# US 2015/0106616 A1 · Systems and Methods for "Machine-to-Machine" (M2M) Communications Between Modules, Servers, and an Application using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

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- Number: US 2015/0106616 A1
- Document ID: US20150106616A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 14/055,606
- Filed: 2013-10-16
- Published: 2015-04-16
- Earliest claimed: 2013-10-16
- Assignees: M2M and IoT Technologies, LLC
- Inventors: John A. Nix
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20150106616A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- G06F 21/35: communicating wirelessly
- G06F 21/445: {by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs}
- H04J 11/00: Orthogonal multiplex systems, {e.g. using WALSH codes}(H04J13/00 takes precedence)
- H04L 9/006: {involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models (network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/0816: {Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use}
- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- H04L 9/085: {Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes}
- H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3066: {involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves}
- H04L 9/32: including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system {or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials}
- H04L 9/321: {involving a third party or a trusted authority}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3249: {using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 12/2854: {Wide area networks, e.g. public data networks}
- H04L 63/0272: {Virtual private networks}
- H04L 63/0435: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06)}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 63/045: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14)}
- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04L 63/0807: {using tickets, e.g. Kerberos (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213)}
- H04L 63/123: {received data contents, e.g. message integrity}
- H04L 63/166: {at the transport layer}
- H04L 67/04: specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
- H04W 4/70: Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
- H04W 8/082: {for traffic bypassing of mobility servers, e.g. location registers, home PLMNs or home agents}
- H04W 12/02: Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
- H04W 12/033: of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
- H04W 12/04: Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W 12/06: Authentication
- H04W 12/069: using certificates or pre-shared keys
- H04W 12/40: Security arrangements using identity modules
- H04W 40/005: {Routing actions in the presence of nodes in sleep or doze mode}
- H04W 52/0216: {using a pre-established activity schedule, e.g. traffic indication frame}
- H04W 52/0235: {where the received signal is a power saving command}
- H04W 52/0277: {according to available power supply, e.g. switching off when a low battery condition is detected}
- H04W 76/27: Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
- H04W 80/04: Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
- G06F 2221/2105: Dual mode as a secondary aspect
- G06F 2221/2107: File encryption
- G06F 2221/2115: Third party
- H04L 63/0464: {using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it}
- H04L 2209/24: Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
- H04L 2209/72: Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
- H04L 2209/805: Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
- H04W 84/12: WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
- H04W 88/12: Access point controller devices
- Y02D 30/70: in wireless communication networks
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04J: MULTIPLEX COMMUNICATION (transmission in general H04B; peculiar to transmission of digital information H04L5/00; systems for the simultaneous or sequential transmission of more than one television signal H04N7/08; in exchanges H04Q11/00; stereophonic systems H04S)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- Y02D: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE

## Abstract

Methods and systems are provided for supporting efficient and secure “Machine-to-Machine” (M2M) communications using a module, a server, and an application. A module can communicate with the server by accessing the Internet, and the module can include a sensor and/or an actuator. The module, server, and application can utilize public key infrastructure (PKI) such as public keys and private keys. The module can internally derive pairs of private/public keys using cryptographic algorithms and a first set of parameters. A server can authenticate the submission of derived public keys and an associated module identity. The server can use a first server private key and a second set of parameters to (i) send module data to the application and (ii) receive module instructions from the application. The server can use a second server private key and the first set of parameters to communicate with the module.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for supporting machine-to-machine communications, the method performed by a server, the method comprising:
authenticating a first message, wherein the first message includes a first module public key and a module identity;
receiving a module instruction and the module identity from an application server;
waiting to receive a second message that includes the module identity before sending the module instruction in a server encrypted data;
receiving the second message, wherein the second message includes a module encrypted data and a source Internet protocol address and port (IP:port) number;
sending a response to the source IP:port number, wherein the response includes the server encrypted data, wherein the server encrypted data is ciphered using the first module public key, and wherein the server encrypted data includes the module instruction and a security token; and,
authenticating a third message using the first module public key, wherein the third message includes a second module public key and the module identity.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein a module using the module identity sends the first, second, and third messages, wherein the module includes a set of cryptographic algorithms to derive (i) the first module public key and a first module private key and (ii) the second module public key and a second module private key, and wherein before receiving the third message, the server sends an instruction for the module to derive the second module public key.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising decrypting at least one of (i) the first module public key in the first message and the (ii) the second module public key in the third message.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, further comprising decrypting a set of parameters in at least one of the first message and the third message, wherein the set of parameters include at least one of (i) an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) named curve, (ii) an ECC defining equation, and (iii) a modulus for an RSA algorithm.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein authenticating further comprises using at least one of (i) a message digest, (ii) a symmetric key, (iii) a shared secret key, (iv) a module digital signature, and (v) a secure connection.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the module instruction received from the application server is decrypted using a first server public key, wherein the first server public key is processed using an RSA algorithm, wherein the server encrypted data is encrypted using a second server public key, and wherein the second server public key is processed using an ECC algorithm.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the module identity in the first message comprises a first string, and wherein the module identity in the second message comprises a second string, and wherein the first string and the second string are associated with a serial number of a module.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein ciphering the server encrypted data using the first module public key further comprises ciphering the server encrypted data with a symmetric key, wherein the symmetric key is shared by using at least one of (i) the first module public key and a key derivation function, (ii) an asymmetric ciphering algorithm and the first module public key to encrypt the symmetric key, wherein the server sends the symmetric key, and (iii) a module digital signature verified with the module public key, wherein the server receives the symmetric key and the module digital signature.

