remote host, a source IP address associated with at least one active connection on the remote host, and a destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection; and
one or more processors configured to detect that the remote host participates in a botnet in response to one or more of the IP address associated with the remote host, the DNS IP address used on the remote host, the source IP address associated with the at least one active connection, or the destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection appearing in a list that includes one or more known botnet IP addresses.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system recited in claim 1, wherein:
the one or more scanners are further configured to scan a web application on the remote host and to identify at least one external network address to which the scanned web application points; and
the one or more scanners are further configured to detect that the remote host links to malicious content in response to the at least one external network address to which the scanned web application points corresponding to one or more of an IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses or a DNS name associated with known botnet activity.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The system recited in claim 1, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to:
detect participation in the botnet within the network in response to information describing at least one connection observed in the network indicating that the at least one observed connection has a source IP address or a destination IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses; and
detect participation in the botnet within the network in response to the information describing at least one observed connection indicating that activity associated with the at least one observed connection includes a query to a DNS IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The system recited in claim 3, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to determine whether the detected participation in the botnet originated from a malicious external IP address associated with the botnet or an internal host that reached out to the malicious external IP address associated with the botnet based on the information describing at least one observed connection.

### Claim 5

A method for detecting botnet participation in a network, comprising:
identifying an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with a remote host in the network and a Domain Name System (DNS) IP address used on the remote host;
identifying a source IP address and a destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection on the remote host;
comparing the IP address associated with the remote host, the DNS IP address used on the remote host, the source IP address associated with at least one active connection, and the destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection to a list that includes one or more known botnet IP addresses; and
detecting that the remote host participates in a botnet in response to one or more of the IP address associated with the remote host, the DNS IP address used on the remote host, the source IP address associated with the at least one active connection, or the destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection appearing in the list.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method recited in claim 5, further comprising:
scanning a web application on the remote host;
identifying at least one external network address to which the scanned web application points; and
detecting that the remote host links to malicious content in response to the at least one external network address to which the scanned web application points corresponding to one or more of an IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses or a DNS name associated with known botnet activity.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The method recited in claim 5, further comprising:
detecting participation in the botnet within the network in response to information describing at least one connection observed in the network indicating that the at least one observed connection has a source IP address or a destination IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses; and
detecting participation in the botnet within the network in response to the information describing at least one observed connection indicating that activity associated with the at least one observed connection includes a query to a DNS IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method recited in claim 7, further comprising determining whether the detected participation in the botnet originated from a malicious external IP address associated with the botnet or an internal host that reached out to the malicious external IP address associated with the botnet based on the information describing at least one observed connection.

### Claim 9

A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having computer-executable instructions stored thereon for detecting botnet participation in a network, wherein executing the computer-executable instructions one or more processors causes the one or more processors to:
identify an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with a remote host in the network and a Domain Name System (DNS) IP address used on the remote host;
identify a source IP address and a destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection on the remote host;
compare the IP address associated with the remote host, the DNS IP address used on the remote host, the source IP address associated with at least one active connection, and the destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection to a list that includes one or more known botnet IP addresses; and
detect that the remote host participates in a botnet in response to one or more of the IP address associated with the remote host, the DNS IP address used on the remote host, the source IP address associated with the at least one active connection, or the destination IP address associated with the at least one active connection appearing in the list.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 9, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
scan a web application on the remote host;
identify at least one external network address to which the scanned web application points; and
detect that the remote host links to malicious content in response to the at least one external network address to which the scanned web application points corresponding to one or more of an IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses or a DNS name associated with known botnet activity.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 9, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
detect participation in the botnet within the network in response to information describing at least one connection observed in the network indicating that the at least one observed connection has a source IP address or a destination IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses; and
detect participation in the botnet within the network in response to the information describing at least one observed connection indicating that activity associated with the at least one observed connection includes a query to a DNS IP address that appears in the list that includes the one or more known botnet IP addresses.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 11, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to determine whether the detected participation in the botnet originated from a malicious external IP address associated with the botnet or an internal host that reached out to the malicious external IP address associated with the botnet based on the information describing at least one observed connection.

### Claim 13

A system for strategic anti-malware monitoring in a network, comprising:
one or more scanners configured to identify one or more processes running on a remote host and compute one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host; and
one or more processors configured to:
query a database that stores signatures associated with a plurality of known malware samples that multiple different anti-virus vendors have catalogued using the one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host; and
detect that the remote host has been infected with malware in response to a result from the query indicating that the unique signature associated with at least one of the one or more processes running on the remote host matches the signature associated with at least one known malware sample stored in the database.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The system recited in claim 13, wherein the remote host does not have a local or resident anti-virus agent, and wherein the one or more scanners are further configured to:
upload, to the remote host, a dissolvable agent configured to identify the one or more processes running thereon and compute the unique signatures associated therewith; and
remove the dissolvable agent from the remote host subsequent to the one or more processors querying the database using the one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The system recited in claim 13, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to:
identify one or more additional hosts in the network that are running at least one process having the unique signature associated with the at least one process that matches the signature associated with the at least one known malware sample; and
detect that the one or more additional hosts have been infected with the malware.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The system recited in claim 13, wherein:
the one or more scanners are further configured to compare a file system associated with the remote host to a trusted file system known to have no malware infections and to identify at least one suspicious file in the file system associated with the remote host based on one or more of the at least one suspicious file not appearing in the trusted file system or having a unique signature that differs from a corresponding file in the trusted file system; and
the one or more processors are further configured to detect that the remote host has been infected with malware in response to the unique signature associated with the at least one suspicious file matching the signature associated with the at least one known malware sample stored in the database.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The system recited in claim 13, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to isolate where the malware was introduced into the network and to evaluate an extent to which the malware has propagated or spread throughout the network based on information that describes one or more connections observed in the network and one or more system processes that have occurred in the network.