### Claim 9

A method for supporting machine-to-machine communications, the method performed by a server, the method comprising:
authenticating a first message, wherein the first message includes a first module public key and a module identity;
receiving a second message, wherein the second message includes the module identity and a module encrypted data, wherein the module encrypted data includes a sensor measurement and a security token;
reading the sensor measurement by decrypting the module encrypted data using a first server private key;
using a secure connection and a second server private key to send the sensor measurement and the module identity to an application server; and,
authenticating a third message; wherein the third message includes a second module public key and the module identity;

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein decrypting the module encrypted data using the first server private key further comprises decrypting the module encrypted data using a symmetric key, wherein the symmetric key is shared by at least one of (i) sending the symmetric key and a server digital signature, wherein the server digital signature is processed using the first server private key, and (ii) using a key derivation function and the first server private key.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein decrypting the module encrypted data using the first server private key further comprises, in sequence:
receiving a symmetric key that is encrypted using an asymmetric ciphering algorithm;
using the first server private key to decrypt the symmetric key; and,
decrypting the sensor measurement using the symmetric key.

### Claim 12 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein authenticating the first message further comprises using at least one of (i) a message digest, (ii) a symmetric key, (iii) a shared secret key, (iv) a module digital signature, and (v) a secure connection.

### Claim 13 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein a module using the module identity sends the first, second, and third messages, wherein the module includes a set of cryptographic algorithms to derive (i) the first module public key and a first module private key and (ii) the second module public key and a second module private key, and wherein before receiving the third message, the server sends an instruction for the module to derive the second module public key.

### Claim 14 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the module identity in the first message comprises a first string, and wherein the module identity in the second message comprises a second string, and wherein the first string and the second string are associated with a serial number of a module.

### Claim 15 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, further comprising decrypting at least one of (i) the first module public key in the first message and the (ii) the second module public key in the third message.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The method of claim 15, further comprising decrypting a set of parameters in at least one of the first message and the third message, wherein the set of parameters include at least one of (i) an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) named curve, (ii) an ECC defining equation, and (iii) a modulus for an RSA algorithm.

### Claim 17 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, further comprising processing (i) the first server private key using an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm, (ii) the second server private key using an RSA algorithm.

### Claim 18

A system for supporting machine-to-machine communications, the system comprising:
a set of cryptographic algorithms for using (i) a first server private key with a first set of parameters and (ii) a second server private key with a second set of parameters, and for authenticating a first message, wherein the first message includes a module public key and a module identity;
a module controller for sending a server digital signature processed using the first server private key, for receiving a module encrypted data and the module identity, wherein the module encrypted data includes a sensor measurement and a security token, for using a symmetric key to decrypt the module encrypted data, for using the module public key and the first set of parameters to verify a module digital signature, for sending a module instruction within a server encrypted data, and for waiting until after (a) receiving a second message which includes the module identity and a source Internet protocol address and port (IP:port) number before (b) sending the module instruction to the source IP:port number; and,
a server program for establishing a secure connection with an application using the second server private key and the second set of parameters, for sending the sensor measurement and the module identity to the application via the secure connection, and for receiving the module instruction from the application;

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, further comprising a module with the module identity for sending the first message and the second message, wherein the module derives the module public key and a module private key using the first set of parameters.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The system of claim 19, wherein the module controller sends (i) the first set of parameters and (ii) an instruction for the module to derive the module public key and the module private key, before the module sends the first message.

### Claim 21 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, further comprising the cryptographic algorithms for decrypting at least one of the first module public key and the first set of parameters, wherein the first set of parameters include at least one of (i) an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) named curve, (ii) an ECC defining equation, and (iii) a modulus for an RSA algorithm.

### Claim 22 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, wherein the secure connection with the application comprises at least one of (i) a transport layer security (TLS) connection, (ii) an IPSec connection, and (iii) a virtual private network (VPN) between a server and the application server, and wherein the server includes the module controller and the server application.

### Claim 23 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, wherein the first set of parameters is associated with an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithm, and wherein the second set of parameters is associated with an RSA algorithm.

### Claim 24 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18, further comprising the cryptographic algorithms for authenticating the first message using at least one of (i) a message digest, (ii) a shared secret key, and (iii) a module digital signature.