### Claim 18 (depends on 13)

The system recited in claim 13, wherein the one or more scanners are further configured to examine one or more local or resident anti-virus agents deployed in the network to audit an anti-malware strategy deployed in the network and evaluate whether the audited anti-malware strategy provides appropriate protection against virus or malware outbreaks in the network.

### Claim 19

A method for strategic anti-malware monitoring in a network, comprising:
identifying one or more processes running on a remote host in the network;
computing one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host;
querying a database that stores signatures associated with a plurality of known malware samples that multiple different anti-virus vendors have catalogued using the one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host; and
detecting that the remote host has been infected with malware in response to a result from the query indicating that the unique signature associated with at least one of the one or more processes running on the remote host matches the signature associated with at least one known malware sample stored in the database.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The method recited in claim 19, wherein the remote host does not have a local or resident anti-virus agent and the method further comprises:
uploading, to the remote host, a dissolvable agent configured to identify the one or more processes running thereon and compute the unique signatures associated therewith; and
removing the dissolvable agent from the remote host subsequent to querying the database using the one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host.

### Claim 21 (depends on 19)

The method recited in claim 19, further comprising:
identifying one or more additional hosts in the network that are running at least one process having the unique signature associated with the at least one process that matches the signature associated with the at least one known malware sample; and
detecting that the one or more additional hosts have been infected with the malware.

### Claim 22 (depends on 19)

The method recited in claim 19, further comprising:
comparing a file system associated with the remote host to a trusted file system known to have no malware infections;
identifying at least one suspicious file in the file system associated with the remote host based on one or more of the at least one suspicious file not appearing in the trusted file system or having a different unique signature from a corresponding file in the trusted file system; and
detecting that the remote host has been infected with the malware in response to the different unique signature associated with the at least one suspicious file matching the signature associated with the at least one known malware sample stored in the database.

### Claim 23 (depends on 19)

The method recited in claim 19, further comprising:
isolating where the malware was introduced into the network; and
evaluating an extent to which the malware has propagated or spread throughout the network based on information that describes one or more connections observed in the network and one or more system processes that have occurred in the network.

### Claim 24 (depends on 19)

The method recited in claim 19, further comprising:
examining one or more local or resident anti-virus agents deployed in the network to audit an anti-malware strategy deployed in the network; and
evaluating whether the audited anti-malware strategy provides appropriate protection against virus or malware outbreaks in the network.

### Claim 25

A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having computer-executable instructions stored thereon for strategic anti-malware monitoring in a network, wherein executing the computer-executable instructions one or more processors causes the one or more processors to:
identify one or more processes running on a remote host in the network;
compute one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host;
query a database that stores signatures associated with a plurality of known malware samples that multiple different anti-virus vendors have catalogued using the one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host; and
detect that the remote host has been infected with malware in response to a result from the query indicating that the unique signature associated with at least one of the one or more processes running on the remote host matches the signature associated with at least one known malware sample stored in the database.

### Claim 26 (depends on 25)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 25, wherein the remote host does not have a local or resident anti-virus agent, and wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
upload, to the remote host, a dissolvable agent configured to identify the one or more processes running thereon and compute the unique signatures associated therewith; and
remove the dissolvable agent from the remote host subsequent to querying the database using the one or more unique signatures associated with the one or more processes running on the remote host.

### Claim 27 (depends on 25)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 25, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
identify one or more additional hosts in the network that are running at least one process having the unique signature associated with the at least one process that matches the signature associated with the at least one known malware sample; and
detect that the one or more additional hosts have been infected with the malware.

### Claim 28 (depends on 25)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 25, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
compare a file system associated with the remote host to a trusted file system known to have no malware infections;
identify at least one suspicious file in the file system associated with the remote host based on one or more of the at least one suspicious file not appearing in the trusted file system or having a different unique signature from a corresponding file in the trusted file system; and
detect that the remote host has been infected with the malware in response to the different unique signature associated with the at least one suspicious file matching the signature associated with the at least one known malware sample stored in the database.

### Claim 29 (depends on 25)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 25, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
isolate where the malware was introduced into the network; and
evaluate an extent to which the malware has propagated or spread throughout the network based on information that describes one or more connections observed in the network and one or more system processes that have occurred in the network.

### Claim 30 (depends on 25)

The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium recited in claim 25, wherein the executed computer-executable instructions further cause the one or more processors to:
examine one or more local or resident anti-virus agents deployed in the network to audit an anti-malware strategy deployed in the network; and
evaluate whether the audited anti-malware strategy provides appropriate protection against virus or malware outbreaks in the network.
